Do Humans Have Compulsary Will? Which best describes your take on 'will'?

[Whateverist]

Bennyboy, do you have any trouble accepting that all life on earth evolved from a certain few or even single ancestor?

If you hypothesize, as I do, some sort of abiogenessis in the origins of life aren't you stuck with the emergence of subjective states from something simpler?

No, because the primeval mind, if I can call it that, co-emerged with whatever physical system/structure/process with which it is partnered, without any temporal lag, or we have to abandon a physicalist view of mind.

I don't understand what you're saying.  You're willing to impute subjective states to mussels but you object that there was ever a creature with a lesser or simpler degree of subjectivity?  I'm confused.

[bennyboy]

No, because the primeval mind, if I can call it that, co-emerged with whatever physical system/structure/process with which it is partnered, without any temporal lag, or we have to abandon a physicalist view of mind.

I don't understand what you're saying.  You're willing to impute subjective states to mussels but you object that there was ever a creature with a lesser or simpler degree of subjectivity?  I'm confused.

I don't think I imputed what you're saying I imputed.

[The Grand Nudger]

In a physicalist world view, then yes, I deny that there is any additional utility in your experience over brain function.  Unless you do not equate the two?

I'm afraid that this "under a physicalist worldview" bit doesn;t save your demonstrably ridiculous claim.  Is there someone other than myself that can comment on the utility of my experience...are you such a person?  No, there isn't...and no, you aren't.   Make the claim for your own mind, if you absolutely must.  
(similarly, your description of the physicalist position invariably ends up being a godawful mound of straw....perhaps you should stick to the implications of your own position?)

Your mind provides you with no additional utility under a physicalist world view (whatever the hell that's supposed to mean...).  Mine does, and I'm afraid you'll simply have to accept that.  Perhaps something is wrong with your mind, Benny?  Do you think it might be the case..rather than there being some difference between my mind and yours.....that you're mistaken? There are reasons aplenty that "physicalists" are trying to replicate mind via AI - clear indicators of it's additional utility over current processing systems - which are, themselves, a far cry from simple. I find it absurd in the highest possible degree that you would even begin to make this claim, let alone put it out there as an excuse for proposing some greater "ultimate explanation" (down the rabbit hole). You're not only looking to fill a gap, you're looking to create it.

Here you and I are, our minds are providing us with additional utility (compared to simple processing...I assume you lean on your mind rather than a pocket calculator in order to make decisions...lol). If it turns out that the physicalist world view is accurate....then that additional utility isn't going to vanish in a puff of shitty logic.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrdpliMfoAM

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[bennyboy]

In a physicalist world view, then yes, I deny that there is any additional utility in your experience over brain function.  Unless you do not equate the two?

I'm afraid that this "under a physicalist worldview" bit doesn;t save your demonstrably ridiculous claim.  Is there someone other than myself that can comment on the utility of my experience...are you such a person?  No, there isn't...and no, you aren't.   Make the claim for your own mind, if you absolutely must.  

Your mind provides you with no additional utility under a physicalist world view (whatever the hell that's supposed to mean...).  Mine does, and I'm afraid you'll simply have to accept that.  Perhaps something is wrong with your mind, Benny?  Do you think it might be the case..rather than there being some difference between my mind and yours.....that you're mistaken?  I mean....you have to admit that's a hell of a claim, eh...no additional utility from mind (no matter what worldview one holds, or is true, really)?

This seems to be your MO..make batshit claim, then drive ahead fullspeed -from- that batshit claim ignoring that you consistently fail to demonstrate the truth of the claim.  It's hardly surprising that you reach a position where you find inconsistencies and contradictions between your batshit claims and reality.   

Here you and I are, our minds are providing us with additional utility (compared to simple processing...I assume you lean on your mind rather than a calculator in order to make decisions...lol).  If it turns out that the physicalist world view is accurate....then that additional utility isn't going to vanish in a puff of shitty logic man.  Youy go down this roae you hope to establish anything about the utility of mind, but because you feel that it supports your anti physicalist viewpoint.  You;re approaching this backwards and you should know that.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrdpliMfoAM

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I think you should learn what the word "additional" means.  If mind is brain function, then mind does not offer ADDITIONAL advantages over brain function, any more than an orange offers any additional advantages over an orange.  If you think that's batshit, then you'll have to explain why.

As for "simple processing," perhaps you would be so kind as to tell me exactly how complex processing must be before one can say there is a mind associated with it. My definition is that any system which sustains a subjective perspective is experiencing mind. What's yours?

[The Grand Nudger]

Your moving the goalposts now.  You started out by claiming that mind offers no additional utility now mind offers no utility over brain? We are assuming that there is a distinction precisely because you framed the question that way - not for any other reason. That might explain why you've reached such a strange conclusion...you know...those assumptions you began with.  Take away that mind bit (whatever that means to you). Assume your body keeps doing what it normally does, minus that (whatever that is to you). You see no decrease in utility? Your mind, in your estimation...is that irrelevant, compared to your brains other functions? You're proposing that if I removed your mind, from your brain (if that's where it resides, but if not okay...I'll remove it from your "undefined").....that there may be no discernible difference? That's simply not my experience of mind, so you can understand why I'm having trouble accepting the claim, especially in that thusfar...you've simply claimed it, right?

-and again, all of this apparently just so you can manufacture a problem for "the physicalist position" as a jumping off point. I'm very leary, and you should be as well.

Make up your mind, so I know what we're discussing.

(hey, gotta ask, do you think that there is anything with a brain that doesn't have mind, or the capacity for mind, btw?)

If you think that's batshit, then you'll have to explain why.

I have been, with every response. Your claim seems to take a left turn from my experience. I bet it doesn't accurately describe your experience either (which is why you see a "problem for the physicalist position"). Huh? Regardless of whether or not the physicalist position is true, mind....either considered separately -from- brain....or as a conversationally divided fraction -of- brain is providing you and I with additional utility over, say, the involuntary and mostly "dark" operation of our lungs (that is what we both observe..is it not?). Additionally, the physicalist position provides no -barrier- to that additional utility. There is nothing about a physical mind that would prevent it from offering you additional utility over the range of other brain functions (or, over the wide range of brain functions..assuming mind is "other") that I'm aware of...and you certainly haven't given me any reason to think otherwise in this thread. The physicalist position simply seeks to describe how we achieve that utility - by reference to what the structures that we think are providing that effect are capable -of-. If we do it "the physicalist way" or some other way, the utility will still be present, as both you and I experience. Again, nothing vanishes in a puff of shitty logic. This is why your jumping off point fails, hard, on it's face.

[bennyboy]

Your moving the goalposts now.  You started out by claiming that mind offers no additional utility now mind offers no utility over brain?

Don't accuse me of dishonest argumentation until you've actually read the posts again. The nice thing about forums is that they record a record of what people ACTUALLY said. I said, and you quoted, ". . . given that they pose no additional utility to any physical system, in terms of physical input and output." As far as I'm aware, the brain is a physical system, and the physicalist position is that mind represents a category of brain function. You could (theoretically) determine the entire range of data processing of a physical system, without knowing whether that system actually experiences a subjective perspective (aka qualia).

Take away that mind bit (whatever that means to you).  Assume your body keeps doing what it normally does, minus that (whatever that is to you).  You see no decrease in utility?  

To me, mind is the subjective experience of ideas and sensations: not the processing of information, but the experience of it. And if you took this away from a functioning brain, then no, from a physicalist perspective I would not expect to see any degradation of functionality, because there's no part of the biochemistry or physics of the body which is posited to be affected by the existence or non-existence of qualia. There's no criterion by which a physicalist can differentiate between a sentient human and a philosophical zombie.

See, this is the problem: I know for sure that qualia exist, because I experience them. However, I cannot prove it, cannot have it proven to me by anyone else, and have no way of knowing whether a given physical system does or does not experience qualia. You can equivocate on different definitions of mind, or throw debatey terms at me, but I don't think you can deny that any of the previous sentence represents truth.

[The Grand Nudger]

Your moving the goalposts now.  You started out by claiming that mind offers no additional utility now mind offers no utility over brain?

. . . given that they pose no additional utility to any physical system, in terms of physical input and output.

Which seems a ridiculous assumption on it's face by reference to our shared observations of the additional utility our minds provide.  Do you want me to answer you within the framework of the question -you asked-?  Or would you prefer that I mentioned that from my POV "What additional utility does brain provide over brain" is a non-sensical question.......which do you think will lead to discussion and will terminate it?

If I propose that mind offers additional utility over brain within the framework of this conversation, as..at the very least, a conversational distinction which -you- decided to impose......then your responding to my answer with some bullshit about mind/brain being interchangeable...after having assumed yourself that they are not -is- entirely disingenuous....and amounts to a moving goalpost./  If I answer your question as asked, all of a sudden you change your fundamental assumption, implicit in the question.  If I answer this, will you reverse the fundamental assumptions of the question -yet again as criticism? Either an answer distinguishing between the two as asked is acceptable.....or it isn't. I can go either way.

As far as I'm aware, the brain is a physical system, and the physicalist position is that mind represents a category of brain function.  You could (theoretically) determine the entire range of data processing of a physical system, without knowing whether that system actually experiences a subjective perspective (aka qualia).

Indeed, and? 

To me, mind is the subjective experience of ideas and sensations: not the processing of information, but the experience of it.  And if you took this away from a functioning brain, then no, from a physicalist perspective I would not expect to see any degradation of functionality, because there's no part of the biochemistry or physics of the body which is posited to be affected by the existence or non-existence of qualia.  There's no criterion by which a physicalist can differentiate between a sentient human and a philosophical zombie.

Not the question I asked and you know it.  You used my question as an excuse to reassert precisely what I'm trying to get an explanation for.   I feel safe in the assumption now that you do think that your mind provides you additional utility...since you've been avoiding a direct answer like the fucking plague. 

See, this is the problem: I know for sure that qualia exist, because I experience them.  However, I cannot prove it, cannot have it proven to me by anyone else, and have no way of knowing whether a given physical system does or does not experience qualia.

Not the conversation we're having...but I'm fine with all of that.  I haven;t asked you to prove that you have qualia, I haven;t denied you that experience (though amusingly you've denied mine). Do you think that qualia is providing you with additional utility?  

The answer is yes, we both know that. We both agree on that. That answer is yes for us both regardless of what mind is made of (the physicalist position). The physicalist position has problems, sure...this isn't one of them.

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[bennyboy]

If I propose that mind offers additional utility over brain within the framework of this conversation, as..at the very least, a conversational distinction which -you- decided to impose......then your responding to my answer with some bullshit about mind/brain being interchangeable...after having assumed yourself that they are not -is- entirely disingenuous....and amounts to a moving goalpost./  If I answer your question as asked, all of a sudden you change your fundamental assumption, implicit in the question.  If I answer this, will you reverse the fundamental assumptions of the question -yet again as criticism?  

I'm sorry, but if this is how you want to debate issues, then I'm not interested in moving forward. I don't like the tone, and listening to it isn't how I want to spend my time.

[The Grand Nudger]

You may not like the tone, but I answered the question you asked, as you asked it...and was criticized -by you- for answering that question in the manner that you imposed.  I think if I can drive through that...you can probably drive through my bringing it to your attention. If you're going to make a distinction between the two, my responses to you will distinguish between the two. Nothing about the physicalist position prevents me from making such conversational distinctions , and conversational distinctions do not render the physicalist position contradictory or absurd. We both seek to incorporate our experience of qualia and it's added utility and there's nothing in either of our diverging POV's preventing us from doing so. If you say "but, under the physicalist position isn't it nonsense to talk about additional utility, as mind is brain?".....in a great many ways, yes, it is...but that isn't the question you asked, eh?

Heads you win, tails I lose.... /shrugs I;m staying chipper about it though, want me to drink a beer for you?

[Angrboda]

Yes.  I am suggesting that the line between subjectivity and no subjectivity is blurred.  It's a vague property.  And your appealing to your belief that it is not a vague property cuts no ice; it's just an assumption.  And it's an assumption that appears undercut by the biology of basic organisms that, while they may not possess subjectivity, appear to possess mind in varying levels depending on the complexity of the organism's nervous system.  Mind and subjectivity are both vague properties.  Look at the psychological development of a baby.  Babies are born with subjectivity but without the full complement of mind features that an adult has.  They acquire new properties of mind, such as theory of mind and object persistence, over time.

I don't think mind, under the definition I've given, is vague, although determining what systems have it is wayyy beyond vague and bordering on impossible.  But with the baby example, you are still talking about psychology rather than psychogony.

I don't know what your definition has to do with it. It seems you are conflating having mind with experiencing qualia. If so, my earlier example of cerebral achromatopsia, where an individual can have visual qualia without the color of ordinary visual qualia, is good evidence that qualia isn't an all or nothing proposition. Regardless, I'm not arguing about qualia. Mind (or subjectivity) could be either vague, or it could be that there is a definite boundary between mind and no mind. Your continually repeating that you think there is a definite boundary does nothing to settle the matter. I don't personally see any reason why there has to be a definite boundary, which is why I question you as to the basis of your belief. Why do you feel there has to be a definite boundary? I don't think that mind is a result solely of complexity - it needs to be complexity of a specific kind. But if animal's nervous systems evolve incrementally, I see no obvious argument that subjectivity or mind wouldn't also have evolved incrementally.

Repeating your assertion doesn't make it more true.  I bolded the right sentence.

It's not an assertion.  HOWEVER you define mind, either it exists or it doesn't, under the definition I gave: that where there is even the vaguest subjective perspective, there is mind.  If you want to argue that mind means something more complex, that's fine-- but since we're talking about evolution, I want to start with the simplest possible definition, and look at how it relates to the development of the nervous system and then the brain throughout our evolutionary history.

(bold mine)
Did you really just say that? My point is that I believe there will likely be cases where, under any criterion, it's not clear whether the organism does or does not possess mind. Given that, your continued insistence that it either is or isn't present is just an assertion, one which you keep repeating to no effect.

Do we really care about "ultimate causes"?  I think this is just a position you've taken to be contrary.  Newtonian physics doesn't describe ultimate causes, but it is sufficient for explaining why billiard balls behave as they do.  Are you interested in an understandable explication of the nature of mind, or are you just holding out for an unreachable perfection.  This is the nirvana fallacy in full bloom.  It's also an example of the fallacy of the beard if you are holding that there are unsatisfactory explanations, but no satisfactory explanations.  What are you really looking for here?  Some unimpeachable metaphysical truth, or a plausible and understandable explanation of the phenomena?

As I said, it's easy enough to point to a brain and claim it "makes" the mind-- but this is only in the same sense that magnets make magnetic fields.  Both these answers answer the "why" question, but in ways that some, myself included, don't find sufficient.

I don't find current explanations of mind sufficient either. So let's dispense with that misunderstanding.

 I think, philosophically, the question of mind is why there are minds rather than not, given that they pose no additional utility to any physical system, in terms of physical input and output.

Here your assumption about the non-vagueness of mind resurfaces. If you could grant that the boundary between mind and no-mind is not distinct, the origin of mind would make a lot more sense, as it wouldn't have to be there all at once. This is analogous to the case of cerebral achromatopsia, where one can have partial qualia.

I do think mind possesses utility to the organism, but yes, it is just one form of processing among many forms of processing that the brain does. My hunch is that the brain uses the neurological machinery of perception to form mind, such that we think in visual images, or in words as in how our auditory systems process; to my view, mind, meaning subjectivity, is just an aspect of making use of the brain systems devoted to perception. It's as if a process in the brain hijacked the machinery of perception for its own ends.