The absurd need for logical proofs for God

[Mister Agenda]

Let me get this straight: You claim that the hypothesis that God exists is based on the agreement that other minds exist, that it's an analogy, that it may be weak; and your conclusion it that if someone doesn't think a disembodied mind exists they must think embodied minds don't exist either; and not only that but it's fundamentally dishonest to accept that embodied minds exist if you don't also accept that at least one disembodied mind that designed and created the universe also exists?

Are you sure you want to stick with that?

I am not sure how you reach the additional fact that all these minds out there are embodied. That's what your senses are telling you, but they're not proof. The existence of God is not really "based" on the existence of other minds. It's just the observation that our reasons to believe in the latter should lead us to the former, if we are honest and coherent, that is.

All the minds we know with a reasonable level of certainty to exist based on observation are associated with brains. It does not necessarily follow that if embodied minds exist, disembodied ones must also exist. There's a disconnect. Literally, since you're imagining minds disconnected from bodies. It is perfectly honest and coherent to accept the existence of embodied minds without also accepting the existence of disembodied ones. It's like saying if you accept the existence of humans, you must also accept the existence of Sasquatch, else you're dishonest or incoherent.

[Silver]

if we are honest and coherent, that is.

The issue I always find is that theists adhere different meanings to words than what is generally accepted.

If we're being honest and coherent, after all, god simply doesn't exist.

[R00tKiT]

I am not sure how you reach the additional fact that all these minds out there are embodied. That's what your senses are telling you, but they're not proof. The existence of God is not really "based" on the existence of other minds. It's just the observation that our reasons to believe in the latter should lead us to the former, if we are honest and coherent, that is.

All the minds we know with a reasonable level of certainty to exist based on observation are associated with brains. It does not necessarily follow that if embodied minds exist, disembodied ones must also exist. There's a disconnect. Literally, since you're imagining minds disconnected from bodies. It is perfectly honest and coherent to accept the existence of embodied minds without also accepting the existence of disembodied ones. It's like saying if you accept the existence of humans, you must also accept the existence of Sasquatch, else you're dishonest or incoherent.

One small reminder, I never presented the full case for why the analogy for other minds is equivalent to that for god. The part explaining that in Plantinga's work is highly technical. I am merely conveying the underlying intuitions of what I understand so far. Roughly speaking, he argues that the objections to the telological argument are exactly the same objections to analogy for other minds.

---

If we're being honest and coherent, after all, god simply doesn't exist.

No conclusive argument against the existence of god was ever presented. By contrast, the reasons to positively affirm god's existence are as good as those we have to believe in the existence of anything other than ourselves

[Angrboda]

You have that exactly backwards - populations of organisms evolve biological processes to suit their environment (this is why the Negev Desert doesn’t have a population of polar bears).

What you’ve done is presumed that environments were deliberately designed to be fit for predetermined groups of organisms. That’s not how it works.

Formally, this is what you’ve done:

1. If God designed the universe, then human beings would exist.
2. Human beings exist.
3. Therefore, God designed the universe.

See the problem?

Boru

No,pal. The first premise is unsound, by the way. The second premise is unprovable in the atheist's worldview - only he, one human being, can say of himself he exists. I am afraid I will insist on the problem of other minds, since it clearly undermines the atheist's tendency to demand the kind of evidence for god he wouldn't demand in other situations of equal importance.

Ther agument actually goes like this:
1. One is certain other minds exists, despite the latter being subject to debate and cannot be formally proven.
2. It can be shown that the existence of God is based on the same analogy, however weak it is, that leads to the existence of other minds.
3. Therefore, if one rejects the existence of god, one rejects other minds. Otherwise, he will have a fundamentally dishonest position.

For the design part, it can be put this way:
1. We can see clear aspects of adaptation of means to end -i.e. design-, regardless of the process that led to it.
2. Design, as defined in 1., is more probably that not the product of a conscious, deliberate decision.
3. Therefore, our universe is more probably than not the design of a conscious agent.

I'm going to deal with this in reverse order because the main problem is that the latter argument, that the universe is likely designed because it looks designed is the main problem. I noted in an earlier definition you gave for design that you had expanded it to the point that it included things which, in the colloquial sense, did not actually exhibit design in the sense you were implying. Your definition also fit out-of-place artifacts which look like they were designed by an agent, but actually were the result of natural processes. This is the main obstacle in any design argument, defining design, and specifically what the indicators of design are, such that they don't yield false positives. William Dembski has written at length on the problem and is the foremost proponent of a framework which claims to be able to identify design. Unfortunately his work is terribly flawed and faulty. The result is that you can't establish premise #1 of your argument that there are clear aspects of design in the universe or in biological life forms, and if anything, the argument is much stronger in the case of biological life forms. In particular, if you are suggesting that fine-tuning of the universe is the aspect which leads to a conclusion of design, one's argument gets recast as:

1. The universe appears fine-tuned which would be clear evidence of design, regardless of the process which led to it.
2. Design, as previously defined, is more probably than not the product of conscious, deliberate decision.
3. It is not necessarily the case that the universe is fine-tuned, as the universe's constants could have happened by chance.
4. If the universe is not designed as in 3, then it would still appear fine-tuned.
5. Therefore the appearance of fine-tuning is not evidence of conscious, deliberate decision.

The main problem is that premise #1 is not true. With the failure of the design part of your argument, the prior main argument fails as well.

Now, as to the first, it's important to note that an argument based upon analogy is neither inductive nor deductive and largely functions as a pedagogical tool rather than an argument. The basis of an argument from analogy is that something displays similarity in aspects which it is known, therefore it's probable that said similarity extends to things that are unknown. This is not a reliable assumption. I can note that a car rests on four tires and argue from analogy that a three-legged stool likely has four legs because, after observing the first three legs, I conclude that the parallel between it and a car also having three points of rest also extends to it likewise having four points of rest, or four legs. In essence, an analogy depends upon a form of uniformitarianism in our assumptions which we have no justification for assuming. Thus it isn't probative of the probability of an analogical thing sharing a trait that hasn't yet been confirmed. Some do, some don't -- and there is no information present to determine which class the analogized object belongs to, so the argument, as such, does not lead to a definite conclusion. It's a non sequitur.

But there's a more important failing in the first argument. We posit the existence of other minds based upon an analogy between our own behavior, and that of other people because we know that we exist and have the ability to perform these behaviors. We know that we, as agents, are incapable of summoning universes into being, so even if the cause behind the universe is an agent, it is an agent wholly unlike us. Allow me to quote the relevant point from David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, part 2:

The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar outcome; and we never want or look for stronger evidence than that. But the evidence is less strong when the cases are less than perfectly alike; any reduction in similarity, however tiny, brings a corresponding reduction in the strength of the evidence; and as we move down that scale we may eventually reach a very weak analogy...

In your case, the analogy is so weak -- basically non-existent -- that one might be charitably inclined to agree that there appear indications of a mind behind the universe, there is little reason to suspect any mind behind it has the properties of a god rather than say aliens or a natural order which we are not yet cognizant of existing. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes this point in its argument from design article concerning a similar analogy, to that of Nicolas Caputo in an election in which cheating was involved. In the case of Caputo, we have an agent who possessed the capabilities to bring about the results that the inference of design in that case was based. In the case of other minds, we have an agent with confirmed similar capabilities. In the case of God, we have no such exemplar. If we don't know that things like gods are even possible, it makes no sense to conclude that they are probable based upon a design inference, as that would be a subtle form of begging the question, assuming the possible existence of God, to argue about the possible existence of God. In any argument there are primary premises, typically those presented, and auxiliary premises, most of which end up being unspoken. In the case of other minds, one primary premise is that minds, namely ours, which are capable of certain things, exist, at least one. That becomes an auxiliary premise in the design argument if one is arguing that there is an analogy there, and says that gods exist, or, at least, are possible. The fact of it being an auxiliary, unstated premise doesn't make it any less necessary to the conclusion for it being unspoken. And when that part of the analogy is brought out, it's clear that either one is begging the question (circularity), or one's analogy is a false one (gods aren't analogous to humans).

[LadyForCamus]

You have that exactly backwards - populations of organisms evolve biological processes to suit their environment (this is why the Negev Desert doesn’t have a population of polar bears).

What you’ve done is presumed that environments were deliberately designed to be fit for predetermined groups of organisms. That’s not how it works.

Formally, this is what you’ve done:

1. If God designed the universe, then human beings would exist.
2. Human beings exist.
3. Therefore, God designed the universe.

See the problem?

Boru

No,pal. The first premise is unsound, by the way. The second premise is unprovable in the atheist's worldview - only he, one human being, can say of himself he exists. I am afraid I will insist on the problem of other minds, since it clearly undermines the atheist's tendency to demand the kind of evidence for god he wouldn't demand in other situations of equal importance.

Ther agument actually goes like this:
1. One is certain other minds exists, despite the latter being subject to debate and cannot be formally proven.
2. It can be shown that the existence of God is based on the same analogy, however weak it is, that leads to the existence of other minds.
3. Therefore, if one rejects the existence of god, one rejects other minds. Otherwise, he will have a fundamentally dishonest position.

For the design part, it can be put this way:
1. We can see clear aspects of adaptation of means to end -i.e. design-, regardless of the process that led to it.
2. Design, as defined in 1., is more probably that not the product of a conscious, deliberate decision.
3. Therefore, our universe is more probably than not the design of a conscious agent.

If one defines design as manufactured things, then he's the one who is affirming the consequent. Since by his own narrow, discriminatory definition, nature is undesigned. The atheist simply asigns an ad hoc meaning to design to undermine an otherwise valid argument.

So, here's what the atheist does, formally:

1. I am afraid the universe really does look fine-tuned. My position is screwed.
2. I have an idea though, I am going to define design as human design only.
3. Therefore the universe is not designed.

See the problem ?

H, Klorophyll.  There are a lot of ways to respond to this, but my first intuition is to just as the most simple question that this line of thinking begs.  If I accept your argument as valid, this still leaves me with an incredibly profound problem.  Which god do I now choose?  And upon what basis do I make this choice?

If you accept the argument, and therefore think a god exists. Then it follows that he couldn't have let his creatures -us, without guidance. The most tenable candidates for that would be abrahamic religions, other known religions either self-affirm their godlessness or are by definition a collection of nebullous, and often contradictory wisdoms, christianity runs into the fatal logical problem of trinity. You're left with Judaism and Islam, the only strictly monotheist beliefs today.

If you agree with all what's above, we'll assess together which of the two remaining religions closely fits what would one expect from an all powerful god.

From the abstract of your linked article:

"We also report on studies that associate HERVs with human diseases of the brain and CNS. There is little doubt of an association between HERVs and a number of CNS diseases."

Thank you for proving my point. Worse than useless.

From the same article :

Another intriguing finding in human brain cells and mouse models was that endogenous retrovirus HERV-K appears to be protective against neurotoxins.

I told you, you're desperately trying to argue from ignorance

Horseshit. Any fool can show that a broken part is useless. The pseudogene that fails to produce vitamin C in primates for example. Useless. Worse than useless in fact, since it takes resources to reproduce.

No, liar. Parts of the gene are literally missing, not broken.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14703305/

We read : Only five exons, as compared to 12 exons constituting the functional rat GULO gene, remain in the human genome. A comparison of these exons with those of their functional counterparts in rat showed that there are two single nucleotide deletions, one triple nucleotide deletion, and one single nucleotide insertion in the human sequence.

It's another matter entirely if the entire gene was there and wasn't able to function nonetheless.

Even more, the mutation that made the gene stop being able to synthetize vitamin C may have been of beneft to early primates.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2917125/
Vitamin C partially blocks the effects of fructose, namely stimulation of fat storage, which provides means for survival during periods of food shortage.

Point of order! Which side of this debate are you arguing? I ask because you're arguing that humans give things function, utility, and purpose, not god. I mean, thanks and all that, but I really wasn't expecting you to argue both sides of this debate. Why don't I just leave you to it.

You're not that stupid, pal. Read your posts again : you're arguing that some gene somewhere is "useless", and therefore not designed. My point is that this logical implication is invalid. Because we have abundant counterexamples to your assertion. And I gave the example of chemical elements out there in nature who stayed "useless" for centuries, then became useful when we figure out out more about chemistry.

In short: the terms "useless" are "useful" are entirely related to our condition, our science, our culture, etc. And one shouldn't blame the creator when he thinks that something is really useless.

---

@Klorophyll

Because I’m not quoting that text wall:

You’re the one that brings up silly analogies like cars and buildings and other man-made objects to compare to all of extant nature, lol. Unless you’re asserting that god hand-designs every individual snowflake; a claim you would have to demonstrate, by the way; then yeah, you’re equivocating. Own it.

Sure, you can run. I have one definition of design, I will restate mine (and yours) in bold, if that helps :

Design (my definition) = adaptation of means to ends.

Design (according to LadyForCamus) = ........... human design

Your definition is circular, biased, and wrong too. And you're accusing me of equivocation ?

You are the one who invokes human designed objects as evidence of design in nature, dipshit. You can’t even agree with yourself on which definition of design you’re going with depending on the day. Quit before all your integrity is lost, guy.

[The Grand Nudger]

It's not like it would matter if he managed to tighten up. Natural teleology doesn't require any gods to explain. We may live in a word full of natural teleology and absent any gods.

That is how we apprehend the world, all day every day..everywhere....every single one of us.

[R00tKiT]

I'm going to deal with this in reverse order because the main problem is that the latter argument, that the universe is likely designed because it looks designed is the main problem.  I noted in an earlier definition you gave for design that you had expanded it to the point that it included things which, in the colloquial sense, did not actually exhibit design in the sense you were implying.  Your definition also fit out-of-place artifacts which look like they were designed by an agent, but actually were the result of natural processes.  

Some artifacts are the result of natural processes.... so what? Is the understanding of natural processes an antithesis to design ? This is an argument from personal incredulity, an opponent of design obviously cannot conceive of design through long term processes of infinitesimal improvements, and thinks that this implies there is no designer...

This is the main obstacle in any design argument, defining design, and specifically what the indicators of design are, such that they don't yield false positives.  William Dembski has written  at length on the problem and is the foremost proponent of a framework which claims to be able to identify design.  Unfortunately his work is terribly flawed and faulty.  The result is that you can't establish premise #1 of your argument that there are clear aspects of design in the universe or in biological life forms, and if anything, the argument is much stronger in the case of biological life forms.  In particular, if you are suggesting that fine-tuning of the universe is the aspect which leads to a conclusion of design, one's argument gets recast as:

1. The universe appears fine-tuned which would be clear evidence of design, regardless of the process which led to it.
2. Design, as previously defined, is more probably than not the product of conscious, deliberate decision.
3. It is not necessarily the case that the universe is fine-tuned, as the universe's constants could have happened by chance.
4. If the universe is not designed as in 3, then it would still appear fine-tuned.
5. Therefore the appearance of fine-tuning is not evidence of conscious, deliberate decision.

The main problem is that premise #1 is not true.  With the failure of the design part of your argument, the prior main argument fails as well.

First of all, you didn't give any improved definition of design we can work with, and so this argument is unintelligible. If we adopt the definition I previously gave, then nature clearly displays aspects of adaptation of means to end, and this at least implies conscious design,.Besides, if we, as conscious agents, can't even reproduce some of nature's achievements, how come one can posit it all got there by blind coincidence.....
Second, I don't see how the argument from design becomes "much stronger" with biological life forms, it's not like opponents to this argument figured out how to come up with rocks and trees ex nihilo so they can move on to the last remaining theist fortress of life forms.

Or, as the Qur'an says : "Here is a parable set forth! listen to it! Those on whom, besides Allah, ye call, cannot create (even) a fly, if they all met together for the purpose! and if the fly should snatch away anything from them, they would have no power to release it from the fly. Feeble are those who petition and those whom they petition!"

In essence, we never managed to design anything, human machines are mere more or less clever combinations of existent matter.

Now, as to the first, it's important to note that an argument based upon analogy is neither inductive nor deductive and largely functions as a pedagogical tool rather than an argument.  The basis of an argument from analogy is that something displays similarity in aspects which it is known, therefore it's probable that said similarity extends to things that are unknown.  This is not a reliable assumption.  I can note that a car rests on four tires and argue from analogy that a three-legged stool likely has four legs because, after observing the first three legs, I conclude that the parallel between it and a car also having three points of rest also extends to it likewise having four points of rest, or four legs.  In essence, an analogy depends upon a form of uniformitarianism in our assumptions which we have no justification for assuming.  Thus it isn't probative of the probability of an analogical thing sharing a trait that hasn't yet been confirmed.  Some do, some don't -- and there is no information present to determine which class the analogized object belongs to, so the argument, as such, does not lead to a definite conclusion.  It's a non sequitur.

I never claimed these arguments lead to a certain conclusion. But again, arguments for other minds and for the external world don't, either. An argument based on analogy is clearly inferential. In the case of other minds, we work with a very very small sample (Me, one person) and reach a very ambitious conclusion : Everyone I observe who resembles me physically has a mind. And we are usually very confident in our conclusion.

And what about the external world, you literally have no example of an external world built within in, but you firmly believe there is one. Why didn't you request more samples of that ?

In your case, the analogy is so weak -- basically non-existent -- that one might be charitably inclined to agree that there appear indications of a mind behind the universe, there is little reason to suspect any mind behind it has the properties of a god rather than say aliens or a natural order which we are not yet cognizant of existing.  The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes this point in its argument from design article concerning a similar analogy, to that of Nicolas Caputo in an election in which cheating was involved.  In the case of Caputo, we have an agent who possessed the capabilities to bring about the results that the inference of design in that case was based.  In the case of other minds, we have an agent with confirmed similar capabilities.  In the case of God, we have no such exemplar.  If we don't know that things like gods are even possible, it makes no sense to conclude that they are probable based upon a design inference, as that would be a subtle form of begging the question, assuming the possible existence of God, to argue about the possible existence of God.  In any argument there are primary premises, typically those presented, and auxiliary premises, most of which end up being unspoken.  In the case of other minds, one primary premise is that minds, namely ours, which are capable of certain things, exist, at least one.  That becomes an auxiliary premise in the design argument if one is arguing that there is an analogy there, and says that gods exist, or, at least, are possible.  The fact of it being an auxiliary, unstated premise doesn't make it any less necessary to the conclusion for it being unspoken.  And when that part of the analogy is brought out, it's clear that either one is begging the question (circularity), or one's analogy is a false one (gods aren't analogous to humans).

Your objection as I understand it is, there is no guarantee this mind behind the universe has the properties of a god. But if this mind is not an uncaused cause, then you have a problem of infinite regress, that only stops with the mind which actually possesses these properties. Natural order isn't really a good solution to our problem, invoking some yet to discover mysterious order warrants itself a designer.

You are the one who invokes human designed objects as evidence of design in nature, dipshit. You can’t even agree with yourself on which definition of design you’re going with depending on the day. Quit before all your integrity is lost, guy.

Now you're resorting to lies ? I clearly stated that aspects of adaptation of means to ends around us are the evidence of design, not human designed objects.

So, let me try again : what's your definition of design ?

[Nay_Sayer]

@Klorophyll
Why are you ducking me and my correct faith?

[Angrboda]

You are the one who invokes human designed objects as evidence of design in nature, dipshit. You can’t even agree with yourself on which definition of design you’re going with depending on the day. Quit before all your integrity is lost, guy.

Now you're resorting to lies ? I clearly stated that aspects of adaptation of means to ends around us are the evidence of design, not human designed objects.

So, let me try again : what's your definition of design ?

I don't have time to respond to the rest at this time, but since you've raised the point multiple times, I have to ask, in the interest of clarity, what ends you are suggesting the universe is clearly adapted toward achieving? The universe isn't in any sense adapted toward the end of being itself, so its fine-tuning seems an unlikely meaning. If you are claiming the universe appears adapted for the existence of life, then you are simply wrong. Life is opportunistic, in as much as it is clearly defined -- which it isn't. This is why I asked you twice, neither time of which you responded, what your beliefs in the relation between fine-tuning and evolution are. If you truly believe they are related, demonstrate how. Otherwise I'm justified in dismissing the whole ill-defined mess.

[Spongebob]

H, Klorophyll.  There are a lot of ways to respond to this, but my first intuition is to just as the most simple question that this line of thinking begs.  If I accept your argument as valid, this still leaves me with an incredibly profound problem.  Which god do I now choose?  And upon what basis do I make this choice?

If you accept the argument, and therefore think a god exists. Then it follows that he couldn't have let his creatures -us, without guidance. The most tenable candidates for that would be abrahamic religions, other known religions either self-affirm their godlessness or are by definition a collection of nebullous, and often contradictory wisdoms, christianity runs into the fatal logical problem of trinity. You're left with Judaism and Islam, the only strictly monotheist beliefs today.

If you agree with all what's above, we'll assess together which of the two remaining religions closely fits what would one expect from an all powerful god.

If I accept that some all powerful being exists, then:
A.  There is no logic that dictates that a creator would not or could not leave its creation without guidance.
B.  There are plenty of other religious modalities that do offer guidance to the creations besides the Abrahamic 3.  You just may not understand how they work.
C.  What we (humans) would expect from an all powerful god is irrelevant.  By definition, it would be impossible for us to comprehend such a being.