(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: Historically, there are three kinds of non-freedom that I can think of: 1) fate (which implies acceptance of a mythology); 2) physical (or at least causal) determinism; 3) God/gods, specifically a Jewish God who allows free will, and which represent from the human perspective a (partly, at least) random influence.

In order to make the God argument, we have to prove God; that's a non-starter for me (even though it's kind of the OP). Fate also implies acceptance of unseen beings-- historically the Fate sisters.

So we're left with the idea of causal determinism. If the will is free, it is free from causal determinism.

That would be arguing from ignorance and begging the question. You can only think of 3 forms of non-freedoms, reject two and then conclude that the third is the only possible non-freedom your will could be free from. Here are a few more forms of non-freedoms:

- Biological non-freedom - your will needs to be free from your basic biological needs and instincts.
- Societal non-freedom - your will needs to be free from society's will.
- Conditioning non-freedom - your will should not be determined by what happened in your developmental or formative years.
- Circumstancial non-freedom - your will should not be constrained by your circumstances.

I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.

Before trying to think of non-freedoms - try and understand what "freedom" means. We take it to mean "the quality of being unconstrained" - but what it actually means is "the quality of being unconstrained by anything other than its own nature". Every object is constrained by itself, by its nature and by its existence. Thinking that 'total' freedom requires it to be free from itself is a logical impossibility and if that's the freedom you are looking for, then the whole idea of freedom is superfluous. Which is why regarding causal determinism as a "non-freedom" is incorrect. Every object, by its nature and irrespective of truth of free-will or substance dualism, is a part of causality. Regarding it as non-freedom means requiring the object to be free form itself - which is a nonsensical notion.

(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: And since physical monists (at least here) assert that such a monism is wholly deterministic, then free will implies dualism.

Wrong. Physical monists do not assert any such thing. Indeterminism is a form of physical monism.

(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: As for the idea that free will is an experience of part of brain function-- no. Will is an agency for motivated action, and no experience can be called that. If that is reality, then the reality is that there is no will, not that the will is compatible with brain function determinism.

No one describes free-will as "experience of a part of brain function". They describe it as one of the brain functions. And that is the explanation of will according to functionalism.

(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: So there is really only one context in which free will can sensibly considered: mind/matter dualism. If such dualism is false, there is no will to prove or disprove, or to investigate.

Incorrect - for all the reasons given above.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:05 am)genkaus Wrote: Here are a few more forms of non-freedoms:

- Biological non-freedom - your will needs to be free from your basic biological needs and instincts.

Just a class of physical causal determinism.

Quote:- Societal non-freedom - your will needs to be free from society's will.

Just an extension of the issue of individual will.

Quote:- Conditioning non-freedom - your will should not be determined by what happened in your developmental or formative years.

This is a good one. Given physical monism and brain as mind, however, it reduces down to basic mind/matter dualism vs. monism.

Quote:- Circumstancial non-freedom - your will should not be constrained by your circumstances.

A pretty vague word, but reducible to causal determinism.

Quote:I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.

Yeah, no. Your categories are about freedom, but not about will. Will is the concept of sentient agency, unique from whatever aspect of the environment might alter or determine its behavior. It probably stems from issues of morality, social control, and the rightness of punishment-- "He could have done otherwise, because God made him free to choose, so we are right to punish him for his misdeeds."

Quote:Before trying to think of non-freedoms - try and understand what "freedom" means. We take it to mean "the quality of being unconstrained" - but what it actually means is "the quality of being unconstrained by anything other than its own nature". Every object is constrained by itself, by its nature and by its existence. Thinking that 'total' freedom requires it to be free from itself is a logical impossibility and if that's the freedom you are looking for, then the whole idea of freedom is superfluous. Which is why regarding causal determinism as a "non-freedom" is incorrect. Every object, by its nature and irrespective of truth of free-will or substance dualism, is a part of causality. Regarding it as non-freedom means requiring the object to be free form itself - which is a nonsensical notion.

All fine and well. You're doing a good job of covering the "freedom" part, but not so much the "will." I can say "my door opens, therefore I'm free to open the door," but this is equivocating badly on the kind of freedom that has always been attached to the idea of will: specifically, the three kinds of freedom I mentioned. History matters.

Quote:

(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: And since physical monists (at least here) assert that such a monism is wholly deterministic, then free will implies dualism.

Wrong. Physical monists do not assert any such thing. Indeterminism is a form of physical monism.

. . . (at least here). . .

Quote:

(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: As for the idea that free will is an experience of part of brain function-- no. Will is an agency for motivated action, and no experience can be called that. If that is reality, then the reality is that there is no will, not that the will is compatible with brain function determinism.

No one describes free-will as "experience of a part of brain function". They describe it as one of the brain functions. And that is the explanation of will according to functionalism.

1) They do, too.
2) If the thing we're talking about is pre-conscious, then it even less deserves the term "will," since will refers to deliberate agency. Again, we're getting to a problem where monists take a word intended for use in a dualistic world view, define it as something completely than it means in its original context, and then moves on as though the word hasn't lost a huge part of its salient meaning. Without that dualistic context, how do you define will? Maybe: "The tendency of the brain to act on memories, rather than responding directly to environmental circumstances?" That's a useful function, but I'm not willing to allow that the word "will" may be used in that sense.

(August 7, 2013 at 6:53 am)bennyboy Wrote: Just a class of physical causal determinism.

Just an extension of the issue of individual will.

This is a good one. Given physical monism and brain as mind, however, it reduces down to basic mind/matter dualism vs. monism.

A pretty vague word, but reducible to causal determinism.

Did you miss the point here or did you forget your own argument?

You chose causal determinism as a "non-freedom" from which one's will should be free. You didn't explain why it must be considered as a whole or why it is the only choice.

Similarly, I can choose a set of restraints some partially reducible to causal determinism but not reducible to whole of it and regard them as the 'non-freedom' the will should be free from.



I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.[/quote]
Yeah, no. Your categories are about freedom, but not about will. Will is the concept of sentient agency, unique from whatever aspect of the environment might alter or determine its behavior. It probably stems from issues of morality, social control, and the rightness of punishment-- "He could have done otherwise, because God made him free to choose, so we are right to punish him for his misdeeds."

(August 7, 2013 at 6:53 am)bennyboy Wrote: All fine and well. You're doing a good job of covering the "freedom" part, but not so much the "will." I can say "my door opens, therefore I'm free to open the door," but this is equivocating badly on the kind of freedom that has always been attached to the idea of will: specifically, the three kinds of freedom I mentioned. History matters.

You did forget your own argument. I didn't cover the "will" part because you didn't bring it up in the argument. The freedoms mentioned above are the ones associated with "will". Your broad generalization is incorrect because philosophers don't stick to those specific kinds of freedom.

(August 7, 2013 at 6:53 am)bennyboy Wrote: 1) They do, too.

Who are they?

(August 7, 2013 at 6:53 am)bennyboy Wrote: 2) If the thing we're talking about is pre-conscious, then it even less deserves the term "will," since will refers to deliberate agency. Again, we're getting to a problem where monists take a word intended for use in a dualistic world view, define it as something completely than it means in its original context, and then moves on as though the word hasn't lost a huge part of its salient meaning. Without that dualistic context, how do you define will? Maybe: "The tendency of the brain to act on memories, rather than responding directly to environmental circumstances?" That's a useful function, but I'm not willing to allow that the word "will" may be used in that sense.

Then that would be your problem. Your failure to grasp the change in the meaning of the word due to differing ontological presumptions is not an issue for the philosophers.

Consider the trivial "proof" given for substance dualism. It goes something like this. What do you mean by "I" or "me" or "self"? How is it defined? Its not my body parts, my arms, my legs my eyes etc. Its not my name or my behavior. Its not my brain. Its not any part of my brain which can be found by cutting it up into pieces. I'm not referring to any of these things when I talk about "I". So, I must be a spiritual entity. I am a soul in a spiritual plane and my body and brain are the means of my interaction with the physical world where "I" am nowhere to be found.

This definition of "self" has been used by substance dualists for centuries. So, any time you try to use this concept within physical monism, it would lose what you might consider a salient aspect - its spiritual nature. Are you arguing that physical monists should not use the word "I" or "me" or "self" - rather accept that within their ontological context, the self cannot exist?

That would be ridiculous. The spiritual aspect of self is a salient feature only within the dualist context. The actual meaning of the word would be the individual's identity as perceived by his consciousness. Those words would take on a completely different meaning within the monist context and yes, some of the salient features gained within the dualist context would be missing here. That does not mean that the words cannot or should not be used within that context.

Coming to the question of "will" - it is defined as "the mental faculty by which one chooses a course of action". In and of itself, it has no dualist or monist connotations. Your will is an attribute of your mind - that is its salient, defining feature. Within the monist context, the mind is a emergent attribute of how the brain functions - and will becomes one of those functions. It is as simple as "Entity A feels hungry. Entity A sees food. Entity A eats food." Here, the will of entity A - the will to eat food - is the result of the interplay between external and internal stimuli. It does not matter if you can reduce the entity A and the set of events to a series of biochemical reactions. Existence of will and its functions take place at the level of a person's identity - not at chemical levels.

Dear Genakus, my first post was an objection to the idea that libertarian free will is possible.

Your objection to my objection was that that was merely my own interpretation of things.

That should be obvious though, I can only interpret things my way, or I wouldn't be me.

I am merely trying to deal with what I consider to be the real issue of free will - the idea that we can somehow have ultimate responsibility of action and ultimate moral responsibility therefore, without determinism. With chance you don't get that. So that interpretation, in my opinion, is a petty and futile interpretation and a waste of time. Many many people really do believe in this world that people, ultimately, when it really comes down to it, have responsibility of action and therefore ultimate responsibility of their own moral action too. This is incorrect.

That is the real issue. I am not interested in what I consider to be your futility and pettiness.

Yours,

HT

(May the Halcyon be with you on and on and on).

(August 7, 2013 at 12:09 pm)genkaus Wrote: Did you miss the point here or did you forget your own argument?

You chose causal determinism as a "non-freedom" from which one's will should be free. You didn't explain why it must be considered as a whole or why it is the only choice.

Similarly, I can choose a set of restraints some partially reducible to causal determinism but not reducible to whole of it and regard them as the 'non-freedom' the will should be free from.

I think you're moving goalpoasts. I started by talking about free will vs. determinism because that's the way the debate is normally framed. You challenged me on that in much the same way you are now, so I mentioned the other categories of freedom around which the debate has traditionally been framed: fate and religion (specifically Christian). Then you went on to give examples that fall under the three categories I'd already given.

Do I really have to consider ever possibly sub-category of freedom? How about freedom from tight drawers? Freedom from Pink Unicorns? Freedom from future-peering Space Monkeys? quote]
I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.[/quote]
Yes, in the historical context this works. Being free from the Fates or from God's predetermination allows for moral judgment, even if it is a determinist "freedom," emphasis on the quotes. You can see philosophers today, like Dennett and Harris, arguing over this.

Quote:You did forget your own argument. I didn't cover the "will" part because you didn't bring it up in the argument. The freedoms mentioned above are the ones associated with "will". Your broad generalization is incorrect because philosophers don't stick to those specific kinds of freedom.

Okay, so we're all talking about will, then? Fine. What is it? It would be funny if I hadn't brought it up, since I've defined it in this very thread. Define "bringing up." lol

Or do you just mean that I failed to bring it up in my attempt to explain specifically to you why I chose causal determinism as the "thing from which will must be free" ?

Quote:

(August 7, 2013 at 6:53 am)bennyboy Wrote: 1) They do, too.

Who are they?

Philosophers 'n' sich. Basically, anyone who thinks that behavior is deterministic, but is aware that people say they feel like free agents.

Quote:Then that would be your problem. Your failure to grasp the change in the meaning of the word due to differing ontological presumptions is not an issue for the philosophers.

Hmmmm. . . it is if they want "will" to mean what it has meant for thousands of years, thereby engaging in meaningful debate with anyone who wants will to mean "will."

Quote:Consider the trivial "proof" given for substance dualism. It goes something like this. What do you mean by "I" or "me" or "self"? How is it defined? Its not my body parts, my arms, my legs my eyes etc. Its not my name or my behavior. Its not my brain. Its not any part of my brain which can be found by cutting it up into pieces. I'm not referring to any of these things when I talk about "I". So, I must be a spiritual entity. I am a soul in a spiritual plane and my body and brain are the means of my interaction with the physical world where "I" am nowhere to be found.

I now know that you've studied Buddhism. Did you do it willfully? Or did your circumstances force you to?

Quote:This definition of "self" has been used by substance dualists for centuries. So, any time you try to use this concept within physical monism, it would lose what you might consider a salient aspect - its spiritual nature. Are you arguing that physical monists should not use the word "I" or "me" or "self" - rather accept that within their ontological context, the self cannot exist?

Absolutely. Making references to the mind in physical monism is not to talk about physical monism.

Quote:That would be ridiculous. The spiritual aspect of self is a salient feature only within the dualist context. The actual meaning of the word would be the individual's identity as perceived by his consciousness. Those words would take on a completely different meaning within the monist context and yes, some of the salient features gained within the dualist context would be missing here. That does not mean that the words cannot or should not be used within that context.

Stop talking about spirit. Next, you'll be dancing around wiggling your fingers, saying "Ooh, look at me. I'm a dualist and I believe in magic."

Quote:Coming to the question of "will" - it is defined as "the mental faculty by which one chooses a course of action".

Of the terse one-line definitions findable on the internet, I think you've deliberatley chosen the one which is most compatible with physical determinism. You are missing the most important parts of will-- volition and sentience. In short, you're doing just what I accused physical monists of doing-- skewing the traditional meaning to make it more compatible with your worldview.

Quote:In and of itself, it has no dualist or monist connotations.

Because you're using a definition that is reducible either to dualism or to "mind is brain," since I already know you're about to go to "mind is brain."

Quote:Your will is an attribute of your mind - that is its salient, defining feature. Within the monist context, the mind is a emergent attribute of how the brain functions - and will becomes one of those functions. It is as simple as "Entity A feels hungry. Entity A sees food. Entity A eats food." Here, the will of entity A - the will to eat food - is the result of the interplay between external and internal stimuli. It does not matter if you can reduce the entity A and the set of events to a series of biochemical reactions. Existence of will and its functions take place at the level of a person's identity - not at chemical levels.

See, you're already using dualistic language. Entity A "feels" hungry. Really? How do you know that it feels? Do you probe it with your "Experience-o-meter 2000"? No. What you actually see is Entity A flopping around as it approaches food, and you are assuming that it is more than a food-approaching mechanism. And this is the problem with the emergence argument: mind is an emergent property which is inaccessible to anyone but the mind itself. This is unlike red light, which doesn't exist at the subatomic level, but can be measured or perceived by anyone.

Now, if only there was a word for things which cannot be measured, touched, or otherwise interacted with using any physical mechanism. Oh wait, there is-- non-physical. So if you want to reduce "will" down to a "faculty of mind" in a physical monism, then I'm going to want you to show me a mind, so I can examine it and decide for myself if it has a will at all, let alone a free one. Because as a diligent physical monist myself, if you can't show me one, or prove that it exists, then I'm going to discard it as a fiction-- and "will" along with it.

You know.. forgive me, but after page 3 I started quickly skimming.

I'm not trying to give an end-all on free will for every religion - that's getting off topic. I'm also not trying to speak for other theists.

I just want to mention a distinction. There is a difference between a decision and a consequence of a decision.
Free will in general is in reference to decisions we make, but in the Bible, free will is addressed specifically in the context of choosing to follow God, or not to follow God. It is a decision; decisions are followed by action. Regardless of circumstances, anyone can choose to do either one. Some decisions may be easier to make than others, but we still have a choice. Some may even have dire consequences, while others do not.. but choice still remains.

This is a flawed analogy, I'm sure, but it demonstrates the point well enough: Consider a wristwatch, with an hour hand and a minute hand. Say the hour hand is God's plan, and the minute hand is an individual person's plan. that person can choose to align their plan with God's, or not to. Regardless of what that person chooses, God's plan will be fulfilled. Their decision, therefore, is whether or not they will be a part of that plan - Free will and predestination, together. Free will is not the same as being all-powerful, and God's knowledge of every outcome is not the same as controlling every outcome.

(August 7, 2013 at 2:15 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: Dear Genakus, my first post was an objection to the idea that libertarian free will is possible.

Your objection to my objection was that that was merely my own interpretation of things.

That should be obvious though, I can only interpret things my way, or I wouldn't be me.

No, my objection to your objection is that your interpretation is incorrect you are conflating two different ideas regarding free-will. The definition you keep criticizing is based on substance dualism while your criticisms are based on monism. Either you should criticize dualist definition of free-will (ultimate self-responsibility) with criticism assuming dualism or you should criticize monist definition (indeterminism) using arguments based on monism. Using monist arguments against the dualist definition is nonsensical.

(August 7, 2013 at 2:15 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: I am merely trying to deal with what I consider to be the real issue of free will - the idea that we can somehow have ultimate responsibility of action and ultimate moral responsibility therefore, without determinism. With chance you don't get that. So that interpretation, in my opinion, is a petty and futile interpretation and a waste of time. Many many people really do believe in this world that people, ultimately, when it really comes down to it, have responsibility of action and therefore ultimate responsibility of their own moral action too. This is incorrect.

That is the real issue. I am not interested in what I consider to be your futility and pettiness.

Once again you are displaying your close-mindedness by claiming to have identified the 'real issue' of free will. The idea of moral responsibility and ultimate moral responsibility are not the same thing. While free will is relevant to the question of moral responsibility - ultimate moral responsibility is not a factor to be considered.

---

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I think you're moving goalpoasts. I started by talking about free will vs. determinism because that's the way the debate is normally framed. You challenged me on that in much the same way you are now, so I mentioned the other categories of freedom around which the debate has traditionally been framed: fate and religion (specifically Christian). Then you went on to give examples that fall under the three categories I'd already given.

I don't need to move the goalposts since you haven't shown what you set out to prove. You started talking about free-will vs determinism with the assumption that free-will, by definition, is incompatible with determinism (being defined as freedom from determinism) and any compatibilism would require redefinition of an established concept, which is unacceptable.

My counter to that is "freedom from determinism" is not the accepted definition of free-will. The accepted definition is "freedom from X" where X can refer to a particular concept within their philosophy which can be determinism as a whole, a part of determinism or bear no relation to determinism whatsoever.

You seemed to accept this and list 3 things you thought X could refer to and proceeded to reject two of them.

My counter was to list a few other things X could refer to - things that X has been traditionally referred to - which do not fall under the given categories.

Simply put, the free-will vs determinism debate arises only within the context of a particular definition of free-will within specific philosophies. Stating that theirs is the true and correct definition and accusing other philosophies of redefining the concept is invalid because their definition hasn't been universally accepted in the first place.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Do I really have to consider ever possibly sub-category of freedom? How about freedom from tight drawers? Freedom from Pink Unicorns? Freedom from future-peering Space Monkeys?

If you wish to prove that yours is the only possible 'correct' definition - then yes, you do.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Yes, in the historical context this works. Being free from the Fates or from God's predetermination allows for moral judgment, even if it is a determinist "freedom," emphasis on the quotes. You can see philosophers today, like Dennett and Harris, arguing over this.

So, we've established that free-will, by definition, does not mean freedom from determinism.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Okay, so we're all talking about will, then? Fine. What is it? It would be funny if I hadn't brought it up, since I've defined it in this very thread. Define "bringing up." lol

Or do you just mean that I failed to bring it up in my attempt to explain specifically to you why I chose causal determinism as the "thing from which will must be free" ?

The latter. This part of the debate was about you justifying the selection of "causal determinism" as the constraint.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Philosophers 'n' sich. Basically, anyone who thinks that behavior is deterministic, but is aware that people say they feel like free agents.

I'm sure their position gets frequently criticized.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Hmmmm. . . it is if they want "will" to mean what it has meant for thousands of years, thereby engaging in meaningful debate with anyone who wants will to mean "will."

Do you understand how a word can mean the same thing while providing completely different implications given the context?

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I now know that you've studied Buddhism. Did you do it willfully? Or did your circumstances force you to?

I haven't studied Buddhism.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Absolutely. Making references to the mind in physical monism is not to talk about physical monism.

You are demonstrably wrong:

[url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind#Monist_solutions_to_the_mind.E2.80.93body_problem

Quote:[/url]

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Stop talking about spirit. Next, you'll be dancing around wiggling your fingers, saying "Ooh, look at me. I'm a dualist and I believe in magic."

That's a rather ignorant view of dualism.

[quote='bennyboy' pid='489576' dateline='1375909696']Of the terse one-line definitions findable on the internet, I think you've deliberatley chosen the one which is most compatible with physical determinism. You are missing the most important parts of will-- volition and sentience. In short, you're doing just what I accused physical monists of doing-- skewing the traditional meaning to make it more compatible with your worldview.

Actually, I chose the first one I found. I didn't choose it based on how compatible it is with determinism and I find it to be the most comprehensive definition available - one that applies equally to all philosophical positions without favoring one over the other. And if you actually see the definition, you should realize that sentience is implied by the phrase "mental faculty" and volition is a synonym. In conclusion, this is the traditional meaning of "will".

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Because you're using a definition that is reducible either to dualism or to "mind is brain," since I already know you're about to go to "mind is brain."

"Mind is brain" happens to be a physical monist position. So, what you are saying is simply that this definition applies to different philosophies. Which isn't a problem.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: See, you're already using dualistic language. Entity A "feels" hungry. Really? How do you know that it feels? Do you probe it with your "Experience-o-meter 2000"? No. What you actually see is Entity A flopping around as it approaches food, and you are assuming that it is more than a food-approaching mechanism. And this is the problem with the emergence argument: mind is an emergent property which is inaccessible to anyone but the mind itself. This is unlike red light, which doesn't exist at the subatomic level, but can be measured or perceived by anyone.

Now, if only there was a word for things which cannot be measured, touched, or otherwise interacted with using any physical mechanism. Oh wait, there is-- non-physical. So if you want to reduce "will" down to a "faculty of mind" in a physical monism, then I'm going to want you to show me a mind, so I can examine it and decide for myself if it has a will at all, let alone a free one. Because as a diligent physical monist myself, if you can't show me one, or prove that it exists, then I'm going to discard it as a fiction-- and "will" along with it.

You seem to have been reduced to incoherent babbling. Perhaps you should read up on the different monist positions regarding "mind" and "will" which should clear up a lot of ignorant statements here.

First of all, you can't use dualist language while talking about Monism.
Second of all, within monism, mind is measurable and observable even though our current technology is not at the level of doing so fully. Study up on it and come back once you have actually understood the position.

(August 7, 2013 at 5:32 pm)Locke Wrote: You know.. forgive me, but after page 3 I started quickly skimming.

I'm not trying to give an end-all on free will for every religion - that's getting off topic. I'm also not trying to speak for other theists.

I just want to mention a distinction. There is a difference between a decision and a consequence of a decision.
Free will in general is in reference to decisions we make, but in the Bible, free will is addressed specifically in the context of choosing to follow God, or not to follow God. It is a decision; decisions are followed by action. Regardless of circumstances, anyone can choose to do either one. Some decisions may be easier to make than others, but we still have a choice. Some may even have dire consequences, while others do not.. but choice still remains.

This is a flawed analogy, I'm sure, but it demonstrates the point well enough: Consider a wristwatch, with an hour hand and a minute hand. Say the hour hand is God's plan, and the minute hand is an individual person's plan. that person can choose to align their plan with God's, or not to. Regardless of what that person chooses, God's plan will be fulfilled. Their decision, therefore, is whether or not they will be a part of that plan - Free will and predestination, together. Free will is not the same as being all-powerful, and God's knowledge of every outcome is not the same as controlling every outcome.

That does not make any sense. At all.

Saying "free-will is in reference to decisions we make" tells me nothing constructive about free-will or my decisions.

You haven't justified your statement - "Regardless of circumstances, anyone can choose to do either one". Many here are of the opinion that "Due of circumstances, you can choose only one and none other". That is what the fuss is all about.

And your analogy does not demonstrate the point you seem to think it does. By manipulating the minute hand, I can manipulate the course of the hour hand. Which means the two are not independent and your god's plan would very much depend upon the person playing out the role.

(August 7, 2013 at 6:01 pm)genkaus Wrote: My counter to that is "freedom from determinism" is not the accepted definition of free-will. The accepted definition is "freedom from X" where X can refer to a particular concept within their philosophy which can be determinism as a whole, a part of determinism or bear no relation to determinism whatsoever.

You seemed to accept this and list 3 things you thought X could refer to and proceeded to reject two of them.

I don't reject God and fate, I discard them. I do this because nobodoy here is making a case for either of these (except of course in the OP lol). If anybody wants to make a serious case that gods can set our behavior, in the context of a free will discussion, then we can actually include that in the discussion.

Quote:My counter was to list a few other things X could refer to - things that X has been traditionally referred to - which do not fall under the given categories.

Except all those things DID fall exactly as children of the first 3 categories I mentioned.

Quote:

(August 7, 2013 at 5:08 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Do I really have to consider ever possibly sub-category of freedom? How about freedom from tight drawers? Freedom from Pink Unicorns? Freedom from future-peering Space Monkeys?

If you wish to prove that yours is the only possible 'correct' definition - then yes, you do.

My definition is "correct" because the words have always meant what I say they meant. Look to historical discussions of free will, or even to etymology of the words "free" and "will." This is not an arbitrary POSITION, it's just a knowledge of what those two words mean.

That being said, I acknowledge what you're saying: there are many world views, and depending on your world view, words can have various meanings. So, in a physical monist world view, will (if it means anything) means, and can only mean, the faculty of making decisions (based on both that world view and on one's emotional state, for example).

What I'm saying is that I do not accept that the words mind, will, etc. HAVE valid meanings in that kind of monism-- they are just euphemisms for brain function, and are better dropped than clung to.

Quote:

bennyboy Wrote:Philosophers 'n' sich. Basically, anyone who thinks that behavior is deterministic, but is aware that people say they feel like free agents.

I'm sure their position gets frequently criticized.

Yes. By me.

Quote:You seem to have been reduced to incoherent babbling. Perhaps you should read up on the different monist positions regarding "mind" and "will" which should clear up a lot of ignorant statements here.

Condescension much? If you want to pull out your philosophical pecker and measure it against mine, then there's always 1 vs. 1. Otherwise, let's stick to ideas rather than ad homs.

Quote:First of all, you can't use dualist language while talking about Monism.

That's exactly what I'm saying.

Quote:Second of all, within monism, mind is measurable and observable even though our current technology is not at the level of doing so fully. Study up on it and come back once you have actually understood the position.

Noooo. Brain function is measurable. I'm asking you to show me a mind. I'll show you red light, a property which emerges out of collections of particles which themselves have no color. You show me that emergent property, mind, which you say arises out of brains.

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: ... You show me that emergent property, mind, which you say arises out of brains.

Emergence is a very complex subject.

Subatomic particles, for example, are not directly observable but they emerge into visible and measurable structures at macroscopic level

Emergence in the brain is not directly observable (mind, as you call it, conscience or yourself if you will) but what mind emerges from, is ... crazy isn't it ?

Anyways, we have a lot (and I mean A LOT) as humans to learn about emergence, especially the strong one, it is very elusive (even mysterious) phenomenon but certainly not a miracle.

I personaly believe that strong emergence is one of the fundamental properties of matter, we already know that weak one is, my hope is that chaos theory will pave the way in sorting this puzzle out sooner or later