Does the fact that many non-human animals have pituitary disprove Cartesian Dualism?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

It’s not derailing at all. In fact, it’s a very pertinent question. 

Boru

So, you are a rationalist rather than an empiricist? You think that the more our philosophy looks like the Euclid's Elements, the better? Well, I am telling you, that way of thinking is useful in geometry, but almost everywhere else though, it leads us nowhere.

Some arguments for fish not feeling pain are "It appears as though type-c neurofibres are necessary to feel pain, because people with congenital analgesia have a smaller proportion of the type-c neurofibers. And fish have little or no type-c neurofibers." and "Fishes with a hole in their fin continue swimming as normal.". Completely empirical, not trying to rationalistically define pain.

I can be either an empirical rationalist or a rational empiricist. You choose.

But, given the whole ‘do fish feel pain’ thingy, I’d have to come down on the rationalist side, since there’s no empirical way to know how the fish feels about it.

Boru

[Belacqua]

No, I am not claiming that dogs and cats don't feel pain, I am being critical of that claim. Descartes famously argued that no animal except human beings feel pain. In my opinion, that suggestion was ridiculous back then, and it's even more ridiculous now.

Whether animals with much simpler brains than cats and dogs, such as fishes or insects, can feel pain is another question entirely.

It makes sense to me that animals feel pain. They certainly react as if they do.

The difference is that when animals feel pain they react according to instinct. They yell, or run, or hide, or lick the wound, or whatever they do. 

Humans feel the pain and they also think about it with concepts. So you'll go very quickly through the process of "Ouch, what's that, something's wrong." You might judge that the thing that hurt you shouldn't have done it. Or you'll be angry that you weren't more careful. You might remember another time you were hurt, or you might get morbid thoughts about the fragility of life. You might get pissed off that you have to stop and take the day off due to migraine, and then life seems unfair. 

So when people feel pain -- or have some other bad physical thing going on -- they don't just feel that thing. They also have lots of accompanying thoughts. These thoughts could be for the better (e.g. "I'd better get this thing checked out"). Or they might make things more depressing (e.g. "Why did God do this to me?").

[Anomalocaris]

What does “feel uncomfortable” mean?       Is there a subjective experience, or does it merely require a reaction?

Subjective experience, of course.

So it seems to prove some creature can feel discomfort or pain, and not just react to stimuli that we humans, projecting ourselfs, liken to discomfort or pain, we need to show the creature can contextualize the stimuli into a mental construct of self. 

What evidence would suggest a creature has a mental construct of self into which it can contextualize experience and stimuli?

[FlatAssembler]

So, you are a rationalist rather than an empiricist? You think that the more our philosophy looks like the Euclid's Elements, the better? Well, I am telling you, that way of thinking is useful in geometry, but almost everywhere else though, it leads us nowhere.

Some arguments for fish not feeling pain are "It appears as though type-c neurofibres are necessary to feel pain, because people with congenital analgesia have a smaller proportion of the type-c neurofibers. And fish have little or no type-c neurofibers." and "Fishes with a hole in their fin continue swimming as normal.". Completely empirical, not trying to rationalistically define pain.

I can be either an empirical rationalist or a rational empiricist. You choose.

But, given the whole ‘do fish feel pain’ thingy, I’d have to come down on the rationalist side, since there’s no empirical way to know how the fish feels about it.

Boru

Oh, really? The empirical fact that fish with a hole in their fin continue swimming normally doesn't suggest that they don't feel pain? Or the empirical fact that they have little or no type-c neurofibers which human beings need to feel pain?

[FlatAssembler]

Subjective experience, of course.

So it seems to prove some creature can feel discomfort or pain, and not just react to stimuli that we humans, projecting ourselfs, liken to discomfort or pain, we need to show the creature can contextualize the stimuli into a mental construct of self. 

What evidence would suggest a creature has a mental construct of self into which it can contextualize experience and stimuli?

Bur the problem is that fish don't even do that. Fish with a hole in their fin continue swimming normally.

There is also neuroanatomical evidence. Fish have little or no type-c neurofibers, which human beings need in order to feel pain.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

I can be either an empirical rationalist or a rational empiricist. You choose.

But, given the whole ‘do fish feel pain’ thingy, I’d have to come down on the rationalist side, since there’s no empirical way to know how the fish feels about it.

Boru

Oh, really? The empirical fact that fish with a hole in their fin continue swimming normally doesn't suggest that they don't feel pain? Or the empirical fact that they have little or no type-c neurofibers which human beings need to feel pain?

No, the hole-in-the-fin thing doesn't suggest anything about pain. Due to the presence of nociceptors and the fact that injured fish exhibit behavioural changes that are alleviated with painkillers, it's likely that fish do feel pain.

But we still don't know if what the fish feels is what we mean when we say 'I feel pain'. We can know, empirically, that fish respond to noxious stimuli. But whether this response is the same (from the fish's perspective) as my response when I hit my thumb with a hammer can only be approached rationally, since we can't really ask the fish about it.

Boru

[FlatAssembler]

Oh, really? The empirical fact that fish with a hole in their fin continue swimming normally doesn't suggest that they don't feel pain? Or the empirical fact that they have little or no type-c neurofibers which human beings need to feel pain?

No, the hole-in-the-fin thing doesn't suggest anything about pain. Due to the presence of nociceptors and the fact that injured fish exhibit behavioural changes that are alleviated with painkillers, it's likely that fish do feel pain.

But we still don't know if what the fish feels is what we mean when we say 'I feel pain'. We can know, empirically, that fish respond to noxious stimuli. But whether this response is the same (from the fish's perspective) as my response when I hit my thumb with a hammer can only be approached rationally, since we can't really ask the fish about it.

Boru

Most fish do have nociceptors (though sharks don't), but nociceptors are not enough to feel pain. At least in human beings, type-c neurofibers are also necessary (and fish have little or no type-c neurofibers). So is the interaction between quite a few parts of the brain that fish don't have. As for fish responding to painkillers, James D. Rose tried to replicate some experiments that supposedly show that and he failed to replicate them.

[Anomalocaris]

We know humans with some form of brain damage, for example from carbon monoxide poisoning, can continue to react to damage, but have no conscious perception of either the pain or of the reaction, even though they clearly are conscious and do otherwise have normal conscious perceptions of other senses or of their own actions..   These humans still have all the neurological structures of normal humans who do have conscious perceptions of pain.

So associating conscious perception of pain to existence of particular neurological macrostructures seems problematic.

Similar observations that brain damage can cause conscious individual to retain the ability to react to other sensory inouts, such as sight, but deprive them of conscious perception of the these senses, as exemplified by the condition called blind sight, also suggest identifying whether a different animal actually has a conscious perception of pain can be quite problematic.

[The Grand Nudger]

IDK if the things listed are reasons it's problematic. If damage to specific structures causes these issues, then it's safe to say that such structures are indeed required..and required to be intact and functioning, in order to feel what we call pain.

[Anomalocaris]

IDK if the things listed are reasons it's problematic.  If damage to specific structures causes these issues, then it's safe to say that such structures are indeed required..and required to be intact and functioning, in order to feel what we call pain.

the fact that brain damage leads to loss of specific aspects of the conscious perception shows conscious perception arises out of circuits in the brain damaged.    the problem is it is difficult to map specific losses to specific damage.    

so when we see a structure in a different animal seemingly analogous to parts of human brain responsible for consciousness, we can’t use analogy to infer the extent of the consciousness.    so the fact that another animal appears to have a structure in the brain analogous to areas the support consciousness in humans, it certainly does not prove or even strongly indicate that animal is conscious of the same things as we humans, such as pain, or even their visual environment.

if there is even hint of some capability analogous to consciousness in humans then the consciousness must be quite like ours is anthropomorphic projection.