(December 21, 2015 at 5:51 pm)Delicate Wrote:

(December 21, 2015 at 4:29 pm)Pizza Wrote: Why are we to believe a personal(anthropomorphic) god is identical to a maximally great being? You got anything beyond semantic tricks?

You're to figure out something a lot more basic before you step up to that level.

Why can't you just answer my question? I'm not asking for much here.

Are you conceding that the Ontological argument isn't an argument for a personal cause? Well, okay then. I don't see how that's a victory for Christian theism at all.

Also if you can't get anyone to believe your conceptual analysis of maximal greatness is correct then I don't see how you and others think this argument is to work. In this case an "omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect" cause creating a world like this one is insulting to intelligence of atheist and theist alike.

Quote:As is readily evident, each version of the ontological argument rests on the assumption that the concept of God, as it is described in the argument, is self-consistent. Both versions of Anselm's argument rely on the claim that the idea of God (that is, a being than which none greater can be conceived) "exists as an idea in the understanding." Similarly, Plantinga's version relies on the more transparent claim that the concept of maximal greatness is self-consistent.

But many philosophers are skeptical about the underlying assumption, as Leibniz describes it, "that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible and implies no contradiction."

http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/  

Additionally, I would make the same objection to Plantinga that I make to Godel's version, namely:

Quote:The proof is fatally flawed because it assumes the possible objective existence of positive and negative properties. Properties themselves exist, but they are neither objectively positive or negative. In short, there is no objective, natural ordering of any set of properties such that for any P(i) and P(j) in the set, under all possible worlds, P(i) is more positive than P(j), or vice versa. You can say nothing about the ordering of properties in all possible worlds, therefore it is impossible to postulate a being that is essentially positive (using the definition of "essence" given in the Wikipedia article).

https://atheistforums.org/thread-23216-p...#pid578986

Therefore the concept of a maximally great being that exists in a possible world is either incoherent (my take), or one would have to say there are as many maximally great beings as there are properties, which seems like an absurd result. There would indeed then be a maximally great being whose greatness consisted solely of being the most smelly being.

This missionary/apologist either won't get it or will refuse to acknowledge it if he does.

(December 21, 2015 at 6:48 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(December 15, 2015 at 6:25 pm)Delicate Wrote: Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

Two doesn't follow from one.  One only states that the concept of a maximally great being is coherent, not that it is instantiated in one or more possible worlds.  I can only assume you've misstated the argument as I can't imagine Plantinga making such a bonehead mistake.  You go on to state that there are no "holes" in the argument, despite this glaring one.  Nice try but bluster doesn't substitute for logic.

If this is indeed Plantinga's argument, then more silliness follows. As noted, a maximally great leprichaun would also be self-consistent and necessary. If all that is required for the rest to follow (number two onward) is that the entity be necessary and self-consistent, then a necessary unicorn also follows. A necessary anything can be plugged into the argument and as long as the concept is "logically self-consistent" then it must in actuality exist according to this argument. I first noticed this in an earlier incarnation of Plantinga's argument when I noticed that you could substitute a necessarily existing universe in place of his necessary "being". You can substitute an infinite number of things.

I think this simply shows at bottom how easy it is to conflate Lewis' possible world semantics with other notions of possibility. A classic example of the use of possible world semantics is to evaluate the concept of free will. In this example, one is given the hypothetical that one has just attempted to make a putt in golf and missed. There are "possible worlds" that differ only slightly from the real world where you would have made that putt. But lets take a possible world in which the ball and the hole are in separate dimensions (or in other words in separate time-space continua, or branes in the language of physics). Let's suppose that brane theory is wrong and there are no "other dimensions" for the hole to sit in. There is nothing logically incoherent about the ball and hole being in different dimensions, so there is a logically possible world in which that happens. But if there is only one set of dimensions, is it "possible" in the real world sense for the hole and the ball to be in separate dimensions? No, it is not. There is a difference between logically possible worlds and real existent worlds. And Plantinga trades on this ambiguity. He starts out addressing logically possible worlds and elides into suggesting that this logically possible world exists. It doesn't necessarily, possible worlds semantics is a tool for generating hypotheticals, and not all logically possible hypotheticals are real world hypotheticals. For this maximally great being to actually exist, it has to exist in some real world hypothetical, not just a logically consistent hypothetical. For at bottom a hypothetical is just an idea of something, not a real thing. This curiously brings us back to Anselm who was trying to elide the same mistake, confusing an idea of a maximally great being with a real, reified thing that has properties such as 'existence' (if existence be a property). At the end, all Anselm has is the idea of something existing actually being real, with the question of whether there is a real world example of that idea that exists correspondingly.

Note that Plantinga doesn't endorse modal realism, and so he is trying to have his cake and eat it too.

Wikipedia Wrote:Intense debate has also emerged over the ontological status of possible worlds, provoked especially by David Lewis's defense of modal realism, the doctrine that talk about "possible worlds" is best explained in terms of innumerable, really existing worlds beyond the one we live in. The fundamental question here is: given that modal logic works, and that some possible-worlds semantics for modal logic is correct, what has to be true of the world, and just what are these possible worlds that we range over in our interpretation of modal statements? Lewis argued that what we range over are real, concrete worlds that exist just as unequivocally as our actual world exists, but that are distinguished from the actual world simply by standing in no spatial, temporal, or causal relations with the actual world. (On Lewis's account, the only "special" property that the actual world has is a relational one: that we are in it. This doctrine is called "the indexicality of actuality": "actual" is a merely indexical term, like "now" and "here".) Others, such as Robert Adams and William Lycan, reject Lewis's picture as metaphysically extravagant, and suggest in its place an interpretation of possible worlds as consistent, maximally complete sets of descriptions of or propositions about the world, so that a "possible world" is conceived of as a complete description of a way the world could be – rather than a world that is that way. (Lewis describes their position, and similar positions such as those advocated by Alvin Plantinga and Peter Forrest, as "ersatz modal realism", arguing that such theories try to get the benefits of possible worlds semantics for modal logic "on the cheap", but that they ultimately fail to provide an adequate explanation.) Saul Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, took explicit issue with Lewis's use of possible worlds semantics, and defended a stipulative account of possible worlds as purely formal (logical) entities rather than either really existent worlds or as some set of propositions or descriptions.

Wikipedia | Possible world

(December 19, 2015 at 8:54 am)Stimbo Wrote:

(December 18, 2015 at 6:32 pm)athrock Wrote: Yes, thank you. I only asked because you expressed that someone (and you may have meant me though I'm not sure of this) was posting shit and giggles or something to that effect all over the forum.

It was in reply to ApeNotKillApe, the "someone" to whom I referred was not specified and intended to be general, and the phrase "shits 'n' giggles" (and the concomitant humorous observation) is a fairly common expression. I welcome any criticism for things I do, but not for things I don't (unless it's something I'm supposed to do and fail so to do). Perhaps asking me to clarify would have helped to avoid potential offense as well as save time.

Ah. Glad to know it wasn't me. Santa knows who's naught and nice, so I'm on my best behaviour. 

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(December 21, 2015 at 4:29 pm)Evie Wrote: Do you or do you not believe God is omnipresent yet invisible, Delicate?

Classical theists would say that God is pure spirit. There is nothing to see.

This is not incompatible with omnipresence.

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(December 21, 2015 at 4:29 pm)Pizza Wrote: Why are we to believe a personal(anthropomorphic) god is identical to a maximally great being? You got anything beyond semantic tricks?

Because in order for a being to be maximally great, being personal is one of the characteristics is must have by definition.

Personal means that the being has rationality, self-consciousness and volition (will).

A non-personal being which lacks one or more of these things is less great than a personal being.

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(December 18, 2015 at 7:57 pm)Simon Moon Wrote:

(December 18, 2015 at 6:32 pm)athrock Wrote: In the universe???

There's your problem right there.

It's a lot less of a problem than positing a god that exists 'outside the universe'.

Positing a god that exists outside the universe, is an incoherent statement. The word 'exists' no longer has any meaning. 

Existence requires time and space. Since those are attributes of this universe, what does it mean to exist without time and space?

It is completely incoherent.

Why, Simon?

You're requiring that anything and everything that exists be physical...this is a presupposition on your part.

Spiritual beings (gods, angels, demons, etc.) are not material at all.

Maybe a god just looks in on us from time to time...

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(December 19, 2015 at 12:59 pm)Cato Wrote:

(December 18, 2015 at 7:22 pm)athrock Wrote: Cato, I agree with you to this point. I think the value of the Ontological Argument for the theist camp is that arguments such as this demonstrate that belief in a supreme being IS rational. That, in and of itself, is a blow to the notion that belief in god is irrational.

Are you intentionally misrepresenting me? I quite specifically stated that I disagreed with this conclusion and pointed out that the referenced article dismantled that part of Plantinga's claim.

Your quiver analogy is misplaced. Your effort is more similar to loading a trebuchet full of shit in the hope of getting some to stick.

A casual look into the matter would reveal something different, Cato.

Just Google for accounts of atheists who converted and see for yourself how many of them were compelled to give the idea of god a second look because of one or more of these arguments. It's not an insignificant number, and just because YOU think the arguments are poor, that does not make them poor OR ineffective.

In the war of words, not every theist arrow finds every target, but as I said, theists only need one to succeed. Conversely, thinking atheists must be able to fend off all of them.

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(December 19, 2015 at 3:17 pm)Pizza Wrote:

(December 18, 2015 at 7:08 pm)Pizza Wrote: What are you actually left with once you remove all forms of anthropomorphism(saying a supreme being wants, commands, etc is anthropomorphism)? Not anything most people would call a god. Atheism is what is left.

No reply to me? Okay, the defenders of the The Ontological Argument have got nothing. You can't reject anthropomorphism and bring anthropomorphism in the backdoor by using weasel words like "personal god." You can't have it both ways, Athrock, Chad, and friends. Because a personal(anthropomorphism) god is not identical to a maximally great being.  Ontological Argument does not work for that reason, in fact, it's a moot point because no one cares about vaguely defined "supreme being or first cause or whatever" and non-sequitur to debate over a personal/anthropomorphic cause of the universe existing.

1. Define anthropomorphism. (I want to know how you are using the term.)
2. Define "personal god".
3. Compare and contrast. Because we may be simply talking past one another.

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(December 21, 2015 at 1:05 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: In Plantinga's version, it is a part of the definition of maximally great being that it exists necessarily.  It is also a part of the background assumptions that this is a conscious being, and not simply some prior natural cause.  Thus premise one states that it's possible that there is a conscious being that exists necessarily.  This appears to be the crux of the matter, whether or not that is actually possible.  We don't know.  So we don't know if premise one is sound.  It doesn't seem probable that the necessarily existing entity that started everything was also a fully developed conscious being, so that casts doubt on the possibility that such a first entity is possible [emphasis added].  The rest is just elucidating the analytical truths contained in premise one.  So it really is one premise away from being argument by definition.

Jorm-

Would you agree that a being that is rational, has self-conscious and has volition is greater than one that does not?

(December 21, 2015 at 1:58 pm)Esquilax Wrote:

(December 18, 2015 at 7:22 pm)athrock Wrote: Alternatively, it may be that theists deploy a cluster of arguments (Kalam, Teleological, Moral, Ontological, etc.) knowing that the net effect is to persuade that the existence of a supreme being is more likely than not to be true.

*sigh*

That's what we always get told. Theists seem to mistake quantity as being the key component here, as if they just need to round up lots and lots of arguments for god, and then suddenly they'll be able to logic him into existence. Not only is that not how it works, as you need evidence to demonstrate a thing, not just arguments about how it must totally exist, but the success or failure of a "cluster of arguments," is predicated on those arguments being successful, which none of the ones for god are. You don't build a cumulative case out of sheer numbers, each one of the arguments within it must actually be cogent in some respect for the case to accumulate, which is where theistic rambling falls down every time.

*sigh*

That's the same old argument that skeptics always make. The assumption being that none of the arguments ARE quality arguments. Which sort of begs the question, "Why do philosophy professors spend so much time arguing about this stuff at a high academic level if the arguments suck?"

Maybe the problem is that most people (I include myself, btw), don't fully understand or appreciate the nuances, implications and potency of the arguments.

I mean, seriously, Equislax, somebody in this very thread was going on about how he's stopped caring about "big words" as he's gotten older. Now, THERE's a brilliant retort from the skeptical camp: "You theists must be wrong because you've used a lot of fancy words that I can't be bothered with."

Really? This passes for atheist argumentation?

(December 21, 2015 at 1:58 pm)Esquilax Wrote: You can have a million bad arguments and still not have a case that the focus of those arguments is probabilistically likely.

There it is again...the "bad" arguments argument. So, you can have one bad argument made a million times and till not have a case.

(December 21, 2015 at 1:58 pm)Esquilax Wrote:

Quote:IOW, Cato, theists have quite a few arrows in their quiver, and it only takes one to strike the target. Atheists, on the other hand, must successfully dodge them all as they rain down...

Are you kidding me? You're going to ramble on about argumentation and then, at the very end, completely fuck it up by committing one of the most obvious logical fallacies of them all, in shifting the burden of proof? No, we don't actually need to refute every single argument or else you're right, you need to demonstrate the accuracy of your argument's claims, which no theist ever actually does. Instead of just getting simple evidence that god does exist, we instead get all these vague, philosophical, poorly defined weasel arguments about how he must exist, because the actual burden of proof is one theists can't shoulder, and so they seek to swap it out with a different criterion more amenable to allowing their predrawn conclusion.

Gee, I didn't realize I had waited to the end. According to you, I fucked it up from the beginning.  

And your demand for "simple evidence"...what's that about, E? What is "simple evidence" that would convince you?

A believer could simply say, "The Lord spoke to me in prayer last night", and you would reject such "simple" testimony as evidence. So, no, you don't want "simple" evidence...you want something that is so overwhelmingly intense that NO ONE (not even you) could possibly deny it.

(December 21, 2015 at 1:58 pm)Esquilax Wrote: Arguments are not evidence. For an argument to be rationally justified, it must rely on evidence that is demonstrably accurate, and nothing in these hand wringing, pathetic little wheedling pleas about how god is logically possible do that. It's all just heavily curated rhetoric, delivered in a vacuum, with no regard to the idea that the real world is what demonstrates what's real, not how far you can twist logic to come to a conclusion you had before you even started thinking about it.

Is your handle derived from the fact that you are an attorney in Los Angeles? (ESQUIre + LAX)

If so, perhaps you can expound upon the types, nature and legal definition of "evidence" - I cannot. However, it seems to me that there are many things about which we make logical arguments, but the ONLY thing for which we refuse to consider such arguments as evidence is the existence of god.

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(December 21, 2015 at 2:02 pm)Esquilax Wrote:

(December 21, 2015 at 1:52 pm)Delicate Wrote: It would be nice if, instead of 100 people making 200 feeble objections to the ontological argument, there could be one, singular, comprehensive refutation that would convince people the ontological argument was fallacious.

Can someone come up with something like that? That would help.

It's an argument that doesn't demonstrate any of its premises, nor even that they're possible. It requires no refutation at all; empty assertions never do.

However, I've already given a refutation: a "maximally great being," is logically impossible, given that greatness has no upper bound and any purported maximally great being can be overshadowed simply by positing an identical being that has all the properties of the first, only more of them. The moment you define a maximally great being- which you'd need to do- it becomes possible to posit a greater one.

Sort of an infinite progression thing, eh?

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(December 21, 2015 at 2:02 pm)Cato Wrote:

(December 21, 2015 at 1:52 pm)Delicate Wrote: It would be nice if, instead of 100 people making 200 feeble objections to the ontological argument, there could be one, singular, comprehensive refutation that would convince people the ontological argument was fallacious.

Can someone come up with something like that? That would help.

It would be nice if, instead of 40,000 Christian denominations making a myriad of different unsupported claims based on a single source, there could be one, singular, comprehensive display of evidence that would convince people that god was real.

Can someone come up with something like that? That would help.

So, you're not sold on Christianity. Fine. 

But we aren't specifically discussing Christianity, and that doesn't really explain how you justify not believing in ANY supreme being.

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(December 21, 2015 at 2:20 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: The premises must be accepted as sound or you don't have a successful argument.  That sword cuts both ways.

Which premise(s) do you not accept as sound, J.

Let's take these one at a time.

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Do you accept or reject that possibility? Why?

(December 22, 2015 at 3:47 pm)athrock Wrote: Classical theists would say that God is pure spirit. There is nothing to see.

This is not incompatible with omnipresence.

Thing is... if God is omnipresent he's still indistinguishable from nonexistent.

"Everywhere at once" looks an awful like "Nowhere to be found.".

(December 22, 2015 at 5:07 pm)Evie Wrote:

(December 22, 2015 at 3:47 pm)athrock Wrote: Classical theists would say that God is pure spirit. There is nothing to see.

This is not incompatible with omnipresence.

Thing is... if God is omnipresent he's still indistinguishable from nonexistent.

"Everywhere at once" looks an awful like "Nowhere to be found.".

Thing is...if this is the best that atheism can muster in response, then no wonder religions are still thriving.

(December 22, 2015 at 5:10 pm)athrock Wrote:

(December 22, 2015 at 5:07 pm)Evie Wrote: Thing is... if God is omnipresent he's still indistinguishable from nonexistent.

"Everywhere at once" looks an awful like "Nowhere to be found.".

Thing is...if this is the best that atheism can muster in response, then no wonder religions are still thriving.

5/7 for a dismissal with zero substance, mate.

So you think a god can be invisible, intangible and unfalsifiable and not indistinguishable from non-existence....?

...K. Feel free to argue with tautological truth. Next you will be telling me that bachelors can be married and still remain as bachelors.

"Invisible, Intangible, unfalsifiable and yet distinguishable from its absence".

No thanks for not making sense.