The Kalam Cosmological Argument

[Ivan Denisovich]

 I still can't post links, but this seems like a problem to me:

(31) Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world. 

Leaving aside the fact that moral perfection is subjective, we live in a world with ubiquitous suffering, can we really imagine a notion of moral perfection that stands idly by, and does nothing to prevent the rape and murder of a child for example, if it could so easily prevent it? Of course I am not a professional philosopher, but if an argument doesn't accurately reflect objective reality, isn't that a problem for that argument? 

It also seems like he simply trying to define something into existence, as other philosophers have pointed out in opposing argument. For example he defines maximal greatness as necessarily possessing omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection, we could as easily posit a maximally evil being, this might even better reflect objective reality given my previous objection. 

There are also semantic problems with both omniscience and omnipotence. where each definition creates rational contradictions of course. Omniscience for example would certainly seem to present problems for any notion of free will, or autonomy of choice.

If whoever made up this "argument" would say I think, therefore I am he would disappear as it's just pile of meaningless bullshit. It's like saying that Superman wouldn't be Superman without all his powers. Sure, he wouldn't be but so what? It does not make him more than a comic book character just like this shitty "argument" does not make god real. It's just some vacuous masturbation over imagined perfection of imagined space Hitler.

[Sheldon]

There are also semantic problems with both omniscience and omnipotence. where each definition creates rational contradictions of course. Omniscience for example would certainly seem to present problems for any notion of free will, or autonomy of choice.

From a purely Christian perspective here's something:

Gen 2:1-3: Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God finished his work that he had done, and he rested on the seventh day from all his work that he had done.

Can anyone offer a reasonable explanation of why a deity with limitless power, would need or want rest?

[The Grand Nudger]

Plantinga's modal ontological.

I don't see how that can be called 'successful', since it begins with a condition that is ill-defined and (possibly) self-contradictory.

Boru

Because there isn't anything obviously wrong with the form of the argument or it's assertions - a unique condition in the history of apologetics.

[Disagreeable]

@The Grand Nudger

The Plantinga ontological argument states that if there is a possible world in which God exists then God necessarily exists in every possible world.

Seems like a non-sequitur?

[The Grand Nudger]

It isn't. It's the logical consequence of the modal hook.

An argument being successful is technical. Doesn't mean it's right, or even compelling - the latter being a good criticism of the argument even from plantingas own view.

[Disagreeable]

It isn't.  It's the logical consequence of the modal hook.  

An argument being successful is technical.  Doesn't mean it's right, or even compelling  - the latter being a good criticism of the argument even from plantingas own view.

Then give me the modal hook!

[The Grand Nudger]

If x is possible (or possibly necessary) in a possible world, then x exists or is necessary in all possible worlds. I want to point out again that you can disagree with this, or find it uncompelling. The success of the argument comes from satisfying technical criteria. This is what sets the argument apart from, for example, the kca - which is a failed argument -technically- even though it has apparently convinced people and even if it's conclusion were somehow correct.

[Disagreeable]

If x is possible (or possibly necessary) in a possible world, then x exists or is necessary in all possible worlds.

How is that not a non-sequitur? Where is the justification for that leap?

[The Grand Nudger]

You misunderstand. That is the s5 theory undergirding a whole family of modal logic. We can be skeptical or critical of logical systems in general or in particular as they all make axiomatic assertions- but that's not something specific to plantingas argument. We accept the validity of modal logic in a broad category of other assertions - and this is all that's required for an argument to be successful in a technical sense. That it meets the criteria of the logical system it's premised on - which is generally accepted..or, to put it in more neutral terms - is not obviously wrong-.

Classical arguments for gods failed at this as a matter of historical interest- thus the continuing search for a better version. FWIW, those classical arguments could or would have often been seen as successful in their own time - because logic as we have it did not spring forth all at once or from the mind of a particular person in a specific time. We have learned over deep human time that the sorts of inferences we once found compelling were flawed in any number of ways and so the "rules of logic" have changed to suit (there are also other forms of logic entirely - as in other than the contemporary western types we often employ here). It may be the case that this is the eventual fate of modal logic in general or it's application to a specific subject in particular.

[Disagreeable]

Well, I haven't seen a sound presentation of the argument.