(May 29, 2014 at 6:12 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(May 29, 2014 at 2:25 pm)Chas Wrote: Believe you? I don't even understand what you are asking.

We are in a thread about mind, and you've stated many times that the evidence favors a particular view of mind. I've stated many time that since the mind of others cannot be directly observed, evidence about it is rooted in one or more philosophical assumptions for which there cannot be meaningful evidence.

I want you to specify what evidence you actually have, and in what way you are confident that it supports your positions, rather than simply repeatedly saying you have evidence. You say there is neurological evidence that supports monism. Please provide it.

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(May 29, 2014 at 5:25 pm)Pickup_shonuff Wrote: Sorry, I must have confused a comment by ChadWooters with yourself. YOU said you're an agnostic idealist, yes? Just out of curiosity, why idealism rather than realism, in your view?

Realism means a lot of things, so you'll have to specify what it means in the context of this question.

I can summarize my position, though: maybe the answer to your question will be in there somewhere.

First, about dualism. I think a philosophical substance dualism is impossible. If you have mind and brain, and they are interacting, then there is a serious problem explaining how they interact. What's the bridge? I contend that it would necessarily be at least a third susbstance. But this third substance would have to have "roots" in both mind and the physical universe. Other than a mystical soul, don't have any good ideas about what this third substance could be.

So let's say for now that a physical monism and an idealistic monism are our two main contenders. Which is better?

To me, the problem of mind is the thorn in physical monism's paw. There is no good physical theory of mind, and mind is not normally considered a physical property (except by monists who want to support their monism). You can't see the minds of others, measure it, or in any capacity interact with it. You're required simply to believe that it exists, and to believe that it is "somewhere in the brain," which completely ignores the important philosophical question of why mind exists, rather than not existing. At best, the physical monist position requires redefining what it means for something to be physical, to the point that the physical/mental semantic distinction is meaningless. But I do have qualia, and that means something to me, and collapsing qualia down to brain function is an avoidance of real inquiry, not a method of inquiry.

There's no such problem in an idealism. Physical properties like color and form are perfectly-well represented as ideas. Gravity, microscopes, scientific methodolgy, talking to professors etc. are all NECESSARILY experienced as ideas by us, and the source of those experiences is not ultimately knowable. They could come from a BIJ, the Matrix, the Mind of God, etc.-- or a physical universe. But even if there is an objective physical reality, we do not experience it-- we experience ideas about it.

Is the presence of mind a bigger thorn for physical monism than the idea of "living matter," matter that comes alive under the right set of chemical conditions in a given environment? To me, one must always be open to broadening our definition of "physicality" as there are still wide gaps of knowledge. You're correct that we don't experience "objective physical reality" directly, but only approximations that our brains permit... but idealism seems to place far too much emphasis on the importance of mind, which is to say, contrary to my understanding of idealism, the objects we perceive would continue existing apart from our apprehension of them, even if their properties are only known to us through a particular conscious experience i.e. synaptic pattern or what have you.

(May 29, 2014 at 5:25 pm)Pickup_shonuff Wrote:

(May 28, 2014 at 9:23 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I don't think I ever said I'm a dualist.

Sorry, I must have confused a comment by ChadWooters with yourself. YOU said you're an agnostic idealist, yes? Just out of curiosity, why idealism rather than realism, in your view?

I don't think I ever said that, either.

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(May 29, 2014 at 6:12 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(May 29, 2014 at 2:25 pm)Chas Wrote: Believe you? I don't even understand what you are asking.

We are in a thread about mind, and you've stated many times that the evidence favors a particular view of mind. I've stated many time that since the mind of others cannot be directly observed, evidence about it is rooted in one or more philosophical assumptions for which there cannot be meaningful evidence.

I want you to specify what evidence you actually have, and in what way you are confident that it supports your positions, rather than simply repeatedly saying you have evidence. You say there is neurological evidence that supports monism. Please provide it.

Our actual experience with brain differences and brain damage show effects on the mind are brain-based. The results from neuroscience at all levels support being a consequence of the brain. There is no evidence for any other hypothesis.

Hypotheses that don't take that into account are unscientific.

There is a massive amount of data and you can Google for it as easily as I.



Bear, M. F.; B. W. Connors, and M. A. Paradiso (2006). Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain (3rd ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott. ISBN 0-7817-6003-8.
Binder, Hirokawa, Windhorst, ed. (2009). Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-23735-8.
Kandel, ER; Schwartz JH, Jessell TM (2000). Principles of Neural Science (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-8385-7701-6.
Squire, L. et al. (2003). Fundamental Neuroscience, 2nd edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-660303-0
Byrne and Roberts (2004). From Molecules to Networks. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-148660-5
Sanes, Reh, Harris (2005). Development of the Nervous System, 2nd edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-618621-9
Siegel et al. (2005). Basic Neurochemistry, 7th edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-088397-X
Rieke, F. et al. (1999). Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code. The MIT Press; Reprint edition ISBN 0-262-68108-0

etc.

(May 31, 2014 at 8:08 am)Chas Wrote: Bear, M. F.; B. W. Connors, and M. A. Paradiso (2006). Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain (3rd ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott. ISBN 0-7817-6003-8.
Binder, Hirokawa, Windhorst, ed. (2009). Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-23735-8.
Kandel, ER; Schwartz JH, Jessell TM (2000). Principles of Neural Science (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-8385-7701-6.
Squire, L. et al. (2003). Fundamental Neuroscience, 2nd edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-660303-0
Byrne and Roberts (2004). From Molecules to Networks. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-148660-5
Sanes, Reh, Harris (2005). Development of the Nervous System, 2nd edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-618621-9
Siegel et al. (2005). Basic Neurochemistry, 7th edition. Academic Press; ISBN 0-12-088397-X
Rieke, F. et al. (1999). Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code. The MIT Press; Reprint edition ISBN 0-262-68108-0

etc.

That's a lot of reading. Maybe you can cut to the part where you show what the scientific criteria are for establishing whether a physical structure experiences qualia or not. OR maybe you can show me the current scientific explanation of how electrochemical interactions manifest as subjective experience.

I've accused you (and in this capacity I think you represent all physical monists) several times of vaguely waving to the brain and claiming qualia are "in there somewhere," and that's still the case. However, in order to know whether consciousness can generalize to the universe as a whole, we need to know what SPECIFICALLY it is about the brain that allows otherwise unconscious matter to become conscious. We need to know that the universe, or at least massive parts of the universe, do not meet those SPECIFIC requirements for the existence of qualia.

As for the lack of evidence-- I'd say this can be categorized as a logical fallacy. An appeal to a lack of evidence, where it is our own limitations which prevent us from collecting evidence, is a poor indicator of truth of a proposition. If I point to the fact that we only know there's life on Earth, because there's no evidence of life anywhere else, would this be good support for the idea that there is only life on Earth? Nope.

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(May 31, 2014 at 2:48 am)Pickup_shonuff Wrote: but idealism seems to place far too much emphasis on the importance of mind, which is to say, contrary to my understanding of idealism, the objects we perceive would continue existing apart from our apprehension of them, even if their properties are only known to us through a particular conscious experience i.e. synaptic pattern or what have you.

I don't think it's possible to place "far too much emphasis on the importance of the mind."

I've had many ideas and experiences which aren't dependent on interaction with my environment. I have not, however, had any interaction with my environment which wasn't dependent on the existence of my mind. Neither has anyone else. This is non-trivial. It must be understood that all world views, including the idea that the world consists of an objective physical reality, are just that-- the experience of ideas. And there is, unfortunately, no other level as human beings on which we can interact with reality.

The problem in this thread is that while the physicalist world view is itself AN IDEA, people hold that idea so strongly in their minds that they take it as more representative of reality than the minds which hold the idea.

(June 1, 2014 at 2:19 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's a lot of reading. Maybe you can cut to the part where you show what the scientific criteria are for establishing whether a physical structure experiences qualia or not.

Did you see that TED talk I put up earlier?
I'm on my phone, so you're going to have to go back a page or two to find it.
Towards the end of that talk, there's a nice little experiment where an electromagnetic pulse is shown to (on some cases) perturb your decision making process...

(June 1, 2014 at 4:30 am)pocaracas Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 2:19 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's a lot of reading. Maybe you can cut to the part where you show what the scientific criteria are for establishing whether a physical structure experiences qualia or not.

Did you see that TED talk I put up earlier?
I'm on my phone, so you're going to have to go back a page or two to find it.
Towards the end of that talk, there's a nice little experiment where an electromagnetic pulse is shown to (on some cases) perturb your decision making process...

I think the brain science is very cool. I think you linked some things about selective brain damage as well, right? With all my philosophical complaints with physicalism as a philosophy, the fact that you can mess with my brain and make interesting things happen to my experience is undeniable.

But my question is how would you determine if a non-Earth-animal physical structure had qualia? How can you even determine if a human really has qualia rather than just behaving like he/she does? With humans, there's always the implicit assumption-- we already believe people to be conscious so we just start seeing what the brain's doing. But how would you go about testing other things?

(June 1, 2014 at 5:41 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 4:30 am)pocaracas Wrote: Did you see that TED talk I put up earlier?
I'm on my phone, so you're going to have to go back a page or two to find it.
Towards the end of that talk, there's a nice little experiment where an electromagnetic pulse is shown to (on some cases) perturb your decision making process...

I think the brain science is very cool. I think you linked some things about selective brain damage as well, right? With all my philosophical complaints with physicalism as a philosophy, the fact that you can mess with my brain and make interesting things happen to my experience is undeniable.

Do I sense a hint of acknowledgement that your qualia can be "reliably" influenced by a direct electromagnetic impulse to the brain?

(June 1, 2014 at 5:41 am)bennyboy Wrote: But my question is how would you determine if a non-Earth-animal physical structure had qualia? How can you even determine if a human really has qualia rather than just behaving like he/she does? With humans, there's always the implicit assumption-- we already believe people to be conscious so we just start seeing what the brain's doing. But how would you go about testing other things?

Depends on their physiology, I guess....

(June 1, 2014 at 5:54 am)pocaracas Wrote: Do I sense a hint of acknowledgement that your qualia can be "reliably" influenced by a direct electromagnetic impulse to the brain?

I've never claimed there isn't a relationship between the brain and qualia. So no hint, just acknowledgement-- but in a mundane sense. The philosophical issue is the real nature of those things, which is inaccessible to us. And in this case, whether that nature is local or general.

(June 1, 2014 at 2:19 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's a lot of reading. Maybe you can cut to the part where you show what the scientific criteria are for establishing whether a physical structure experiences qualia or not. OR maybe you can show me the current scientific explanation of how electrochemical interactions manifest as subjective experience.

Quote:No one yet has explanations for those, so why do you demand that I do?

I've accused you (and in this capacity I think you represent all physical monists) several times of vaguely waving to the brain and claiming qualia are "in there somewhere," and that's still the case.

You continue to misunderstand what I've said and you are going in circles.
No, qualia aren't in the brain, they are in the mind. It is minds that experiences, brains are the substrate.

Quote:However, in order to know whether consciousness can generalize to the universe as a whole, we need to know what SPECIFICALLY it is about the brain that allows otherwise unconscious matter to become conscious. We need to know that the universe, or at least massive parts of the universe, do not meet those SPECIFIC requirements for the existence of qualia.

We are working on it. Stop acting like a frickin' three year-old and demanding answers this minute.

Quote:As for the lack of evidence-- I'd say this can be categorized as a logical fallacy. An appeal to a lack of evidence, where it is our own limitations which prevent us from collecting evidence, is a poor indicator of truth of a proposition.

And once again you are objecting to something I didn't frickin' say.
I have neither claimed that my view is true nor that yours is false.
I have stated that the evidence we have supports that mind is dependent on brain and only brain.

Quote:If I point to the fact that we only know there's life on Earth, because there's no evidence of life anywhere else, would this be good support for the idea that there is only life on Earth? Nope.

And that is nothing like what I said.

(June 1, 2014 at 7:57 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 5:54 am)pocaracas Wrote: Do I sense a hint of acknowledgement that your qualia can be "reliably" influenced by a direct electromagnetic impulse to the brain?

I've never claimed there isn't a relationship between the brain and qualia. So no hint, just acknowledgement-- but in a mundane sense.

That's news to me, but alright! I'll take it!

(June 1, 2014 at 7:57 am)bennyboy Wrote: The philosophical issue is the real nature of those things, which is inaccessible to us. And in this case, whether that nature is local or general.

Local == brain?
general == anywhere?

(June 1, 2014 at 9:21 am)pocaracas Wrote: Local == brain?
general == anywhere?

Right. One of the theories of consciousness is that it is information-driven, not dependent on a particular physical mechanism. So the question in that case is-- how much information has to be processed in order to say something has consciousness? Where's the magic line in the sand?

My guess is it would be arbitrary. It's kind of like asking how many water molecules do you need in order to have wetness.