Finally an atheist proper, with views and questions

[Lucian]

I think I need to be really careful to restrict the scope of my error theory to a tentative hypothesis (pending more conclusive empirical evidence) about what lay folk mean with their moral judgements. 
If someone claims to be a non-cognitivist I should not be claiming they are in error about their semantic claims. That would smack of “you really believe in god” which my friend has told me (unsurprisingly). 

I also need to be careful not to slip into the tribalism that I engaged with when a Calvinist. That just leads to overreactions and entrenchment. 

Relating this back to atheism, I do think the error theory can be useful when applied to Christian claims of “objective morality” regardless of how they define that.  

Already useful pondering on here, so thanks for feedback so far

[Lucian]

From my reading list to challenge my current views. Would appreciate it if anyone has read these / can recommend any others
Königs - Problems for moral debunkers
Sauer - Debunking Arguments in Ethics
Michelle - Ethical naturalism: current debates
Fitzpatrick - ethical realism
Ingram - Robust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity
Stingl - Evolutionary Moral Realism
McPherson - The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Van Roojen - Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction
Miller - Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction, 2nd Edition
Sayr - Essays on Moral Realism
Kulp - Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge
Enoch - Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense Of Robust Realism
Bloomfield - The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism
DeLapp - moral realism
Shafer-Landau - moral realism: a defence

And especially the upcoming “The Moral Universe” by Bengson, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau

I probably also need to tackle Huemer’s Ethical Intuitionism and possibly some Blackburn on Quasi-Realism
Not sure of the best works on relativism

[The Grand Nudger]

Relating this back to atheism, I do think the error theory can be useful when applied to Christian claims of “objective morality” regardless of how they define that.  

It's been my experience that christians don't tend to argue for an objective morality, at least not on the internet.  They argue for a subjective morality and call it objective since it's a gods.  The way I respond to "christian objective morality" is to argue for a genuinely objective morality.

[Lucian]

Relating this back to atheism, I do think the error theory can be useful when applied to Christian claims of “objective morality” regardless of how they define that.  

It's been my experience that christians don't tend to argue for an objective morality, at least not on the internet.  They argue for a subjective morality and call it objective since it's a gods.  The way I respond to "christian objective morality" is to argue for a genuinely objective morality.

I agree with that analysis of what is happening in most cases. I think that Swinburne would be a counter-example as I believe he argues that a moral fact would obtain in all possible worlds, even those that did not contain a god?


Have you read much on the modified euthythro dilemma? Roughly it departs from the argument about are gods commands good because he wills them, or is his will good because the commands are good (probably butchering that). The modified version says that even if they ground goodness in his nature, the argument still applies. Is his nature good because of his desires, or are his desires good because of his nature. See this paper by koons https://www.researchgate.net/publication..._Euthyphro

[Nay_Sayer]

Salutations

[The Grand Nudger]

Ish - he's content to state that a gods existence isn't a precondition for moral knowledge but still feels compelled to make claims about gods existence and the nature of the moral knowledge which might speak to transactional subjectivity, but does not accurately reflect moral objectivity.  I think he does show how there may be a convenient confluence of the two - if you just so happen to be the sort of agent (or god) that an objective theory of value holds we have a moral obligation to over-praise.  

As far as euphyro, I believe he attempts to resolve it with something so hilarious in it's self imposed inanity that I couldn't come up with a better way to criticize the position than to simply state it.  He believes that a god can only ever command us to do what we would already be obligated to do -  that a gods specific moral authority is an issue of what day to worship it. Our duty to such a commandment, as above, not being based on the specific content of the command or it's goodness by any metric but upon a general duty to over praise. Humoring the old man.

(at the bottom of the well, I agree with him on this - while I don't think it's morally obligatory to humor the old man I do think it is or at least can be a good or nice thing to do, and that I do have a moral duty to do good or nice things in general.)

[Lucian]

Thanks. Useful clarification around Swinburne. I had only heard second hand about it and that very briefly

[Ahriman]

Ish - he's content to state that a gods existence isn't a precondition for moral knowledge but still feels compelled to make claims about gods existence and the nature of the moral knowledge which might speak to transactional subjectivity, but does not accurately reflect moral objectivity.  I think he does show how there may be a convenient confluence of the two - if you just so happen to be the sort of agent (or god) that an objective theory of value holds we have a moral obligation to over-praise.  

As far as euphyro, I believe he attempts to resolve it with something so hilarious in it's self imposed inanity that I couldn't come up with a better way to criticize the position than to simply state it.  He believes that a god can only ever command us to do what we would already be obligated to do -  that a gods specific moral authority is an issue of what day to worship it.  Our duty to such a commandment, as above, not being based on the specific content of the command or it's goodness by any metric but upon a general duty to over praise.  Humoring the old man.

(at the bottom of the well, I agree with him on this - while I don't think it's morally obligatory to humor the old man I do think it is or at least can be a good or nice thing to do, and that I do have a moral duty to do good or nice things in general.)

I think so too. I don't feel like I should do good or nice things for other people, but God deserves better.

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure. I love this stuff. If you wanted something else to ponder..and perhaps a way to talk about morality in terms that would appeal to or be understandable to a theist with opinions similar to those expressed by swinburne - but from an atheist pov - you might observe that if or when we accept that over praise may be a moral obligation in a general sense and is or can be essentially valid in an objective moral system, with the greatest overpraise being obliged to agents or forces most critical and generative to our very being..that such a commitment might be better served by a religion of nature than a religion of theistic gods.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think so too. I don't feel like I should do good or nice things for other people, but God deserves better.

Well, the way you feel isn't required to follow any logical rules or flow from any logical premise.  Though, in swinburnes formulation, while he feels the need to assert that our own moral knowledge comes from god - it's still the case that moral facts themselves do not.  Thus, there's some thing (we can call it whatever we want) that deserves our overpraise (if anything does - objectively speaking) more than god for our present moral condition.  It was only by virtue of that x existing that god could pass along such knowledge by whatever means in the first place.  

This is an untenable position for many theists, as swinburne acknowledges, placing gods as subordinate to whatever x that is, morally speaking. The very moment we begin to posit ideas about what that x is we will also find that claims of deference due to existential necessity must also pass through gods and to whatever that x is, as said god existed in whatever that was and was bound by whatever rules or limitations inherent to said x.