“Normative” ethical theories

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, np. As an addendum, and since I’ve already recommended kagan- this business about doing realism while rejecting realism is something he observed and quantified in the process of the research which lead to his book on the geometry of desert. I’ve run into it both in moral discussions and in normal life. He turned it into a reliable predictive model for self respondence.

What you and I (and he) might call considerate and thoughtful people are guarded with their moral convictions ( and condemnations) if pressed. We might casually make some moral remark which other people immediately accept as true and obviously true. However…if prompted to think objectively or directly queried about moral realism or objectivity some portion of that same group will immediately reverse their initial responses. You can get a very good read on which ones before you do this by asking them questions about moral desert, about whether people should get more, exactly as much, or less than they deserve. Even more specifically in the negative sense.

So called “underpunushers” those who think that it might be better if we get less than we deserve when those consequences would be negative are reliable reversers. It’s hypothesized that we become wary of our moral convictions when we fear that they may lead to someone suffering in ways we do not easily anticipate.

TLDR version….it turns out that even when there’s only one person involved, internal moral disagreement is fairly easy to prompt.

[Lucian]

Cool. I needed to scan the papers I have read and the books I have as I was so confused here as to why you frame realism as you do. Ultimately it comes down to none of these sources say “hey, you reference a desire to see prosocial behavior so regardless of your reasons you are really doing moral realism”. Sure, I have heard some philosophers say “oh, but you really believe what I believe but you are just confused” but I have heard Christians say the same sing and my response to both is “yeah, cool, you do you and think that while I will get on with believing what I believe”. Moral realism isn’t just referring to facts in the world and consequences of actions, there is a psychological component about what the grounds of morals are, and a metaphysical claim, and a claim about objectivity in most that I have read.
I won’t belabour this and we can move on as we are unlikely to come to an agreement. I also recognise I haven’t read everything you have. That said, I don’t recognise your characterisation of moral realism, nor accept your claims that people are doing moral realism while claiming they aren’t.
All good though, differences are what make life interesting

[The Grand Nudger]

Anyone who thinks there's something really wrong with any x, not just an opinion, is doing moral realism - rightly or wrongly. As you said, there's a psychological component. We're conditioned to see the world in terms of real and discrete units even when there are not. Don't even get me started on christian dipshits and their version of objective morality. Long story short, it's neither thing. It is highly likely, though, that atheists and theists from the same culture share many or most of their moral intuitions.

[Lucian]

And error theorists don’t think things are morally wrong in the way way realists do as in something really wrong with x. So no; they aren’t and I am not doing moral realism

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure. If you don’t think that harm is real or really wrong, that harm reduction is real or really right to do, that the set of pro social values leads to harm reductions that even a pure egoist would accept if they properly understood it, and that there is no ought in in organizing our societies towards those values…you wouldn’t be doing any form of moral realism.

I’d add it’s not just error theorists who aren’t doing moral realism, at least in an intellectual sense. There are plenty of other isms. There is, ofc, the sense in which what we do or apprehend is not completely consistent with some position we hold. For example….im dead certain, as a moral realist, some of my moral intuitions are not well grounded in realism, though I act in life as though they are. Some of them I know…but there’s a set of them that I know must exist but I’m not fully aware of the contents. Things that -seem- grounded in realism for some (or no particular) reason- but are not. Mistakes of fact, misapplication of principle. Etc.

In that sense, I’m doing realism, even though those items are not valid realist content.

[Lucian]

Cool. Cheers for the interaction

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah man, I’m always down for this one. I do want to note that when I talk about people in general doing realism… I’m not saying that they believe what I believe. Get two self professed realists in a room and you’ll get three distinct moral opinions on any given item. These isms refer to the origin of the content and how we approach the content. Not the specific list of content itself. We can do any of these isms from multiple potential basis. Hence value pluralism.

Even if we drilled it down to something seemingly singular in the non cognitive space like yum and yuck…it’s very likely that our yums and yucks, our purely emotional responses, come from and swirl around individual psychological complexes and histories of experience.