Exposing the Intellectual Bankruptcy of Atheists Criticizing Religion

[Neo-Scholastic]

I write only for the sake of those who find themselves swayed by Esquilax’s rhetoric, although I wish nothing for him but the best. While you may share with him an inclination to disbelieve in God, he has hardened himself against reason and hopefully my reply below will demonstrate more fully his errors.

Most of us have read and contributed to threads about what evidence would suffice to convince an atheist that God exists. The stand taken by Esquilax against the 5W and his reasons for opposing them demonstrates that for many, no form of evidence would ever suffice. He has ruled out beforehand rational reflection as a source for a priori knowledge without realizing that in so doing he has contradicted himself. How does one go about empirically proving that only empirical knowledge is valid? And how can he dismiss a priori knowledge known by rational reflection without using a priori knowledge?

I trust that at least some of you are true freethinkers and remain willing to follow the truth wherever it may lead. My journey from atheist to Christian came from a true desire to know. I have been where you are. At the same time, I continue to challenge not only myself but professional Thomist scholars. In other words, I’m trying to prove myself wrong, even if it doesn’t show in this particular venue.

[quote='ChadWooters' pid='1108550' dateline='1446956957']I see little point in attempting to persuade you to read Aquinas correctly.

I think you mean "persuade you to read Aquinas precisely as I interpret it."

Because I have regular e-mail exchanges with notable contemporary Thomist scholars, like Dr. Fesser who wrote the article referenced by the OP, I can say with confidence that the views I present reflect not only my interpretation but that the best thinkers in the field.

Is it really so intellectually fulfilling for you to not even consider the possibility that you aren't immediately, one hundred percent convincing every time?

In the case of Esquilax, he will employ all the resources of his intellect to direct attention away from valid demonstrations. When he finds himself unable to do so, he hand-waves and inserts rolling eyes emoticons as if his incredulity were enough to justify his opinions. I accept that not all will be convinced because not all can be convinced. For those who have confirmed in themselves an ardent disbelief no amount of evidence or rational demonstration will lead them to the truth.

[quote='Esquilax' pid='1108555' dateline='1446958796']There is, of course, a larger problem with Aquinas that I mentioned earlier, which is that arguments are not evidence. No amount of twisting will ever get you to rational justification for belief…

Many of you have heard that before: arguments are not evidence. Since my initial reply fails to satisfy then I will call on a greater authority than myself. In Book 4, Chapter 3 of his Metaphysics, Aristotle presents the Principle of Non-Contradiction (a.k.a. the PNC) which states that nothing can be and not-be simultaneously and in all ways. The PNC shows conclusively that 1) human being have the capacity to know fundamental truths and 2) humans can have certain and true a priori knowledge that transcends sensory verification, i.e. it lies beyond empirical knowledge.

As Aristotle shows, all arguments (including those of natural science) presuppose the PNC, its truth is self-evident, and it is impossible to think otherwise. Therefore, if even one person sees and understands the PNC, then people have the capacity to know fundamental truths. Furthermore, the truth of which they know is something fundamentally true not only about particular beings, but about all of reality as well. Aristotle’s demonstration of the PNC also shows that at least one argument can be known by a priori reflection. Therefore, Esquilax is wrong, at least one argument IS evidence: the PNC.

This is not to say that other rational demonstrations for deity are valid. The point here is that contrary to popular opinion, it is indeed possible to ‘logic something into existence’ and to provide evidence for facts about the world that are not subject to sensory verification. Since Esquilax is unable or unwilling to overcome his incredulity for all forms of rational demonstration, he prevents himself from recognizing or even considering any ideas that could challenge his preconceptions.

…in this case many of the ways ultimately fail because they don't isolate contributing factors. It's all just "oh, this must be god," despite the fact that there are other, far more parsimonious explanations that fit better with the science that developed between Aquinas' time and the present day.

Esquilax, says this so often and with such conviction that he has started to believe it. If people followed his example, they would say Agatha Christi is a bad writer because she doesn’t reveal ‘whodunit’ in the first chapter. The 5W are the beginning and not the end of the Summa.

I cannot speak to his examples of ‘parsimonious explanations’ since Esquilax presents none. I can say; however, that natural science presupposes certain truths and facts about reality that can only be known a priori, like the PNC. Those kinds of facts about reality stand regardless of who thinks them or when they thought them. Truth has no expiration date. Natural science cannot give ‘parsimonious explanations’ of things that lie beyond its epistemological reach.

[SofaKingHigh]

I can't believe that after 21 pages, not one of you fine, upstanding people has called the OP a cunt.

The mind boggles.

[Anomalocaris]

Chad:

To better magnify your idiot pomposity, you should refer to yourself in the third person as well.

[Anomalocaris]

I can't believe that after 21 pages, not one of you fine, upstanding people has called the OP a cunt.

The mind boggles.

I believe I have called him (her) cunt before, I believe that would serve for all time, at least from me.

[Thumpalumpacus]

The point here is that contrary to popular opinion, it is indeed possible to ‘logic something into existence’ and to provide evidence for facts about the world that are not subject to sensory verification.

Name three facts about the world not subject to sensory verification, please.

You're obviously operating unaware of the constraints of logic. It is descriptive, not prescriptive.

Just this one quoted sentence alone belies the weakness of your claim. You clearly haven't thought this through with any great diligence. Reality doesn't bend to the will of man alone, your wishful thinking aside.

[Angrboda]

If the logic of an argument is sound, and the premises appear sound, you can still come up with an unsound conclusion. This indicates that one or more of the premises is actually not sound. But what of ontological arguments, the 5W of Aquinas and such. It's not clear that all of the premises are sound because many of them have no application outside the argument, are unfalsifiable, or are just plain weak. When the conclusion of an ontological argument is all you have to say that a God exists, it's impossible to tell whether or not this conflicts with reality because there is no other evidence. In that case, one is left forever wondering whether the conclusion is sound, or whether one or more of the premises are faulty. Further ontological arguments cannot put this doubt to rest because they suffer the same flaw.

So there may be nothing wrong with a priori inferences, but if it's all you've got, there is plenty of room left for doubt.

[abaris]

As Aristotle shows, all arguments (including those of natural science) presuppose the PNC, its truth is self-evident, and it is impossible to think otherwise. Therefore, if even one person sees and understands the PNC, then people have the capacity to know fundamental truths. Furthermore, the truth of which they know is something fundamentally true not only about particular beings, but about all of reality as well. Aristotle’s demonstration of the PNC also shows that at least one argument can be known by a priori reflection. Therefore, Esquilax is wrong, at least one argument IS evidence: the PNC.

Chad, you're quoting fascinating persons, but isn't it obvious to you that these persons only could know what their time knew? The time when they lived is very important to this kind of discussion, since even the brightest minds didn't doubt the existence of the supernatural in Aristotles and Aquinas days. There were things they couldn't explain by other means. Things, we take for granted, since the last centuries found natural explanations.

[Angrboda]

Even if quantum mechanics is considered to be no more than a set of rules, it is still in conflict with a view of the world many people would consider obvious or natural. This world view is based on three assumptions, or premises that must be accepted without proof. One is realism, the doctrine that regularities in observed phenomena are caused by some physical reality whose existence is independent of human observers. The second premise holds that inductive inference is a valid mode of reasoning and can be applied freely, so that legitimate conclusions can be drawn from consistent observations. The third premise is called Einstein separability or Einstein locality, and it states that no influence of any kind can propagate faster than the speed of light . The three premises, which are often assumed to have the status of well-established truths, or even self-evident truths, form the basis of what I shall call local realistic theories of nature. An argument derived from these premises leads to an explicit prediction for the results of a certain class of experiments in the physics of elementary particles. The rules of quantum mechanics can also be employed to calculate the results of these experiments. Significantly, the two predictions differ, and so either the local realistic theories or quantum mechanics must be wrong.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/media...1_0158.pdf

It turns out that local realistic theories are wrong. Strike two for a priori reasoning.

[GrandizerII]

Aquinas' arguments for God pretty much presume that ad infinitum into the past is impossible. But this is an issue with God's series of thoughts as well. And we don't really have a good logical argument against ad infinitum other than that it sounds incredible.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Chad, you're quoting fascinating persons, but isn't it obvious to you that these persons only could know what their time knew? The time when they lived is very important to this kind of discussion, since even the brightest minds didn't doubt the existence of the supernatural in Aristotles and Aquinas days. There were things they couldn't explain by other means. Things, we take for granted, since the last centuries found natural explanations.

Often times, Abaris, I end up responding to you indirectly by replying to others. I certainly do not want you to think you are on my ‘ignore list’ nor that I lack respect for the points you raise. Indeed, it is obvious that people are, to a greater or lesser extent, products of their time. Discoveries in the sciences and their technological applications have made profound changes to how we see the world. This doesn’t mean; however, that pre-modern thinkers did not make at least some important discoveries. Euclid’s proofs remain valid to this day and he discovered them without the benefit of computers or even the the number zero. No one disputes that early thinkers used examples that today no one would take seriously. Aristotle may have been a geo-centrist but his contributions to logic have stood the test of time. If you have not already noticed, I believe the truths discovered by ancient and Medieval philosophers transcend any particular theory or finding of natural science. I demonstrated this in my my last post with regards to the PNC.

If the logic of an argument is sound, and the premises appear sound, you can still come up with an unsound conclusion.

If the logic is sound and the premises are sound (and do not merely appear to be so) then the conclusion is sound.

It's not clear that all of the premises [of the 5W] are sound because many of them have no application outside the argument[1], are unfalsifiable [2], or are just plain weak.[3]

Without examples, I cannot effectively respond to the exact apparent flaws you see, except in the most general way.

[1] IF a premise is either 1) self-evident knowledge OR 2) universal sense experience THEN it can be used in multiple demonstrations, i.e. they can have application outside the Five Ways.

[2] Unfalsifiablity is not a synonym for uncertainy. Self-evident principles are certain because while people can deny their truth with words, they cannot deny their truth in thought. Some are very well known and universally accepted a) the PNC, b) the Law of Identity, and c) the Law of Excluded Middle. It is precisely because such as these are unfalsifiable AND certain that they make excellent first principles. In the Summa Aquinas uses another that is equally self-evident: something cannot give what it does not have.

[3] Premises based on universal sense experience will not be as strong as self-evident truths; however, none of those used by Aquinas seem particularly controversial. Here is the list of general observations used in the Five Ways:
Some things in the world change.

Only things that actually exist can have effects.
No cause is the efficient cause of itself.
Some things that could be are not and some things are not that could have been.
Some things serve as better examples of a concept than others.
Similar causes consistently produce similar effects.

None of the above statements seem particularly weak to me and most fair-minded people would consider them common sense.

When the conclusion of an ontological argument is all you have to say that a God exists, it's impossible to tell whether or not this conflicts with reality because there is no other evidence.

Are you suggesting that the Pythagorean theorem must be empirically verified before it can be accepted as true? Clearly that is not the case. Physical measurements, no matter how precise, only yield approximate values, not the absolute values that define mathematical results. The truth of the theorem does not rely on ‘other’ evidence nor is other evidence necessary.