Atheism and Ethics

[Lucian]

Christians say alot of things about their god, most of it nonsense.  There may be something wrong with them that no amount of discussion can fix.

That is certainly an approach I could take, but I don’t want to be dismissive of all my Christian friends, or all Christians in general. It would be good to have a coherent worldview of my own to offer in place of Christianity rather than just tell them they are wrong

[The Grand Nudger]

It may be all you can do, in the end. Sort of wound in to the hypothetical setup. You've got a christian who believes in objective morality if there's a god..and doesn't believe in an objective morality if there isn't. That's the antithesis of a coherent worldview and literal nonsense. Sometimes people are just wrong and there's not much more you can say about it because they're wrong in such a simple way there really isn't anything left after the simple explanation.

Brings me back to that q you asked. Whether we care if a statement is accurate or whether we care if we're moral by any metric is, I think, dispositional and fundamentally subjective. Not argued into place. So lets say you point out that your friend is spouting literal nonsense. If that's true - will your friend actually care?

[Lucian]

It may be all you can do, in the end.  Sort of wound in to the hypothetical setup.  You've got a christian who believes in objective morality if there's a god..and doesn't believe in an objective morality if there isn't.  That's the antithesis of a coherent worldview and literal nonsense.  Sometimes people are just wrong and there's not much more you can say about it because they're wrong in such a simple way there really isn't anything left after the simple explanation.

Brings me back to that q you asked.  Whether we care if a statement is accurate or whether we care if we're moral by any metric is, I think, dispositional and fundamentally subjective.  Not argued into place.  So lets say you point out that your friend is spouting literal nonsense.  If that's true - will your friend actually care?

I don’t disagree with you that this is the case with some people, and my friend I genuinely believe is one of them. That said; not all my friends are though and some are willing to accept where they have bad arguments even if it doesn’t change their wider beliefs. Perhaps it would just make them accept atheism as a more tenable position, and treat it more seriously than they do now. 

But still further, I care what I should believe. If there is good reason to believe that there are objective morals then in some sense I would prefer that to the view that there aren’t. I happen to think there aren’t and am an error theorist at the moment, but haven’t read widely enough . As mentioned in the other thread you commented on, I am new to actually adopting the position that there are no gods, rather than shrugging my shoulders about everything and simply not having a belief in them. It would be nice to have a coherent worldview for myself, and that includes how I think about morality.

[The Grand Nudger]

Error theory, like objectivism, wouldn't be more or less accurate based on whether or not there are gods...but it also seems as though our level of compulsion is not necessarily affected by the accuracy (or purported accuracy) of fact statements. As an error theorist you likely still feel compelled by at least some moral fact statements...even though you suspect that they're all false.

They can be true and we may say so what - like a christian who acknowledges their arguments are poor but doesn't change their beliefs to reflect that...or they may all be false and we're still compelled - like you..explicitly..or myself..implicitly.

[Lucian]

Error theory, like objectivism, wouldn't be more or less accurate based on whether or not there are gods...but it also seems as though our level of compulsion is not necessarily affected by the accuracy (or purported accuracy) of fact statements.  As an error theorist you likely still feel compelled by at least some moral fact statements...even though you suspect that they're all false.

Yep, I absolutely feel compelled by some moral feelings (however I parse that) and think that there are good evolutionary reasons why I would. I happen to think trying to get rid of these probably isn’t possible, even for just me, let alone the entire population. So I struggle with the Now What Problem of moral error theory. More reading to do
Currently I think that belief in moral properties has had some good effect on societies, especially when smaller. That they also have bad effects is also clear to me with views on women’s role in society, sexual morality etc. if we didn’t believe that some things were based on objective properties then perhaps these issues wouldn’t have been as difficult to revise. I am pretty ignorant on all this though

They can be true and we may say so what - like a christian who acknowledges their arguments are poor but doesn't change their beliefs to reflect that...or they may all be false and we're still compelled - like you..explicitly..or myself..implicitly.

The “so what” problem is more than just an argumentative turn in my opinion. It is a question about what it is that makes moral properties somehow motivating or binding as a standard. Rather than just being a fact that our behaviour can approximate to some degree or another, how are these properties relevant to me if I don’t care about them. Also how is it that I am somehow bad if I don’t feel bothered with them and act otherwise. I don’t see that such a thing exists, but that could be a failure in my imagination

[Silver]

You have to judge each situation differently. Just an example I recently saw reiterated: If you are not feeling bad about the harm done to others, and you think there is nothing wrong with you, then this is an issue in how you are mentally wired.

The more common example is when a parent cannot see beyond himself to comprehend the hurt he is causing to his child. Instead, the selfish parent whines, "Why is my kid doing this to me?"

[Questor]

It may be all you can do, in the end.  Sort of wound in to the hypothetical setup.  You've got a christian who believes in objective morality if there's a god..and doesn't believe in an objective morality if there isn't.  That's the antithesis of a coherent worldview and literal nonsense.  Sometimes people are just wrong and there's not much more you can say about it because they're wrong in such a simple way there really isn't anything left after the simple explanation.

Brings me back to that q you asked.  Whether we care if a statement is accurate or whether we care if we're moral by any metric is, I think, dispositional and fundamentally subjective.  Not argued into place.  So lets say you point out that your friend is spouting literal nonsense.  If that's true - will your friend actually care?

Many xtians are not able to admit that what they believe could be considered nonsense, at least to those who do not subscribe to the same underlying belief structure. Thus, when told that they are spouting nonsense, cannot rustle up a coherant answer. They will state that you are wrong, or that you are an idiot, or get rather red in the face, and huff and puff.

Caring about the accuracy of a statement, though . . . is that not a moral question?

[Questor]

Error theory, like objectivism, wouldn't be more or less accurate based on whether or not there are gods...but it also seems as though our level of compulsion is not necessarily affected by the accuracy (or purported accuracy) of fact statements.  As an error theorist you likely still feel compelled by at least some moral fact statements...even though you suspect that they're all false.

Yep, I absolutely feel compelled by some moral feelings (however I parse that) and think that there are good evolutionary reasons why I would. I happen to think trying to get rid of these probably isn’t possible, even for just me, let alone the entire population. So I struggle with the Now What Problem of moral error theory. More reading to do
Currently I think that belief in moral properties has had some good effect on societies, especially when smaller. That they also have bad effects is also clear to me with views on women’s role in society, sexual morality etc. if we didn’t believe that some things were based on objective properties then perhaps these issues wouldn’t have been as difficult to revise. I am pretty ignorant on all this though

They can be true and we may say so what - like a christian who acknowledges their arguments are poor but doesn't change their beliefs to reflect that...or they may all be false and we're still compelled - like you..explicitly..or myself..implicitly.

The “so what” problem is more than just an argumentative turn in my opinion. It is a question about what it is that makes moral properties somehow motivating or binding as a standard. Rather than just being a fact that our behaviour can approximate to some degree or another, how are these properties relevant to me if I don’t care about them. Also how is it that I am somehow bad if I don’t feel bothered with them and act otherwise. I don’t see that such a thing exists, but that could be a failure in my imagination

Surely it is societal standards and the resultant peer pressure that makes moral properties both motivating and binding. To belong to any societal group would surely affect one's behavior, due to its effect on one's ability to succeed within the group, would it not?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

It may be all you can do, in the end.  Sort of wound in to the hypothetical setup.  You've got a christian who believes in objective morality if there's a god..and doesn't believe in an objective morality if there isn't.  That's the antithesis of a coherent worldview and literal nonsense.  Sometimes people are just wrong and there's not much more you can say about it because they're wrong in such a simple way there really isn't anything left after the simple explanation.

Brings me back to that q you asked.  Whether we care if a statement is accurate or whether we care if we're moral by any metric is, I think, dispositional and fundamentally subjective.  Not argued into place.  So lets say you point out that your friend is spouting literal nonsense.  If that's true - will your friend actually care?

Many xtians are not able to admit that what they believe could be considered nonsense, at least to those who do not subscribe to the same underlying belief structure. Thus, when told that they are spouting nonsense, cannot rustle up a coherant answer. They will state that you are wrong, or that you are an idiot, or get rather red in the face, and huff and puff.

Caring about the accuracy of a statement, though . . . is that not a moral question?

Much like maaminim, then.

Boru

[Lucian]

You have to judge each situation differently. Just an example I recently saw reiterated: If you are not feeling bad about the harm done to others, and you think there is nothing wrong with you, then this is an issue in how you are mentally wired.

The more common example is when a parent cannot see beyond himself to comprehend the hurt he is causing to his child. Instead, the selfish parent whines, "Why is my kid doing this to me?"

I definitely feel bad about harm done to others, and have the same attitudes towards theft and a lot of other issues as most other people. An error theory of morality doesn’t necessarily entail a change to the things we want to happen in the world, although some abolitionists would say it could. I am deliberately not focussing on my views as am trying to get at what moral realists believe. When I ask “why care” though, it is about what makes moral facts differ from other facts, it is more of a hypothetical.

 Surely it is societal standards and the resultant peer pressure that makes moral properties both motivating and binding. To belong to any societal group would surely affect one's behavior, due to its effect on one's ability to succeed within the group, would it not?

Yes, I think socialisation and peer pressure is a key factor and why moral thinking has been successful in human evolution. That said, that doesn’t seem to necessarily result from any distinct property that we have to hypothesise as moral properties, on top of just the natural / descriptive set of facts. If the motivational and binding force is outside the claimed moral properties themselves, then the “so what” question still arises for me when thinking about those properties just shifted a level. Why should society care about these properties?