morality is subjective and people don't have free will

[Edwardo Piet]

What about exercising? I certainly suffered when my cross country coach had me run endless laps around the trails. Both when I was doing it, and for the next 2 days of being incredibly sore. Also when I stayed up for hours doing homework in college, exhausted mentally an physically and with a sore neck.

If in the long run exercise gives you better physical and mental health and happiness then it's worth it.

What if you steal from someone and they never even notice you stole from them? Clearly you aren't causing any suffering.

They wouldn't suffer from it but they would have been perhaps happier if you didn't... perhaps a world where they still had what you stole they would be happier.

But stealing is still wrong. Same with lying or cheating, assuming no one ever finds out and no suffering comes from it.

No. The whole reason we believe it's wrong in the first place is because they are activites that hurt people.

I don't think suffering = wrongness, in and of itself. I don't think it makes sense to base morality on suffering.

I think basing out moral values on what we positively and negatively value is the only thing that does make sense. And ultimately all anyone cares about is the well being of themselves and others who they care about.

[SteveII]

My understanding is the only reason to think we do not have free will is to presuppose naturalism.

Wrong. Here's why supernaturalism and a soul is useless:





Q.E.D.

The definition of free will Stawson gives is so restrictive as to make the term meaningless. Of course our decisions are informed by our genetics, experiences, and consciousness. This is the definition most people think of when discussing free will:

Definition: A personal explanation of some basic result R brought about intentionally be person P where this bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occurred and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I and B provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R be exercising power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducible teleological goal. (Moreland, Blackwell's Companion to Natural Theology. p 298)

The only reason to define the term into meaninglessness is because you can't admit to having it when presupposing naturalism.

[Edwardo Piet]

The definition of free will Stawson gives is so restrictive as to make the term meaningless.

Wrong. It's a classic incompatabilist definition of free will.

[SteveII]

The definition of free will Stawson gives is so restrictive as to make the term meaningless.

Wrong. It's a classic incompatabilist definition of free will.

THat does not change the fact that redefining free will so that it is impossible for a person to have it is not proof that a person does not have free will.

[Edwardo Piet]

Wrong. It's actually the other way around. The classic problem of free will existed for hundreds of years before the compatabilists came in and redefined it to make the definition so broad and so trivally true that it completely avoided the problem and the key question altogether.

[brewer]

Wrong. It's a classic incompatabilist definition of free will.

THat does not change the fact that redefining free will so that it is impossible for a person to have it is not proof that a person does not have free will.

The definition of omniscient god eliminates the possibility of free will. Why do you have a problem with other peoples definitions?

[Whateverist]

I wonder what exactly you feel adding "objectively" here adds to what you're saying...Is an assertion that something is humorous or beautiful likewise enhanced by adding that it is "objectively" so? Also, why is your standing up for a value you think is "objectively" correct supposed to have more value than my standing up for a subjective value I hold which I recognize not everyone may share?  Something about this feels off to me.  Do see what I mean?

One indicates an imperative. The other is a preference. Consider circumstances of ambiguity where the outcome of someone's decisions could go various ways. If there is an imperative then it is incumbent on the agent to determine, as best he can, the right course of action. If there is no imperative then the choice has no import and any outcome will do. The qualifier of objectivity adds real significance to action, facts that exists beyond one's own opinions.

Doesn't look like there will be any way of talking past each other here. That still seems like a difference without a difference. Moral situations which I feel strongly about feel imperative to me too. That doesn't mean there can't be contravening imperatives which prevent either one of us from acting against one of two such values. Saying that yours are objective won't prevent you failing to perform both A and not A. Both the objectivist and the subjectivist can account for anguish and tragedy. Insisting that either one is less than fully (and morally) human isn't anything I'd want to claim, and under subjectivism I don't have to.

[Edwardo Piet]

THat does not change the fact that redefining free will so that it is impossible for a person to have it is not proof that a person does not have free will.

The definition of omniscient god eliminates the possibility of free will. Why do you have a problem with other peoples definitions?

It doesn't eliminate the possibility in the compatabilist sense. But the compatabilist sense is fucking stupid and fucking idiots (i.e. 99% of people) make logically incompetent equivocations rather regularly.

The compatabilist definition of free will is basically just the legal or social definition. It's a construct. It's about holding people responsible because it's better for society in practice even though the truth of the matter metaphysically is the fact that no one can ever do otherwise in precisely the same circumstances. The incompatabilists are right. The compatabilists believe exactly the same thing as the incompatabilists but choose to loosen their definition of free will and merely redefine it. What the compatabilists have is a vacuous label of "free will" added to exactly the same conclusions.

[brewer]

The definition of omniscient god eliminates the possibility of free will. Why do you have a problem with other peoples definitions?

It doesn't eliminate the possibility in the compatabilist sense. But the compatabilist sense  is fucking stupid and fucking idiots (i.e. 99% of people) make logically incompetent equivocations rather regularly.

The compatabilist definition of free will is basically just the legal or social definition. It's a construct. It's about holding people responsible because it's better for society in practice even though the truth of the matter metaphysically is the fact that no one can ever do otherwise in precisely the same circumstances. The incompatabilists are right. The compatabilists believe exactly the same thing as the incompatabilists but choose to loosen their definition of free will and merely redefine it. What the compatabilists have is a vacuous label of "free will" added to exactly the same conclusions.

I think all arguments for "no free will" are nonsense. Of course there are actions that humans will take based on past experience, even evolution. That does not eliminate independent actions not constrained by the past. 

The christian definition of omniscient god = only the illusion of free will. This is one of the incompatible parts of the fantasy that christians refuse to admit.

I expect we will see some tap dancing soon. It should take the form of, we get to make our own definitions, rationalizations and inconsistencies, it's our fantasy.

[Catholic_Lady]

What about exercising? I certainly suffered when my cross country coach had me run endless laps around the trails. Both when I was doing it, and for the next 2 days of being incredibly sore. Also when I stayed up for hours doing homework in college, exhausted mentally an physically and with a sore neck.

If in the long run exercise gives you better physical and mental health and happiness then it's worth it.

What if you steal from someone and they never even notice you stole from them? Clearly you aren't causing any suffering.

They wouldn't suffer from it but they would have been perhaps happier if you didn't... perhaps a world where they still had what you stole they would be happier.

But stealing is still wrong. Same with lying or cheating, assuming no one ever finds out and no suffering comes from it.

No. The whole reason we believe it's wrong in the first place is because they are activites that hurt people.

I don't think suffering = wrongness, in and of itself. I don't think it makes sense to base morality on suffering.

I think basing out moral values on what we positively and negatively value is the only thing that does make sense. And ultimately all anyone cares about is the well being of themselves and others who they care about.

So as I said in another post, suffering can often times be for the best. That doesn't really jive with saying that suffering is inherently immoral in and of itself, and that suffering literally = wrongness. And as such, doesn't jive with basing morality entirely on suffering. 

Also, if I cheat on my husband and he never finds out, it won't hurt him. He won't suffer from it or be less happy for it. If I steal $10 from a rich person so that I can buy a pack of cigarettes, and they never find out, it won't effect them in the least bit. No suffering will come to that rich person and they won't be less happy.

I think there are many holes and flaws in the notion that immorality is entirely based on suffering.