“Normative” ethical theories

[The Grand Nudger]

All of them. Every single ethical system is an idea about how society should be constructed and how one should live one’s life. None of them -require- a metaethical commitment for utilitarian value because in addition to having edge cases they could all be gettier cases. Coincidentally useful, not based on their explicit claims or propositions. For example, authoritarian deontology could be a utilitarian good not because whatever the authority says actually is good (or the authority even exists) or because it actually will lead to the best outcomes…. but because, lacking a singular and “true” authority or the broad agreement of the society in questions members….knocking on heads and sticking to -any- sort of rules whatsoever provides some measure of stability, reliability, and predictability. To use the example of incarceration. Prisoners may be treated poorly and we may be encouraged or conditioned to accept this not for anything that’s true anbout a given prisoner or prisoners ans a whole…- but because it makes running prisons easier. That’s more or less compelling depending on how many people you plan to capture or incarcerate, obvs. Here in the us the answer is “a lot”.

[The Grand Nudger]

-as an addendum, there’s alot more riding on our prison complex from a utilitarian and societal standpoint than those things many interested people would normally accept as good. Positive and negative edge cases where “but we shouldn’t be doing that @ has little value or meaning outside of some external commitment or metric. External to the good of society I mean. This is true of prisons but also true in general. The things that are truly “good for society” may not completely overlap and may lay outside of what’s “good for people”.

That grey area is a pretty constant objection to world building idealism of any kind. We’re over here trying to answer complex questions with tons of moving parts and the whole time we can’t even work out what would be ethical for our next meal. Whether or not it’s actually okay to fool around with our mistress.

[Lucian]

All of them.  Every single ethical system is an idea about how society should be constructed and how one should live one’s life.  None of them -require- a metaethical commitment for utilitarian value because in addition to having edge cases they could all be gettier cases.  Coincidentally useful, not based on their explicit claims or propositions.  For example, authoritarian deontology could be a utilitarian good not because whatever the authority says actually is good (or the authority even exists) or because it actually will lead to the best outcomes…. but because, lacking a singular and “true” authority or the broad agreement of the society in questions members….knocking on heads and sticking to -any- sort of rules whatsoever provides some measure of stability, reliability, and predictability.   To use the example of incarceration.  Prisoners may be treated poorly and we may be encouraged or conditioned to accept this not for anything that’s true anbout a given prisoner or prisoners ans a whole…- but because it makes running prisons easier.  That’s more or less compelling depending on how many people you plan to capture or incarcerate, obvs.  Here in the us the answer is “a lot”.

Yeah, fair! Stupidly phrased of me re wanting to work out what ethical systems deal with how to live / structure society. I meant it specifically in the light of anti-realist commitments. If any are structured around a view that there is an objective type of right or wrong, virtue / vice and that is the underpinning of all else that follows, then it isn’t really one I am as interested in. If I can jettison those underpinnings without damaging the practical part of the system, or the basis for which I should consider the system worth following then I would love to read up on them. 
I guess utilitarian views might be worth me looking at. 
I am working through Morris’ less recent book “Science and the end of ethics” and he answers my questions in part there. He looks at desire dependent and desire independent enlightened self-interest views. Not enough there for me to really get my teeth into, but it gives at least a view of “here is a good way to approach life and culture that is grounded on non-realist commitments.” Basically being the view that acting in prosocial ways can benefit oneself and that this is worth striving for as a society as it would make people happier in themselves, but also others as well. 


I don’t feel comfortable with the view that we ought to normalise bad treatment of prisoners for the purpose of making prisons easier to run. The studies that Morris and others cite point out that prison systems where this is the case tend to lead to more recidivism and therefore cost society more overall. It might be better for the person running the prison, on the budget they have, but to my mind that is an issue of needing to invest more into the system and not treat prisoners as if they are somehow deserving of such treatment. 
That isn’t just something I am saying about the US system, but the studies I see cited in what I have read focus on that system in comparison to those in some of the Scandinavian countries. Heck, Britain isn’t great in this respect either with chronic understaffing, poor living conditions, lack of focus on reintegrating people successfully back into society.
Of course, my desire for the things above to change isn’t grounded in some metaethical truth claims about what should be. But it is nonetheless something I would like to see changed (and too lazy to do anything about it myself).

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, fair! Stupidly phrased of me re wanting to work out what ethical systems deal with how to live / structure society. I meant it specifically in the light of anti-realist commitments. If any are structured around a view that there is an objective type of right or wrong, virtue / vice and that is the underpinning of all else that follows, then it isn’t really one I am as interested in. If I can jettison those underpinnings without damaging the practical part of the system, or the basis for which I should consider the system worth following then I would love to read up on them.
I guess utilitarian views might be worth me looking at. 

I am working through Morris’ less recent book “Science and the end of ethics” and he answers my questions in part there. He looks at desire dependent and desire independent enlightened self-interest views. Not enough there for me to really get my teeth into, but it gives at least a view of “here is a good way to approach life and culture that is grounded on non-realist commitments.” Basically being the view that acting in prosocial ways can benefit oneself and that this is worth striving for as a society as it would make people happier in themselves, but also others as well. 

I don’t feel comfortable with the view that we ought to normalise bad treatment of prisoners for the purpose of making prisons easier to run. The studies that Morris and others cite point out that prison systems where this is the case tend to lead to more recidivism and therefore cost society more overall. It might be better for the person running the prison, on the budget they have, but to my mind that is an issue of needing to invest more into the system and not treat prisoners as if they are somehow deserving of such treatment. 

That isn’t just something I am saying about the US system, but the studies I see cited in what I have read focus on that system in comparison to those in some of the Scandinavian countries. Heck, Britain isn’t great in this respect either with chronic understaffing, poor living conditions, lack of focus on reintegrating people successfully back into society.
Of course, my desire for the things above to change isn’t grounded in some metaethical truth claims about what should be. But it is nonetheless something I would like to see changed (and too lazy to do anything about it myself).

I suggested quasi realist utilitarian emotivism precisely because you say things like the bolded bits.  It's linguistic or semantic, not metaethical. It acknowledges that nothing you've said is morally or ethically truth-making, but that we find such utterances more compelling and thus more useful to change..which we seek because yum or yuck, not for any purported benefit (even if such benefits do or might exist).

There exist such a thing as facts from studies which are truth-making in ethical consideration?  Recidivism is bad? Cost overruns are bad? Prisons running do or at least should do a particular thing that isn't related to the financial earnings of the operator?  You believe it to be inconceivable that some society may in fact benefit from prisons organized this way?  There's such a thing as a need for society to invest more, or...do anything at all?  There's a way we shouldn't treat prisoners?  There should be more staff?  There's such a thing as a better living conditions, and such a thing as desert?  

These aren't claims about how you feel - though they very well could be grounded in them, properly.  They reject equivalent and countervailing subjectivist and relativist claims.  Is what you're looking for a way to say realist things without acknowledging realist content, or ethical systems truly devoid of any realist content or conceit? For the former...that's easy, you don't need a system. Just lie, lie and lie some more until you get the change you desire. Whatever you think the other person would respond to...say that. For the latter.....what's the point? Normativity is in the business of right and wrong, rightly or wrongly.

[Lucian]

After I heard Blackburn in the interview you linked to mention Alan Gibbard I bought one of his books that deals with the day to day applications. It is called “ Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics” and has the following description
“ In these three Tanner lectures, distinguished ethical theorist Allan Gibbard explores the nature of normative thought and the bases of ethics. In the first lecture he explores the role of intuitions in moral thinking and offers a way of thinking about the intuitive method of moral inquiry that both places this activity within the natural world and makes sense of it as an indispensable part of our lives as planners. In the second and third lectures he takes up the kind of substantive ethical inquiry he has described in the first lecture, asking how we might live together on terms that none of us could reasonably reject. Since working at cross purposes loses fruits that might stem from cooperation, he argues, any consistent ethos that meets this test would be, in a crucial way, utilitarian. It would reconcile our individual aims to establish, in Kant's phrase, a "kingdom of ends." The volume also contains an introduction by Barry Stroud, the volume editor, critiques by Michael Bratman (Stanford University), John Broome (Oxford University), and F.M. Kamm (Harvard University), and Gibbard's responses.” Apparently he isn’t quite quasi - realist but Blackburn seems to think he is close. I will try to find some recent explicitly quasi-realist stuff as well based on what you have said.

Re you noting that I am making claims that are opposed to other views, I absolutely agree. I am not claiming those things to be morally good or bad in some objective sense, but the kind of society I want to live in would treat prisoners better, focus on reducing reoffending without just locking people away for life etc. I can’t tell someone they are bad for not wanting those things and that is fine to me.

I am not sure if I am seeking to say realist things without acknowledging realist content, I need to think that through after getting into the quasi-realist stuff. I do think that trying to change my language so that it reflects my metaethics is hard to do, largely because qualifying every statement if I use standard moral language is just a lot of effort. I try to avoid calling things wicked or evil or morally bad or good, but still use the terms “bad” “good” and “progress”; the first two meaning my feelings towards those actions and potential desires for change based on them. The latter purely indexicalised to my preferred way for things to be and movement towards it. That could be misleading to people who hear me say those words without qualification.
Would you say that it is dishonest communication to use those words when discussing things with people if I don’t explain that what I mean by them may not be what they mean by them? I sort of think it might be, and perhaps I ought to look harder at using clearer language without having to go into a “and this is what I think about moral realism” discourse with anyone I talk to where I use a term that they may take to imply realist commitments? No clue what those clearer terms would be either. Perhaps just “I don’t approve of x” although that seems a bit trite, same as “I don’t like x”. They don’t quite capture that there is a difference between the ice-cream dislike vs my dislike of murder, and my disapproval of chewing with out open compared to genocide. That difference is one of intensity of feeling, constancy of that feeling and not giving free-passes to people who do it in some situations etc.

Re am I looking for an ethical system devoid of realist content or conceit, I think that is more what I am after. I want to see what people who don’t believe in objective morals have to say about ways to live life and how they justify those. Is it just on utilitarian grounds or something contractarian or is it some other way. Or does it just devolve down to “what’s the point” and if so, why do I take that approach to society but not my employment. I have definite views about the way things are best run and how to do it when it comes to my work, and with no objective standard for that either. I am genuinely not sure hence wanting to see what is out there but not knowing where to start. I will dig into the quasi-realism stuff as a starting point along with Gibbard’s stuff and see if they signpost theories.


Hopefully getting into the stuff you have been saying will help me think the above through.

[The Grand Nudger]

After I heard Blackburn in the interview you linked to mention Alan Gibbard I bought one of his books that deals with the day to day applications. It is called “ Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics” and has the following description
“ In these three Tanner lectures, distinguished ethical theorist Allan Gibbard explores the nature of normative thought and the bases of ethics. In the first lecture he explores the role of intuitions in moral thinking and offers a way of thinking about the intuitive method of moral inquiry that both places this activity within the natural world and makes sense of it as an indispensable part of our lives as planners. In the second and third lectures he takes up the kind of substantive ethical inquiry he has described in the first lecture, asking how we might live together on terms that none of us could reasonably reject. Since working at cross purposes loses fruits that might stem from cooperation, he argues, any consistent ethos that meets this test would be, in a crucial way, utilitarian. It would reconcile our individual aims to establish, in Kant's phrase, a "kingdom of ends." The volume also contains an introduction by Barry Stroud, the volume editor, critiques by Michael Bratman (Stanford University), John Broome (Oxford University), and F.M. Kamm (Harvard University), and Gibbard's responses.” Apparently he isn’t quite quasi - realist but Blackburn seems to think he is close.  I will try to find some recent explicitly quasi-realist stuff as well based on what you have said.

Re you noting that I am making claims that are opposed to other views, I absolutely agree. I am not claiming those things to be morally good or bad in some objective sense, but the kind of society I want to live in would treat prisoners better, focus on reducing reoffending without just locking people away for life etc. I can’t tell someone they are bad for not wanting those things and that is fine to me.

Not opposed to other views in the sense of their fundamental nature, but opposed to equivalent views making countervailing claims from -within- an ethical structure which you share. IE subjectivism doesn't privilege your subjective views. I places them alongside all other subjective views. All equivalently grounded in the fact that matters, which is not a fact of the matter in question, but of each individual.

I am not sure if I am seeking to say realist things without acknowledging realist content, I need to think that through after getting into the quasi-realist stuff.  I do think that trying to change my language so that it reflects my metaethics is hard to do, largely because qualifying every statement if I use standard moral language is just a lot of effort. I try to avoid calling things wicked or evil or morally bad or good, but still use the terms “bad” “good” and “progress”; the first two meaning my feelings towards those actions and potential desires for change based on them. The latter purely indexicalised to my preferred way for things to be and movement towards it.  That could be misleading to people who hear me say those words without qualification.

It's unwieldy, for sure.  We learn to speak about right and wrong before we learn the sorts of things we're discussing here.  Before we think about what commitments the language entails or suggests.  So long as you're comfortable with there being nothing that's actually better about treating prisoners..well..better, it's just a habit.   If you actually do think you mean something when you say that which doesn't reduce to your mere opinion or your emotional state...if you really think prisoners can be treated worse or better....

...well, that's either realist content, or a realist conceit.  

Would you say that it is dishonest communication to use those words when discussing things with people if I don’t explain that what I mean by them may not be what they mean by them? I sort of think it might be, and perhaps I ought to look harder at using clearer language without having to go into a “and this is what I think about moral realism” discourse with anyone I talk to where I use a term that they may take to imply realist commitments? No clue what those clearer terms would be either. Perhaps just “I don’t approve of x” although that seems a bit trite, same as “I don’t like x”. They don’t quite capture that there is a difference between the ice-cream dislike vs my dislike of murder, and my disapproval of chewing with out open compared to genocide. That difference is one of intensity of feeling, constancy of that feeling and not giving free-passes to people who do it in some situations etc.

The first question that leaps to my mind being..so what if it were?  Dishonest implies the possibility of true content and an intent to deceive.  Inaccurate, more like.  Big Bad X's.  Personally, I understand why they're wrong (or are said to be, at least), but I don't feel yuck about them.  Similarly, there are things which disgust me which I can't find any moral fault with whatsoever.   That's why emotivist theories don't work for me.  I suppose if you felt yuck about every "bad" thing and "yum" about every good thing they would seem more compelling, and even obvious, but it's just not my experience.  As you note, there's something about the subject that emotivist statements don't capture.  

Re am I looking for an ethical system devoid of realist content or conceit, I think that is more what I am after. I want to see what people who don’t believe in objective morals have to say about ways to live life and how they justify those. Is it just on utilitarian grounds or something contractarian or is it some other way. Or does it just devolve down to “what’s the point” and if so, why do I take that approach to society but not my employment. I have definite views about the way things are best run and how to do it when it comes to my work, and with no objective standard for that either. I am genuinely not sure hence wanting to see what is out there but not knowing where to start. I will dig into the quasi-realism stuff as a starting point along with Gibbard’s stuff and see if they signpost theories.


Hopefully getting into the stuff you have been saying will help me think the above through.

Utterly devoid is a high bar to clear.  Critics of any such system you might find would and have contended that realist conceit is a fundamental unit of moral discourse even if realist content is utterly absent in the universe.  Point being that I don't think that anyone could actually tell you, definitively, "here's such a system, and -it is- devoid of -any- such content.

[Alan V]

One of the things that we rarely see is a justification for viewing ethics as anything more than the necessary behaviors of members of a tribe of apes with delusions of sentience. Sure, Don't-Be-A-Dick ethics is probably a bit too simple, but it's pretty much where it's at. Aside from keeping both philosophers and theologians occupied so that they don't endanger the public by studying anything with real-world applications, long-winded metaethical arguments never seem to be able to demonstrate a need for their inevitably bendy thinking.

Rephrasing the above with additions, this is quoted from Google:

Criticisms of normative ethics include its perceived detachment from reality, the potential for naive or overly simplistic applications of its theories, its anthropocentric focus, the problematic nature of deriving moral "oughts" from factual "is" statements (the naturalistic fallacy), and the inherent challenge of finding a universally acceptable foundation for its principles. Critics also question whether normative ethics offers genuine practical guidance or merely creates theories that are "too abstract and distant from the phenomena they ultimately describe".

[The Grand Nudger]

The need for such an exploration is proven when we fail, and fail together, in an organized way. Conversely, when we are being failed. Would we find ourselves where we're at now in the us if our normative ethics hadn't been perverted and weaponized against us before being drowned in a gas station shitter by a walking cautionary tale of man? I often find myself wondering what anyone is even complaining about, vis a vis that outcome, in context to the things they then say about ethics and normativity.

Like, if this is all true, then what's the problem with maga and magats, anyway? What makes their policies bad, or wrong? This is another angle where I can see maga as a disaffected leftist phenomena. We're talking about people whove decided that our rules for justice and fairness were a bunch of bullshit and mere opinions that only a sucker would accept - and the real rule is take whatever you can steal at whomevers expense we must. Ironic, in that they kept bitching about the pop culture lefts obsession with anti realist and post modern moral interpretations would be the downfall of the nation......and then they beat the left to the finish line on that count. It's, apparently, the one thing that the left managed to convince the right of before they convinced themselves.

[Alan V]

The need for such an exploration is proven when we fail, and fail together, in an organized way.  Conversely, when we are being failed.  Would we find ourselves where we're at now in the us if our normative ethics hadn't been perverted and weaponized against us before being drowned in a gas station shitter by a walking cautionary tale of man?  I often find myself wondering what anyone is even complaining about, vis a vis that outcome, in context to the things they then say about ethics and normativity.

Like, if this is all true, then what's the problem with maga and magats, anyway?  What makes their policies bad, or wrong?  This is another angle where I can see maga as a disaffected leftist phenomena.  We're talking about people whove decided that our rules for justice and fairness were a bunch of bullshit and mere opinions that only a sucker would accept - and the real rule is take whatever you can steal at whomevers expense we must.  Ironic, in that they kept bitching about the pop culture lefts obsession with anti realist and post modern moral interpretations would be the downfall of the nation......and then they beat the left to the finish line on that count.  It's, apparently, the one thing that the left managed to convince the right of before they convinced themselves.

I wouldn't blame the victims.  The left has been arguing for the benefits of fairness, equality, and pluralism, and for paying close attention to the facts, not for moral relativity.  The right simply lied about all of it because it is easier to tear things down than learn enough to understand the complexities involved.

The right set up propaganda outlets on the radio and television and -- guess what? -- they were effective at flooding people with disinformation, conspiracy theories, and hatred so that they couldn't think straight.  The right largely swallowed the lies and dogmas which made them impervious to the facts about crime, immigration, climate change, the economy, and other Americans.

The normative ethics which the right embraces are still there.  They are just not applied equally to everyone because many of us are now seen as evil. If anything, the present situation is proof that normative ethics are as weak as we have been saying. That's just one of many sad facts about the human condition.

[Belacqua]

The left has been arguing for the benefits of fairness, equality, and pluralism, and for paying close attention to the facts, not for moral relativity.

I thought it was cool how, in 2016, Obama dropped 26,000 bombs on seven countries without congressional approval.