If it wasn't for religion

[Angrboda]

What you have, is a tired old line parroted endlessly and breathlessly by fundy dipshits..that you imagine to be some profound comment on the nature of morality or rights.  You could disabuse yourself of this misapprehension quickly and thoroughly if you listened to what people are telling you, rather than insisting that they must be x y and z.

I do listen, that's why I continually point out the contradictions and inconsistencies in your moral views, and why you run and hide from simple yes or no questions. I can listen to what someone delusional is telling me, or suffering from cognitive dissonance is telling me, but I can't expect them to fully grasp their delusions and dissonance. Such as your insistence of believing in moral realism, while at the same time arguing as if moral subjectivism is true.

lol. "Physician, heal thyself!" Yet another Dunning-Kruger with zero personal insight, deficient wisdom, and a whole heaping bucket full of projection.

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We can argue that killing is wrong, while also arguing that we ought to kill.

That would like saying we can argue that something is impressible, while also arguing that it is permissible.

"Wrong" implies we ought not do it.

In that case then you've expressed an analytic truth by saying that we ought to do what is good, not given us a moral precept dictated by reality except in the most trivial sense, and that sense is not relevant to the question. So by your own admission, you have not provided a moral truth that is dictated by reality. All you've done is take advantage of what ought and good mean, which has fuckall to do with "what" one ought to do and how reality provides that moral. So, we're back to unfogged's original question. Name a moral that is provided by reality. So far, you have not done so.

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If you're a moral subjectivist, a moral nihilist, you're far more likely to be an atheist than a theist.

If you're trying to say that atheists are more likely to be moral nihilists than theists, I don't think that's true. More theists embrace moral nihilism than atheists by a long shot, largely because they don't realize that founding your moral views on God is itself a form of moral nihilism, it's just a particular coat that moral nihilism wears. And the reason theists don't realize this is multifold, but one of them is that theists are not particularly insightful about their own beliefs, particularly being that they are heavily invested in confirming their beliefs rather than understanding or even falsifying them. If what you meant was that atheists are more likely to be moral subjectivists than atheists, that's not entirely clear either, as theism seems to reduce to moral subjectivism, again, with theists simply not realizing this for a variety of reasons.

[The Grand Nudger]

What does this have to do with whether or not objective morality exists in the Platonic sense? Or do you mistakenly equate "objective" to "Platonic"?

You do realize that moral platonism, is another name for moral realism?  Morality existing in a platonic sense would be an objective sense.

I think that this statement neatly encapsulates everything you've gotten wrong about this subject in two threads...all by itself. 

No, platonism is not another name for moral realism.  We know this, because a person does not have to be a platonist to be a realist. Neither the non-natural realist nor the natural realist are platonists. These three camps are simply not saying the same thing. I can understand your comments if I put myself into the shoes of a person who believed that this statement were true, but doing so explicitly acounts for why you got the whole bit wrong. So..we're done.....right?

[Acrobat]

No, platonism is not another name for moral realism. 

From Wikipedia : “Moral realism (also ethical realism or moral Platonism)”

But you’re right not all realist need to be Platonist, but all moral platonist are moral realist.

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In that case then you've expressed an analytic truth by saying that we ought to do what is good, not given us a moral precept dictated by reality except in the most trivial sense, and that sense is not relevant to the question. So by your own admission, you have not provided a moral truth that is dictated by reality. All you've done is take advantage of what ought and good mean, which has fuckall to do with "what" one ought to do and how reality provides that moral. So, we're back to unfogged's original question. Name a moral that is provided by reality. So far, you have not done so.

No, what I was asked to provide is a moral aim or goal provided by reality, and what I provided is the mother of all moral goals and aims, that we ought to do good.

If you want a lesser one, here: we ought not rape innocent babies just for fun.

If you're trying to say that atheists are more likely to be moral nihilists than theists, I don't think that's true.

Yet nearly every advocate of moral nihilism, nearly every philosopher associated with that view, are atheists.

. If what you meant was that atheists are more likely to be moral subjectivists than atheists, that's not entirely clear either

Same as above.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, what I was asked to provide is a moral aim or goal provided by reality, and what I provided is the mother of all moral goals and aims, that we ought to do good.

If you want a lesser one, here: we ought not rape innocent babies just for fun.

b-mine
Here's where you're fucking the pooch.

You are supplying deontological claims, you...you are not establishing that or how reality provides them.  This is old hat in moral philosophy, the problem was articulated way back in 1739 by David Hume and then reformulated by G.E. Moore in 1903.

As it turns out, in all of that time, the best answer realism has come up with is to accept that both Hume and Moore were on to something, even if they may not have thought/meant exactly what we think they did, or been completely right. It does seem to be the case that every ought is derived from the conjunction of at least one evaluative premise (sometimes spoken but often silent) which may not itself be a fact even if the preceding claim is a moral fact (assuming there are moral facts).

None of this has a unique impact on a secular morality, it's a very broad constraint. Religious moralities must also supply such a premise. The trouble for religious moralities in comparison to secular moralities is that the only distinct facts between them are purported facts of the religions claims. A secular morality needs only to establish why we might have the goal of being good..for example. A religious morality must establish that their god exists to extort it's followers to be good (or create them to be so inclined).

That fundamental asymmetry is hard to overstate. Consider this, in the event that the religious moralities defining claims are false..then the goal is still present even though the god is not, exposing the fact that the religious morality was operating under the secular moralities explanation the entire time. If the religious moralities claims turn out to be true - the secular moralities claims are no less true on account of that, and the claims stand in competition and without need of reference to a god. The realist deck is heavily stacked against religious morality.

Yet nearly every advocate of moral nihilism, nearly every philosopher associated with that view, are atheists.

-just as nearly every advocate of moral realism is also an atheist, and secular realism is the dominant position of academia. It's not exactly news that atheism is and has been on the rise within the intelligentsia. If you get two academics arguing ethics (or anything else) it's very likely to be an argument between two atheists.

[Acrobat]

b-mine
Here's where you're fucking the pooch.

You are supplying deontological claims, you...you are not establishing that or how reality provides them.  This is old hat in moral philosophy, the problem was articulated way back in 1739 by David Hume and then reformulated by G.E. Moore in 1903.

I’m not providing a how. I’m telling you there’s a cup in front of us, I’m not trying to explain how the cup got there.

I am claiming, that the moral ought, I ought to do good, I ought not torture innocent babies just for fun, exists like brute facts. I see them as clearly as I see the cup in front of me.

It does seem to be the case that every ought is derived from the conjunction of at least one evaluative premise (sometimes spoken but often silent) which may not itself be a fact even if the preceding claim is a moral fact (assuming there are moral facts).

And I am, the ought here is a fact. It’s interesting that you choose to say it “may not” be a fact itself, as opposed to “it’s not a fact”. It suggest to me that you’re not in complete denial here.

A secular morality needs only to establish why we might have the goal of being good..for example.  A religious morality must establish that their god exists to extort it's followers to be good (or create them to be so inclined).  

No I don’t need to establish God, or any of my other religious belief. As far as you or anyone here need to be concerned, I’m just a person who believes reality possess moral goal and aims. That we ought to be good is a brute fact of reality.

If the religious moralities claims turn out to be true - the secular moralities claims are no less true on account of that, and the claims stand in competition and without need of reference to a god.  The realist deck is heavily stacked against religious morality.

Good, then I don’t need to argue for the existence of God, or the validity of any of my other religious beliefs, the supernatural etc… and we can stick to arguing about whether reality posses moral aims or goals. Regardless of whether you’re not sure what the relationship between the existence of these things, have to do with God.

[GrandizerII]

What does this have to do with whether or not objective morality exists in the Platonic sense? Or do you mistakenly equate "objective" to "Platonic"?

You do realize that moral platonism, is another name for moral realism?  Morality existing in a platonic sense would be an objective sense.

Yet morality can be objective without existing in the platonic sense. The only article I know that equates moral realism to moral platonism is from Wikipedia. Other [more] academic articles, such as on IEP, do not.

That's your view, which does not necessarily reflect what reality is about.

No it reflects what reality is about. Just like reality reflects the existence of other minds outside of my own, or objective truths, etc.. It's only your deluded version of reality that negates this, you're the solipsist, the reality you sell is akin to what they sell.

There's a world of difference between accepting that other people have minds of their own (because that should be the default reasoning given that other people are just like us in so many ways and behave as if they have minds) and accepting that moral goodness exists in the platonic sense (my default reasoning does not lead me to such a conclusion and I have nothing to go by in terms of observations that would compel me to do so).

Sure, but many atheists have no problem agreeing with this. So why are you trying to make this an atheism vs. theism thing when it's really not?

Yet, here you are, arguing that goodness and wrongness don't exist in reality, just in our minds alone, etc.. Yet it seems that only atheists tend to ever suggest such a reality, empty of "the stuff of morality". If you're a moral subjectivist, a moral nihilist, you're far more likely to be an atheist than a theist. Maybe you just think this is just a coincidence, or perhaps there is a relationship between atheism and a disbelief in a reality that possess "the stuff of morality".

I don't think morality exists in a concrete sense, but then again, this is just how I see things at the moment. That said, I think a lot of theists would disagree with you as well that morality exists in such a way, as many of them believe morality is dependent on God himself, which ironically makes them more subjectivists (and maybe even nihilists) than they are objectivists.

Many atheists, on the other hand, believe that morality is objective, whether or not they believe it exists in the way you posit morality exists. The important thing here, however, is that this is not a theism vs. atheism debate but a moral realist vs. moral platonist vs. moral subjectivist debate (irrespective of theistic beliefs or lack of them).

So again and again, I'm not seeing where a god (of any non-secular or supernaturalist sort) is needed for morality to be objective.

I don't deny a reality in which objective morality may be true.

So you don't deny the reality possess "the stuff of morality"?

You're equivocating (as explained above), but then again, even the platonic sense I merely question. Like I said before, my view on this is provisional and am very open to adjusting my view in light of proper logic, which I have yet to see.

Still no compelling argument for a god. And going by your last post, it looks like you submit that morality can be objective even if a god did not exist. That's good.

[pocaracas]

I'm sorry for just jumping in the thread without reading it properly... But i'd just like to address this wee detail here

As far as you or anyone here need to be concerned, I’m just a person who believes reality possess moral goal and aims. That we ought to be good is a brute fact of reality.

I'd say that's a brute fact of society, not reality.
Society is an intangible thing that arises from the interactions of several individuals, hopefully, to make life easier and more prosperous to every individual within the group.

[The Grand Nudger]

You seem to be stuck Acro.  Incapable of communicating any evaluative premise that helps you derive your oughts from your is, and unwilling to argue in good faith in that regard.  

The two are probably related. If it weren't for religion..perhaps you wouldn't be so stuck...lol?

It may be the case that the evaluative premise which leads to your deontological conclusions was simply never expressed to you. You're repeating the answer from your moral schema, but not how that answer is derived, because you just don't know. This is common to deontological claims. We use them as shorthand for moral reasoning. We supply them to our children, because..for the most part... it's more important that a child understand the expectations and general rules under which we operate than how we arrived at them.

If there actually is some difference between religion and no religion then this indicates that the evaluative premise being used is specific to the religion. If it isn't, then there is no difference between religion and no religion and your thoughts on the matter resolve to incoherence. So long as you insist on distancing yourself from your superstitions then you actually can't communicate that premise. So long as you fail to establish the veracity of whatever superstition is operative...then you will be incapable of establishing that your evaluative premises are, in any sense, factual, let alone moral facts as opposed to some other type of fact.

Or, it may be that there is no evaluative premise whatsoever, in which case you're just expressing the hanging assertions peculiar to your superstition, not a valid deontological claim derived from a realist apprehension. If we allow, as a non natural realist might, that we don't infer our moral truths as facts that we can communicate but intuit them directly as something like a self evident axiom..then here again we see no necessity of religion, and here again..your comments on the matter of there being some difference between religion and no religion resolve to incoherence.

You've placed yourself in an unenviable position where you aren't wrong so much as you've not allowed yourself any grounds by which you could be right. You are either unwilling or incapable of communicating any means by which you have derived your ought, or are unwilling or incapable of communicating any intuition specific to superstition and necessary to a realist conclusion.

-Moving along

And I am, the ought here is a fact. It’s interesting that you choose to say it “may not” be a fact itself, as opposed to “it’s not a fact”. It suggest to me that you’re not in complete denial here.

Have I been unclear? You've had two threads worth of this already. You....are.....speaking...to.....a.....moral.....realist. You need to scrub this "denial" trash right out of your shitmouth, lol.

In good faith, I simply allow that it's possible that whatever premise you have failed to supply may be some type of fact - I haven't heard it because you haven't offered it so I couldn't comment on whether or not it's factual. You'll need to decide what it is, and if there is one, and communicate it to me, before I could make any attempt at a determination. Above, what I see is that you're drifting between a non naturalist and naturalists concept of moral realism. You assert on the one hand that you observe some empirical fact about the universe which informs your deontology..but this is contested. On the other hand you maintain that you do not observe this fact but, instead, intuit as much as being self evident. Beyond neither claim supporting your overall contention that there is some difference between religion and non religion....these two secular approaches to moral realism are directly incompatible with each other. Your ought is either derived or directly apprehended. Fact, or intuition.

Take the example of Poca, the poster directly above me. The very last portion of that sentence describes a purported fact that grounds pragmatist thought on the matter. I'm taking a liberty here by supplying moral reasoning and poca may choose to amend it or reject it, but...the general form of the statement (if we proposed it in full) is-

We should avoid doing bad things | in order to make life easier and more prosperous to every individual in the group.

Before the line is our ought, after is our purported fact - the evaluative premise. The purported fact is not a moral fact, it's an empirical fact. To wit, that bad things™ make life harder and less prosperous. Non natural realism, realism by intuition..makes this distinction. It is not on the basis of an empirical fact, in non naturalism's estimation...that we hold something to be a moral fact or a moral truth. Similarly, it would not be on the basis of some purported empirical fact of the universe..in your case, that it supplies goals and aims, that we hold some thing to be a moral fact or moral truth. If you directly apprehend that you shpould not do bad things, no reason..full stop..pure intuition....then no empirical fact is required and there is no empirical fact for anyone to confirm or to deny. Either they have a similar direct apprehension or they don't..but since such an apprehension isn't required for a realist deontology...we're right back to square one, aren't we?

[dyresand]

I see quite a lot more people quitting life after seeing the misery of it if it wasn't for religion . Being born in post collapse ex soviet state(Imagine the collapse of UK or US), I think a lot of poor people getting disappointed in life would just quit it if it wasn't for invisible happy land and painful land waiting for them.

Oh hey, a fellow sunbro but anyways religion itself has kinda done some good here and there but it also has done a lot bad. The problem with it people in the lower classes of society tends to believe in a god to get them by which isn't bad. But you look at other countries that are less theistic in the first world the people in the lower class of this the U.S. would be better off in Scandinavian countries they tend to be happier and healthier and their medical systems work.

Then there is the middle eastern or really religious countries in the middle east they... are.. really hostile to our kind of thinking. I would argue that Islam really did more harm for the free thinkers of the middle east
than any good. This is just a comparison to the christian dark ages where scientific advancement was set back.

[Acrobat]

Yet morality can be objective without existing in the platonic sense. The only article I know that equates moral realism to moral platonism is from Wikipedia. Other [more] academic articles, such as on IEP, do not.

Yet, in order for morality to be objective, reality needs to “possess the stuff of morality”, even if you want to suggest this exists in some non-platonic way.

There's a world of difference between accepting that other people have minds of their own (because that should be the default reasoning given that other people are just like us in so many ways and behave as if they have minds) and accepting that moral goodness exists in the platonic sense (my default reasoning does not lead me to such a conclusion and I have nothing to go by in terms of observations that would compel me to do so).

Not really. In fact i’m more confident that moral goodness exist in reality, more so than I am that your mind exists. And you yourself seem to be of two minds when it comes to the question. Unsure of where you stand in the equation. You’ve never really argued otherwise.

I can recognize it exists objectively, and not just in my mind, by acknowledging a variety of similarities with other things that exists objectively like the cup. That the thing I’m perceiving with my mind exists independently of it. I can go around asking others whether they also see that the holocaust is objectively wrong. And they confirm they see this as well.

I can recognize that goodness, wrongness are not decorative frills of personal opinion, like my taste in music, nor are they imposed on us by our societies and other people, as evident by even babies having some basic moral cognitions, or the existence of core universal morality. I can acknowledge that morality is matter of objective truth, as evident by the level of delusions, lies, and falsehoods required to believe things like the holocaust is good, unlike for subjective things, like pepperoni pizza is good, which require no such false justification, to disagree.

You're equivocating (as explained above), but then again, even the platonic sense I merely question. Like I said before, my view on this is provisional and am very open to adjusting my view in light of proper logic, which I have yet to see.

See even you can’t bring yourself to deny the existence of a reality that “possess moral stuff”, unlike the sort of confidence you might have about the God question. I’m also not sure how i’m supposed to reject that it does, when my opponents lack the confidence, and are so unsure as to whether it does or not?

Still no compelling argument for a god. And going by your last post, it looks like you submit that morality can be objective even if a god did not exist. That's good.

No I’m just saying my argument is not dependent on you acknowledging the existence of God, doesn’t require any agreement on what the term God means between us, etc… As a result for the purposes of this discussion, we can leave the God question out.

What I will say that it’s not merely coincidental that you as atheists are unsure about whether reality possess moral stuff, unsure about objective morality, regardless of whether you see the relationship between these views and your atheism or not. In fact  in my view, its your atheisms that makes  you unsure, a fear that such beliefs may undermine your disbelief. It’s a symptom of your disease.

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I'd say that's a brute fact of society, not reality.
Society is an intangible thing that arises from the interactions of several individuals, hopefully, to make life easier and more prosperous to every individual within the group.

This doesn't seem to be the case at all.

Even if every other person in my society claimed that  torturing innocent babies just for fun is good, they would be wrong, just as they would be if every other person in my society claimed the earth is flat. Societies or people might recognize a fact, but they themselves are not the authors of it.

You can take an infant, a baby, put on a puppet show where one puppet is cruel or mean, and they seem to recognize that there's something wrong about that behavior, that this level of recognization is not dependent on external social influences telling him that it is.