(March 13, 2016 at 1:57 am)robvalue Wrote: Minds have never been shown to exist without brains. This is evidence (not proof, science doesn't deal with proof) that minds require a brain. As soon as someone finds a mind without a brain, we will have a reason to reconsider.

Let me fix this for you:

"Minds have never been shown to exist."

There, that's a little simpler.

You are both right, yes. Minds don't literally exist as an entity, as far as we know. My wording was not good.

Thank you

(March 12, 2016 at 10:07 pm)bennyboy Wrote: *Someone called my name?*

The problem for a material monism is this: it completely disregards, and has no capacity for discussing or explaining, qualia.

You've been saying this for as long as we've been discussing it.  It's no more true now than it was the first time you said it.  You aren't satisfied with a material monist explanation, with the manner that material monist's discuss qualia.  

Not being satisfied is not interchangeable with "no capacity for discussing or explaining".

(March 13, 2016 at 4:06 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(March 13, 2016 at 1:57 am)robvalue Wrote: Minds have never been shown to exist without brains. This is evidence (not proof, science doesn't deal with proof) that minds require a brain. As soon as someone finds a mind without a brain, we will have a reason to reconsider.

Let me fix this for you:

"Minds have never been shown to exist."

There, that's a little simpler.

I'm not convinced I believe this. Minds exist as a function of the brain. If the functioning brain is altered then the function of the mind is altered.

(March 12, 2016 at 8:13 pm)Esquilax Wrote: So let's consider what conclusion should be reached, using the OP's linked argument. We have brains, and all of the evidence available suggests an inextricable correlation between them. No evidence at all exists that suggests that the mind is separate from the brain, can exist without a brain, or is in any way supernatural, and in many cases the available evidence directly contradicts these claims.

Let us also accept that yes, correlation does not uniformly map to identity. While this is true, it also fails to take into account the state of the evidence at our disposal: given what we know about the brain and minds, would it be rational to throw all that away because it's possible (yet unevidenced) that it's only a correlation and not a case of the two being identical? Should we reverse the burden of proof and say that because we haven't proven that possibility wrong, it's anywhere near as valid as the other conclusion, that fits with all the evidence? Should we conclude that the two are separate, at all?

The answer, on all counts, is no. We must follow where the evidence leads, not ignore the evidence because it's not yet complete and perfect.

i would add strongly to your post is that in science that's all we do: correlations. Every laws of nature we discovered expressed as an equation is a correlation. Every scientific theory is based on a number of hypotheses which is translated into equation, which are correlations. If anyone thinks that correlations are not the way to go, then you've just denied science.

(March 12, 2016 at 9:50 pm)MysticKnight Wrote: The author wasn't arguing that we should accept dualism. He wasn't arguing even that materialism shouldn't believed in. He was simply saying the arguments against dualism are all fallacious and baseless.

As I said, he is an Atheist, and he use to rely on some of the fallacious arguments.

Well, he might be attempting to argue that, but all he's really done is shown that those arguments aren't perfect, airtight proof against dualism, which... I mean... yeah. All evidence-based conclusions are probabilistic, but the fact is that A: an evidence-based conclusion would not lead to dualism and B: not having airtight proof against a position doesn't mean that position is on equal standing with an evidence-based conclusion. The fact that there are ways in which a dualist could wriggle to escape the arguments against dualism is trivial and irrelevant: finding a loophole such that your position still might be possible just puts you back at zero evidence and zero justification for that position, it doesn't mean that the argument you've wriggled out of is totally useless, or fallacious.

It just means that people with prior commitments to positions can find ways around contradictory arguments. That's nothing special.

(March 13, 2016 at 12:43 pm)Rhythm Wrote:

(March 12, 2016 at 10:07 pm)bennyboy Wrote: *Someone called my name?*

The problem for a material monism is this: it completely disregards, and has no capacity for discussing or explaining, qualia.

You've been saying this for as long as we've been discussing it.  It's no more true now than it was the first time you said it.  You aren't satisfied with a material monist explanation, with the manner that material monist's discuss qualia.  

Not being satisfied is not interchangeable with "no capacity for discussing or explaining".

Ru-heally?  You sure?

Okay, tell me, by what criteria will I establish whether a given system experiences qualia?

*Absuive redefinition of "qualia" into physical monist terms in 5. . . 4. . . 3. . . 2. . . 1 . . *

(March 12, 2016 at 7:41 pm)little_monkey Wrote:

(March 12, 2016 at 7:00 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: Define mind please.

I've defined it. There's no need to redefine what has been defined.

Is there ever a point where mind does not equal activities of the brain?

(March 13, 2016 at 1:12 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: I'm not convinced I believe this. Minds exist as a function of the brain. If the functioning brain is altered then the function of the mind is altered.

You are stating as fact something which you assume. Tell me, by what criteria will you establish an actually sentient being from a philosophical zombie?

Before you tell me that mind is altered, you have to tell me how you know that there IS a mind to be altered. Cuz I say it can't be done.

(March 13, 2016 at 3:33 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: Is there ever a point where mind does not equal activities of the brain?

I can answer this. Yes-- the experience of mind is not a brain activity. Brains' activities involve blood flow, electrochemical signal transmission, the release and uptake of neurotransmitters, etc. Mind is the experience of things.

Now, it may be that mind is a product of those processes, or that it is supervenient on them. But mind is no more those physical processes than redness is an apple.