Does it make sense to speak of "Universal Consciousness" or "Universal Intelligence"?

[pocaracas]

Should be that gray scale thing... and with a great dependence on which exact neurons you pull out...
Should... can't say I've tested it... can't say I know of anyone who's done it, either...

If it's a gray scale, and not a critical mass, then you'd expect to get down to either two neuron or to a single neuron, and this should represent the most basic unit of (very primitive) possible awareness. Does anyone here disagree with this?

That's not what I said, and no, I wouldn't expect such a thing.
Gray scale, fading to darkness while there are still some structures (as in lots and lots of neurons) connected and ticking... Ever heard of Alzheimer's?

[Angrboda]

Is there a kind of "critical" mass at which you pull just one more neuron and can suddenly non-arbitrarily announce "now there is no more vision," or "now the person has a complete lack of face recognition" or whatever? Or is it just a gray scale from full functioning down to non-functioning?

We don't know the minimum requirements for each function. What we do know is that damage to specific areas of the brain correlates strongly with specific deficits of functioning. This implies that those aspects of consciousness are associated with those aspects of the brain. Map them all and there isn't a heck of a lot left over to be explained.

[Chas]

Should be that gray scale thing... and with a great dependence on which exact neurons you pull out...
Should... can't say I've tested it... can't say I know of anyone who's done it, either...

If it's a gray scale, and not a critical mass, then you'd expect to get down to either two neuron or to a single neuron, and this should represent the most basic unit of (very primitive) possible awareness. Does anyone here disagree with this?

Yes, I utterly disagree. Your argument is absurd.

[bennyboy]

If it's a gray scale, and not a critical mass, then you'd expect to get down to either two neuron or to a single neuron, and this should represent the most basic unit of (very primitive) possible awareness. Does anyone here disagree with this?

Yes, I utterly disagree. Your argument is absurd.

You forgot to say, "You have no evidence to support your thought experiment." OR to acknowledge that I gave a sensible alternative-- that there is a "critical mass" of complexity under which a system could (non-arbitrarily, mind you) no longer be said to have even a tiny spark of awareness. You know what would be fun? Since you so confidently assert what mind is-- a function of complexity-- then YOU explain why you think this to be so, and precisely what kind and amount of complexity is required.

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We don't know the minimum requirements for each function. What we do know is that damage to specific areas of the brain correlates strongly with specific deficits of functioning. This implies that those aspects of consciousness are associated with those aspects of the brain. Map them all and there isn't a heck of a lot left over to be explained.

Sure there is. What is left over to be explained is why arranging cells into those structures causes the existence of qualia. Since the sections you are talking about can be damaged, and often still have a partially-functioning person, I would say they are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain consciousness. So first, I'd want to find out what part IS responsible, and then start pulling neurons one by one. At what exact point does that switch go off between "something happening" and "nothing here but oblivion"?

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That's not what I said, and no, I wouldn't expect such a thing.
Gray scale, fading to darkness while there are still some structures (as in lots and lots of neurons) connected and ticking... Ever heard of Alzheimer's?

Yes, and it's kind of what I have in mind. In this case, the function of the mind deteriorates along with the brain. Since I'm investigating Chas's idea that mind is a function of complexity, and since the deterioration of brain function in Alzheimer's is an example of exactly that, I want to know at exactly what point there is no longer anything there.

I think even after a person forgets their family, or their own name, or even that they are a human being, there is still "something there." They are moving down that gray scale toward a kind of raw, contentless state. And yet, they still have neuronal activity, chemical activity, atomic and subatomic activity. We still haven't identified the specific subtrate that is minimally sufficient and necessary for there to be "something there" rather than complete oblivion.

[Chas]

Yes, I utterly disagree. Your argument is absurd.

You forgot to say, "You have no evidence to support your thought experiment." OR to acknowledge that I gave a sensible alternative-- that there is a "critical mass" of complexity under which a system could (non-arbitrarily, mind you) no longer be said to have even a tiny spark of awareness. You know what would be fun? Since you so confidently assert what mind is-- a function of complexity-- then YOU explain why you think this to be so, and precisely what kind and amount of complexity is required.

I'm sorry you value evidence so little. I don't know what that threshold is, and I have no problem saying so.

What is absurd is considering one or two neurons to be sufficiently complex to host 'awareness'.

It appears there is a threshold and a scale. That sort of thing is quite common in nature.
There are many sizes of stars but there is a mass threshold below which a ball of hydrogen won't start fusing hydrogen to helium.

We only see mind in the complex structures we call brains.
And we see degrees of consciousness and self-awareness correlate strongly to brain size - body mass ratio (encephalization quotient). One or two neurons doesn't make a brain.

[bennyboy]

I'm sorry you value evidence so little.

Who says I don't value evidence? I just don't agree that the evidence says what you think it says. The evidence shows that some physical systems have qualia associated with them, and that the nature of the qualia is determined by the structure or function of the systems. This is not the same as establishing the existence, vs. the complete non-existence, of maximally simple (i.e. atomic) qualia.

It does not demonstrate that all systems of similar complexity have associated qualia-- that is a non sequitur. Nor does it demonstrate upon which stratum the most elemental essence of mind supervenes-- we have no experimental ability to isolate substrata and know whether there is some primitive qualia associated with them or not. Given any gross system upon which mind supervenes, how would you establish that the mind is not rather supervenient on that systems components, rather than on the function of the system as a whole?

What is absurd is considering one or two neurons to be sufficiently complex to host 'awareness'.

Why is it absurd? Some neurons respond to multiple inputs, and have multiple outputs. They also grow new dendrites in response to chemical trails in their environment-- something I would say could be categorized as a behavior. Are you suggesting or outright saying that single-celled organisms are purely mechanical, and have no qualia associated with them at all? How could you know this, and on what basis could you assume it?

It appears there is a threshold and a scale. That sort of thing is quite common in nature.

This is a possibility to be sure. But is there a non-arbitrary threshold or position on a scale at which mind ultimately collapses into oblivion, or is it an arbitrary semantic issue: "At this point, we deem the mental activity sufficiently minor to say that it should not be recognized as mental activity at all." I think you're going to have a very hard time showing that your complexity idea isn't a product of anthropomorphic assumption rather than solid evidence.

[Chas]

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I'm sorry you value evidence so little.

Who says I don't value evidence? I just don't agree that the evidence says what you think it says. The evidence shows that some physical systems have qualia associated with them, and that the nature of the qualia is determined by the structure or function of the systems. This is not the same as establishing the existence, vs. the complete non-existence, of maximally simple (i.e. atomic) qualia.

It does not demonstrate that all systems of similar complexity have associated qualia-- that is a non sequitur. Nor does it demonstrate upon which stratum the most elemental essence of mind supervenes-- we have no experimental ability to isolate substrata and know whether there is some primitive qualia associated with them or not. Given any gross system upon which mind supervenes, how would you establish that the mind is not rather supervenient on that systems components, rather than on the function of the system as a whole?

What is absurd is considering one or two neurons to be sufficiently complex to host 'awareness'.

Why is it absurd? Some neurons respond to multiple inputs, and have multiple outputs. They also grow new dendrites in response to chemical trails in their environment-- something I would say could be categorized as a behavior. Are you suggesting or outright saying that single-celled organisms are purely mechanical, and have no qualia associated with them at all? How could you know this, and on what basis could you assume it?

It appears there is a threshold and a scale. That sort of thing is quite common in nature.

This is a possibility to be sure. But is there a non-arbitrary threshold or position on a scale at which mind ultimately collapses into oblivion, or is it an arbitrary semantic issue: "At this point, we deem the mental activity sufficiently minor to say that it should not be recognized as mental activity at all." I think you're going to have a very hard time showing that your complexity idea isn't a product of anthropomorphic assumption rather than solid evidence.

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Since I included all brains, not just human, "anthropomorphic assumption" is pretty wide of the mark.

Since you continue to misrepresent what I say, I'm done with you.

[pocaracas]

That's not what I said, and no, I wouldn't expect such a thing.
Gray scale, fading to darkness while there are still some structures (as in lots and lots of neurons) connected and ticking... Ever heard of Alzheimer's?

Yes, and it's kind of what I have in mind. In this case, the function of the mind deteriorates along with the brain. Since I'm investigating Chas's idea that mind is a function of complexity, and since the deterioration of brain function in Alzheimer's is an example of exactly that, I want to know at exactly what point there is no longer anything there.

So, our best available "evidence" of this effect seems to happen to people who suffer from Alzheimer's, but this disease attacks mostly the brain areas dedicated to memory, not so much for the actual functioning of consciousness.... so we don't really have much evidence of what you're asking.
We can conjecture, based on what we see happening to Alzheimer's patients.... and that is a slow decline in memories, never quite reaching zero memory, before the patient suffers some terminal malady, often from the failure of some autonomous system that also gets affected by the disease.

I think even after a person forgets their family, or their own name, or even that they are a human being, there is still "something there." They are moving down that gray scale toward a kind of raw, contentless state. And yet, they still have neuronal activity, chemical activity, atomic and subatomic activity. We still haven't identified the specific subtrate that is minimally sufficient and necessary for there to be "something there" rather than complete oblivion.

No, we haven't identified it... and I anticipate that the technology for such determination might be quite a bit far off.

But do remember, like I said above, Alzheimer's is not the best way to approach the problem of consciousness, as it affects an area of the brain that is mostly connected to storage of information, rather than the processing of that information. I don't know if the processing is done on the same area, or not, but it seems that the consensus states that it is not. And we can see an Alzheimer's patient processing the little information he has... little as it is, it usually brings about confusion and frustration. Clear hints that consciousness is still there.

[bennyboy]

So, our best available "evidence" of this effect seems to happen to people who suffer from Alzheimer's, but this disease attacks mostly the brain areas dedicated to memory, not so much for the actual functioning of consciousness.... so we don't really have much evidence of what you're asking.
We can conjecture, based on what we see happening to Alzheimer's patients.... and that is a slow decline in memories, never quite reaching zero memory, before the patient suffers some terminal malady, often from the failure of some autonomous system that also gets affected by the disease.

Yes, this is a serious problem. We never really get to find out what happens when brain systems get simpler and simpler, because a too-simple brain cannot stay alive. And even if you could transplant a dying brain and keep blood pumping through it-- it would be very hard to know what that "person" is experiencing, if anything, because he can no longer communicate.

[Angrboda]

I would say they are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain consciousness.

Yes. You've been saying that since the day you got here. You're incredulous that a brain can give rise to mind. Regardless, the evidence is that qualia are the result of brain activity.