“Normative” ethical theories

[The Grand Nudger]

Retribution and anti-retribution being an issue of desert and not nature I'd have to recommend shelly kagan. The Geometry of Desert, specifically.

I'm an over praise under punish guy, because I believe it to be more coercive than the other combinations. That's my pragmatic theory of what to do after a moral question has been answered, rightly or wrongly, in any system. Mind, that's what I would do facing outward, to other people. Myself, under praise over punish. Externally permissive internally restrictive.

This arrangement ought to be familiar to lapsed and cultural catholics. We call it the shame wizard in this house. To wit - "Assume positive intent on the part of everyone else you degenerate fuck." Sounds trite and funny when I put it that way, but I'm underselling it in my own experience. Failing at that is the single most consequential thing I've ever done in my life or in anyone else's, and the outcomes were as bad as they get for everyone involved...and worse for the other guys than they were for me....though it came pretty damned close to the same outcome for us both. The trifecta. Long story short I pulled a trigger I shouldn't have, morally speaking and according to me. I eventually tried to do the same to myself, and failed by pure chance - dud round. That rippled throughout my life every day up to today. Ruined marriage, absentee parent, abandoned friendships, a loss of fundamental purpose and confidence, addiction issues, financial hardship.

Pragmatically speaking, avoid that. Never do your worst..whatever that may be and however you have it, and if you do... back off, don't double down.

[Lucian]

Retribution and anti-retribution being an issue of desert and not nature I'd have to recommend shelly kagan.  The Geometry of Desert, specifically.  

I'm an over praise under punish guy, because I believe it to be more coercive than the other combinations.  That's my pragmatic theory of what to do after a moral question has been answered, rightly or wrongly, in any system.  Mind, that's what I would do facing outward, to other people.  Myself, under praise over punish.   Externally permissive internally restrictive.

This arrangement ought to be familiar to lapsed and cultural catholics.  We call it the shame wizard in this house.  To wit -  "Assume positive intent on the part of everyone else you degenerate fuck."  Sounds trite and funny when I put it that way, but I'm underselling it in my own experience.  Failing at that is the single most consequential thing I've ever done in my life or in anyone else's, and the outcomes were as bad as they get for everyone involved...and worse for the other guys than they were for me....though it came pretty damned close to the same outcome for us both.  The trifecta.  Long story short I pulled a trigger I shouldn't have, morally speaking and according to me.  I eventually tried to do the same to myself, and failed by pure chance - dud round.  That rippled throughout my life every day up to today.  Ruined marriage, absentee parent, abandoned friendships, a loss of fundamental purpose and confidence, addiction issues, financial hardship.  

Pragmatically speaking, avoid that.  Never do your worst..whatever that may be and however you have it, and if you do... back off, don't double down.

Great answer and thanks for the personal stuff - sounds rough as hell.

[Lucian]

I am still interested in explicit philosophical ethical theories. I will look up pragmatist stuff and the geometry of desert, I currently don’t believe in such a thing so will be interesting to grapple with.

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, that's the fun thing about quasi realist expressivism and it's confluence with prgamatic ethics. OFC you have genuinely held beliefs on moral desert, even if, intellectually, you think you are or suspect that you may be wrong on a fact-basis. That those beliefs and opinions are not actually grounded in truth apt statements but may change or be changed for explicitly truth apt reasons, non truth apt reasons, or no reason at all. Pragmatism in and of itself makes no comment on the nature of -those- beliefs, and you'll find a pragmatic theory of every variant..because regardless of the second order questions and their answers pragmatism is more about what to do with all of that, whatever or however it is, the first order bit. Normativity. Moral desert occupies the same space.

Should people get more, exactly what, or less than they deserve? Is it more or less praiseworthy (or more or less punishment worthy) for a good person to do a bad thing, a bad person to do a good thing, a good person to do a good thing, or a bad person to do a bad thing? We needn't be hung up on what good or bad is, here - or whether the worthy-making property of each question is a moral one. Perhaps things are more or less praise and punishment worthy depending on the outcomes of that act itself and not the instigating act in context of our societal goals.

Let's take retribution as an example. Over, exact, or less than? Do we feel differently between different subjects? Say a person thinks or feels, in general, people should get exactly what they deserve for good or for ill. That this is how we should organize society and justice. Maybe we think or feel that a given act deserves death in return because it caused a death. Maybe we think or feel that even if an act didn't cause death then death is still on the table because the act is particularly detestable. Or maybe we don't think or feel that explicitly but will accept it in the case of a particular subject. Say.... a person who hurts kids. Or maybe we think or feel that even if people kill people or hurt kids they still don't deserve to die and/or we should not then make ourselves killers on their account.

What do you think? Can you think of any edge cases to what you think..where as soon as you posit an opinion you realize that there are exceptions to what you -say- or -think- is an explicitly philosophic and thus truth-apt, even if not objectively truth-apt, system?

[The Grand Nudger]

-answers to those sorts of pragmatic and communicative questions would help you to narrow down what sorts of ethical systems appeal to your metaethical commitments and semantic preferences.

[Lucian]

-answers to those sorts of pragmatic and communicative questions would help you to narrow down what sorts of ethical systems appeal to your metaethical commitments and semantic preferences.

Will give a reply tomorrow, brain died for the day. Appreciate the responses so far

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah no worries. I mean, it may take longer than a day to figure out your own morality, too. Been a log slog for me.

[Lucian]

Yeah no worries.  I mean, it may take longer than a day to figure out your own morality, too.  Been a log slog for me.  

Ha, more the effort of interacting with humans and trying to work out how to quote etc on an iphone. Brain tends to die quickly these days

Well, that's the fun thing about quasi realist expressivism and it's confluence with prgamatic ethics.  OFC you have genuinely held beliefs on moral desert, even if, intellectually, you think you are or suspect that you may be wrong on a fact-basis.  That those beliefs and opinions are not actually grounded in truth apt statements but may change or be changed for explicitly truth apt reasons, non truth apt reasons, or no reason at all.  Pragmatism in and of itself makes no comment on the nature of -those- beliefs, and you'll find a pragmatic theory of every variant..because regardless of the second order questions and their answers pragmatism is more about what to do with all of that, whatever or however it is, the first order bit.  Normativity.   Moral desert occupies the same space.  

I guess this comes down to how we view moral feelings and reactions and whether we would call those beliefs. Sure, I have retributivist tendencies and they are borne from my emotional reactions to things. I wouldn't call those beliefs though as they are non-propositional and are the basic emotional substrate of moral interactions. Morris and also de Waal cite Jonathan Haidt's work a lot to the effect that most moral positions are actually emotional in nature and rationality is kind of a justificatory veneer on top. Nice an consistent with an evolutionary view of morality where it doesn't track reality but is a quick and dirty prod to actions

Should people get more, exactly what, or less than they deserve?  Is it more or less praiseworthy (or more or less punishment worthy) for a good person to do a bad thing, a bad person to do a good thing, a good person to do a good thing, or a bad person to do a bad thing?  We needn't be hung up on what good or bad is, here - or whether the worthy-making property of each question is a moral one.  Perhaps things are more or less praise and punishment worthy depending on the outcomes of that act itself and not the instigating act in context of our societal goals.  

Let's take retribution as an example.  Over, exact, or less than?  Do we feel differently between different subjects?  Say a person thinks or feels, in general, people should get exactly what they deserve for good or for ill.  That this is how we should organize society and justice.  Maybe we think or feel that a given act deserves death in return because it caused a death.  Maybe we think or feel that even if an act didn't cause death then death is still on the table because the act is particularly detestable.  Or maybe we don't think or feel that explicitly but will accept it in the case of a particular subject.  Say.... a person who hurts kids.  Or maybe we think or feel that even if people kill people or hurt kids they still don't deserve to die and/or we should not then make ourselves killers on their account.

Outside of my emotional responses to those situations I would prefer to think in terms of what can be productive in how we treat those people. Sure, locking them away may make sense, and doing it for life may make sense but that doesn't have to be a "you are a horrible person, and part of the reason I am locking you away is that evaluation of you". That said, if someone did something to my nephew (I don't have kids) I am sure I would react in about as horrible a way as I can imagine to such a person. That doesn't mean I think it is right or justified to do so intellectually though.
I think where Morris makes a good case is that we can look at this from a policy perspective where moral argumentation doesn't always lead to the best solutions, but more utilitarian considerations can be preferable. Happy to delve into that route, but a lot there that is more than just a paragraph worth.

I am broadly speaking a necessitarian (Karofsky), and philosophical / neuro-science arguments against free-will bear some weight for me here.

What do you think?  Can you think of any edge cases to what you think..where as soon as you posit an opinion you realize that there are exceptions to what you -say- or -think- is an explicitly philosophic and thus truth-apt, even if not objectively truth-apt, system?

Can you help me understand what you mean here?

[The Grand Nudger]

Can you help me understand what you mean here?

 Luther Ingram.  If loving you is wrong, I don't wanna be right. He's referring, ofc, to his sidepiece.

A person who believes or feels or thinks that love is good or yum or will lead to better or more desirable outcomes might not believe, feel, or think that extends to infidelity.  Conversely, a person who believes or feels or thinks that infidelity is wrong or yuck or will lead to worse or less desirable outcomes might not believe, feel, or think that extends to love.   Edge cases, where some piece of normative content is stretched to (or potentially past) it's limits.  Where, at least in that instance, the content you would otherwise affirm feels quite a bit shakier than it did before.  

For example, thinking about moral abolitionism from a utilitarian standpoint, are there any instances or circumstances in which you think the removal of moral content did or would or could cause exactly what the abolitionist seeks to reduce? A personal opinion of mine is that america is at this point because a bunch of people had their moralizers..which were admittedly shitty and malfuncting, recently removed. They stopped caring about what they said was right or wrong and opted for a utilitarian ideology of power absent any genuine moral beliefs. It did not improve our society, at least imo.

[Lucian]

Can you help me understand what you mean here?

 Luther Ingram.  If loving you is wrong, I don't wanna be right. He's referring, ofc, to his sidepiece.

A person who believes or feels or thinks that love is good or yum or will lead to better or more desirable outcomes might not believe, feel, or think that extends to infidelity.  Conversely, a person who believes or feels or thinks that infidelity is wrong or yuck or will lead to worse or less desirable outcomes might not believe, feel, or think that extends to love.   Edge cases, where some piece of normative content is stretched to (or potentially past) it's limits.  Where, at least in that instance, the content you would otherwise affirm feels quite a bit shakier than it did before.  

For example, thinking about moral abolitionism from a utilitarian standpoint, are there any instances or circumstances in which you think the removal of moral content did or would or could cause exactly what the abolitionist seeks to reduce?  A personal opinion of mine is that america is at this point because a bunch of people had their moralizers..which were admittedly shitty and malfuncting, recently removed.  They stopped caring about what they said was right or wrong and opted for a utilitarian ideology of power absent any genuine moral beliefs.  It did not improve our society, at least imo.

Ah ok, I think I understand you, even though feel like I am in danger of being made more culturally aware by references to singers I have never heard of before and had to look up. Not sure I like that feeling of not restricting my knowledge to my corner of the pond.

I guess I am not fully abolitionist, more what I would class as sympathetic to it and not finding a solid reason to reject it. That said, the point of abolitionism isn’t that you just leave a vacuum. 
Depending on the flavour of the abolitionism, it could be that the type of moral expression that is being argued against is that which assigns blame and praise and retribution based on supposed moral standards. That wouldn’t banish emotional reactions, it would though seek to ground those reactions outside of non-existent (according to the abolitionist) absolute values. Such a grounding could be in empathy, a shared concern in the best use of public funds etc. The point of arguments from Morris is, in part, that basing policies and decisions around moral standards can lead to things like the American penal system where recidivism is high, rates of incarceration and punishment length are higher than most other western countries, and the whole thing is a huge economic burden. He sees that in part as being due to beliefs in needing to be tough on crime, but also tough on criminals being a proxy of that. Sentences for comparable offenses and situations go up near reelection etc, as judges want to me seen as not soft on crime. That is just one element of a much wider case

Also worth noting that I don’t see a lot of people in different political camps, here in the UK or in the US as being devoid of moral basis for what they are doing. The great thing about work like Haidt’s, and Oliver Scott Curry’s is that it shows the different types of things that could be making up the moral beliefs. For some it is more of an individualistic ethic of minimising harm for people and maximising their freedom. For other people there is more of a collectivist focus where the group is important at the expense of the individual. For some it may be about issues of purity in some cultural or religious sense with notions of disgust about an action being important. I cant recall if it is De Waal or Haidt who uses the analogy of a morality to taste with different flavours and preferences being influenced by the same basic underlying types of taste buds. We prefer some types of taste compared to other people, but largely have the same basic factors underlying the sense in different combinations.
By implementing a form of moral abolitionism you aren’t going to get rid of people’s moral taste buds, but you will give them cause to think about their responses beyond being governed by “it is right to do it this way because that person broke x moral rule and therefore is worthy of condemnation”. By becoming an anti-realist I still haven’t yet gone on my first murder spree. This isn’t due to the fact that it isn’t yet February, but is more that I have empathy for people and don’t want to go out and murder.

There would need to be an effort to promote pro-social behaviour, which incidentally people like Morris argue is actually conducive to happiness in those doing it so has benefits all around. So I am looking for what systems of ethics have been proposed that can address ideas of the best way to construct a society and live among people in it. Again, largely as a purely intellectual exercise. Just where I am at at the moment