Does the fact that many non-human animals have pituitary disprove Cartesian Dualism?

[The Grand Nudger]

Present and damaged, as you lead in with. It's actually pretty easy to come up with a sound and valid syllogism for those circumstances. At any rate "some conscious perception" is probably all that an animal rights type would require.

Both sides of the issue make arguments from homologies (both structural and behavioral). Either that they exist, or are lacking. The dispute is not in whether or not this would suggest or imply or strongly indicate x, but which of two competing propositions about their existence is true.

[Anomalocaris]

the fact that observable damage could not be correlated to specific symptoms says overall resemblance aside, we do not have a strong ability to deduce the actual organ capability from the appearance of the organ.

[The Grand Nudger]

Which is why we look for homologies in structure and behavior. If something has homologous structures that we know are involved in pain with us, and acts like us in response to the same stimuli, it's a fair bet it's going through something similar. Or it's just one gigantic well demonstrated co-ink-e-dink.

Let's drop the interspecies comparisons, though, since I guess that's what seems controversial? This line of reasoning is the basis for our conclusion that other people are "really there", too...rather than being bioautomata. If it's fair of me to suggest that you feel pain, it's fair of me to suggest that homologies are instructive. If you think it would be ridiculous of me to doubt whether or not you feel pain, then homologies are instructive.

Or...we may be the same species, with the same structures and the same behaviors...and maybe the same types of changes are recorded when we suffer the same types of damage...but that's all just a giant well demonstrated co-ink-e-dink and it would not be fair to suggest that you feel pain, because homologies are not instructive.

[Anomalocaris]

behavior in animals that can’t talk back is hard to pin down to consciousness and not reflex.   A person with blind sight can navigate a crowded corridor with every appearance of conscious awareness and his surroundings without the conscious person, being aware at all of what he is doing, and what is surrounding in which he’s doing this, and this is in a human with demonstrable consciousness. Now to say that an animal consciously feel pain, merely because he has an organ that we think is responsible for some form of consciousness humans is a stretch.

I suspect creatures like chimpanzees and dolphins do actually have a concept of self, based on the fact that they seem to be able to grasp the image of themselves in a mirror is, in fact, they themselves, and not just another member of their species. However, to assume that having the consciousness imported by a concept of self means it is therefore conscious of exactly the same things that we are is also a stretch

[The Grand Nudger]

There are fish that pass mirror tests. That, btw, is a homology, so you do appear to believe that homologies are instructive. Perhaps things like chimps and dolphins pass mirror tests but it's just a coincidence. They don't actually have any sense of self.

Mind you, I'm not arguing that the matter of whether a given animal has x is settled, I'm just trying to pin down some of the stranger missteps. Like believing that a mirror test gives us good reason to suspect that chimps and dolphins have a sense of self because they pass mirror tests, but not a fish when it passes a mirror test. Conversely, that we know specific structures are required for "human pain" that are either absent or in very short supply in fish - and yet we still suggest they feel such pain.

As a fun aside, I'm not sure that fish being able to talk would be any more useful than people being able to talk. We lie to researchers. Like...alot.

[Anomalocaris]

Apparent homologies can only be considered potentially useful as a guide to deeper similarities in operation if there aren’t already countervailing evidence to show the appearance of homologies are superficial, and do not in fact reflect more fundamental similarity in the operation.

The evidence of the preservation of the appearance of homology when operations change shows the homologies are superficial and do not reflect more fundamental similarity in the operation.

[The Grand Nudger]

Well..... then. You're bioautomata. I remain human. Our apparent similarities are not indicative of actual similarity. I have no reason to believe that you are anything like me.