Rae, the Churchland quote claims that the subjective is our experience of neural events ‘from the inside’ while the objective could be our view of the same events ‘from the outside’. Even if that is true it does not undermine my position with respect to the severability of signs from their significance.

(January 25, 2015 at 3:19 pm)rasetsu Wrote:

(January 25, 2015 at 1:10 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: The medium is not the message...These examples show that meaning has features distinct from the various physical mediums that support it.

True, but irrelevant. We're talking about meaning in a complex set of neurons, not writing on a page. This doesn't even remotely relate.

The analogy holds. I say that despite vast differences of complexity both are signs that carry significance. Unless someone supplies a reason why the observed complexity brings forth novel properties, then to say the more complex example is different seems like special pleading.

(January 25, 2015 at 3:19 pm)rasetsu ' Wrote:

(January 25, 2015 at 1:10 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Explaining the relationship between signs and their significance requires more kinds of cause than reductionism allows. At least formal and final causes provides a more complete model for that relationship.

This is an abstract philosophical argument which depends on a certain theory of causes, which, even if true, is far from obvious. This is simply insufficient and seems to put you in the position of claiming to know the kinds of causes which meaning and intentionality require.

I approach the problem against the background of moderate realism. Indeed moderate realism is not an obvious solution since it took close to 1400 years to develop. I do not think it is too bid of a step from final cause to intentionality since they seem to be different ways of saying the same thing.

(January 25, 2015 at 3:19 pm)rasetsu ' Wrote:

(January 25, 2015 at 1:10 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Explaining the relationship between signs and their significance requires more kinds of cause than reductionism allows.

I think this reduces to a form of argument from ignorance,...

The arguments I presented are sufficient to remove from consideration the sort of identity theory proposed by eliminative materialists like Churchland.

(January 25, 2015 at 3:19 pm)rasetsu ' Wrote: ...could you explain what kinds of causes are required that aren't allowed by reductionism?

Formal and final.

(January 25, 2015 at 10:32 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: ]The analogy holds. I say that despite vast differences of complexity both are signs that carry significance. Unless someone supplies a reason why the observed complexity brings forth novel properties, then to say the more complex example is different seems like special pleading.

Weak analogy equals weak conclusions. Obvious disanalogies weaken it and the fact you use only give a small number of shared properties weakens it. So I think you're really overstated your case here.

You haven't actually defended the theory of four causes. I doubt many people here take the four causes seriously since the four causes are just tautologies, purely linguistic, and not really insightful. Example, saying a ball is round because of it's form isn't really saying anything new or saying the the ball bounds because it's made of material that makes it bounce isn't neither. The four causes just restate the question as the answer. If we believe the four causes are trivial tautologies this isn't going to go anywhere. There would be no point in going on with the dialogue because the disagreement is at a deeper level. If there is no common ground we going to agree on nothing.

(January 26, 2015 at 5:53 am)Pizz-atheist Wrote: You haven't actually defended the theory of four causes....If we believe the four causes are trivial tautologies this isn't going to go anywhere.

Offering up such a defense to satisfy your incredulity would be far beyond the scope of even a few posts. And you are correct, if you intend to dismiss my approach because of your mistaken belief about the four causes, then I really cannot help you much. But let me ask you, are you equally dismissive of efficient and material cause?

(January 26, 2015 at 9:38 am)ChadWooters Wrote:

(January 26, 2015 at 5:53 am)Pizz-atheist Wrote: You haven't actually defended the theory of four causes....If we believe the four causes are trivial tautologies this isn't going to go anywhere.

Offering up such a defense to satisfy your incredulity would be far beyond the scope of even a few posts. And you are correct, if you intend to dismiss my approach because of your mistaken belief about the four causes, then I really cannot help you much. But let me ask you, are you equally dismissive of efficient and material cause?

First cause debunked - Infinite regress of causes are impossible and would be redundant there is only a finite allow number of actions.
1 down you have 3 more to defend.

(January 26, 2015 at 9:38 am)ChadWooters Wrote:

(January 26, 2015 at 5:53 am)Pizz-atheist Wrote: You haven't actually defended the theory of four causes....If we believe the four causes are trivial tautologies this isn't going to go anywhere.

Offering up such a defense to satisfy your incredulity would be far beyond the scope of even a few posts. And you are correct, if you intend to dismiss my approach because of your mistaken belief about the four causes, then I really cannot help you much. But let me ask you, are you equally dismissive of efficient and material cause?

I lean towards some kind of pyrrhonian skepticism and ignosticism in regards to metaphysics especially when it comes to substance and property theory. I feel like I'm pulling teeth here. It's like you hate talking about this subject and hate disagreement. All I really want is for you to try to defend your metaphysical claims. Otherwise this going to be fifty pages of nuh uh yeah huhs.

(January 25, 2015 at 10:32 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Rae, the Churchland quote claims that the subjective is our experience of neural events ‘from the inside’ while the objective could be our view of the same events ‘from the outside’. Even if that is true it does not undermine my position with respect to the severability of signs from their significance.

Yes, those are two different arguments. Churchland deals with Liebniz.

(January 25, 2015 at 10:32 pm)ChadWooters Wrote:

(January 25, 2015 at 3:19 pm)rasetsu Wrote: True, but irrelevant. We're talking about meaning in a complex set of neurons, not writing on a page. This doesn't even remotely relate.

The analogy holds. I say that despite vast differences of complexity both are signs that carry significance. Unless someone supplies a reason why the observed complexity brings forth novel properties, then to say the more complex example is different seems like special pleading.

To argue that it can only bring forth the same properties as the simple case is the fallacy of composition. No special pleading here, just the avoidance of a fallacy. Your example remains irrelevant.

As to the rest, no reason has been given why efficient causes cannot suffice. Until such cause is given, it remains an argument from ignorance. I don't know how significance arises from efficient causes, but until you explicitly rule them out, you're left with a fallacious argument.