Atheism and the existence of peanut butter

[polymath257]

If there were no physical laws, there would be no causality at all.

This only means that causality is a necessary condition of physical laws. It doesn't mean it is a physical law per se.
I will again ask you to provide some reference citing causality itself as a physical law.

No, it is exactly the other way around: causality depends on the existence of natural laws.

For there to *be* a designer takes enough structure and orderliness that some sort of physical laws (or laws governing the behavior of the designer) are required. So the most fundamental laws *cannot* be designed, but must be uncaused.

As I said earlier, all physical laws are descriptive, they merely describe the inner workings of a universe. They have ZERO explanatory power of the universe's existence.

I think you are wrong here. They describe the workings of the universe, but to say it is the 'inner' workings, you must assume there is something outside of the universe. That amounts to either a multiverse or some other universe, which must have its own physical laws.

The *ultimate* laws *cannot* be caused. That is because if they are caused, there is some law that describes the process of that causality, and *that* law would be more fundamental.

So, your conclusion that laws are uncaused is simply ridiculous. Think about the game of chess, the fact that chess pieces can only move according to very precise rules doesn't mean they are uncaused, someone created the game. The rules of chess simply describe how the game should be played and have no independent existence.

Now, if we picture the universe as some giant chessboard where the laws of physics are analogous to the rules of chess, our scientific theories are merely the formulation of these rules, they still warrant an originator of the chess game....

In other words, laws point to a lawgiver, it's that simple.

But the physical laws are NOT like the rules of chess. The rules of chess are arvbitrary and up to a person to make them up. They do not reflect any actual properties of the pieces, but are merely conventions for how humans play the game.

In contrast, natural lws have to do with the actual properties of the objects described: mass, charge, spin, etc. They are NOT simply conventions (proscriptive) like human laws or rules of a game. They are descriptive of how things actually behave.

No, it does NOT follow that the universe is eternal, just that the physical laws, time, space, matter, and energy are co-existent. It is *possible* that all are of limited duration. of course, it is also *possible* that they are all eternal (infinite in duration). We just don't know.

Aquinas gave the trivial reason for why there can't be a universe with an infinite duration hundreds of years ago: We are here, which means that there can't be an eternal past.

A flawed argument also used by Craig. It fails because of a lack of understanding of the nature of infinity and the non-contradictory aspects of infinite regress.

Yes, I think an actual infinite regress is possible. There is nothing contradictory about an actual infinity (in spite of what Aristotle and Aquinas thought).

Your god proposition is neither self-evident

I am going to ask you again once:

Do you think the following proposition : There are infinitely many prime numbers.

1) Is falsifiable ?
2) Is experimentally verifiable ?
3) Requires empirical evidence ?

These are Y/N questions.

I'll answer. Noe of the above. it is also dependent on the assumptions of mathematics. Which rules of math actually apply to our universe can only be determined based on observation.[/quote]

[R00tKiT]

Please state your axioms and then provide a mathematical proof.  

What proof...? It's a material conditional(or material implication). In a material conditional, the proposition "P=>Q" is always true if P is false, regardless of Q. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_conditional

I was just trying to explain to you that mathematical coherence doesn't mean anything. It just means that we thought clearly about something.

As for the Cosmos, if such is eternal and infinite, then it needs no cause.

We have no experimentally verified theory of an infinite/eternal cosmos. All available data indicates a finite universe.

We already know the agent, Kloro.  It's called genetics.  God isn't painting the roses red....even if there were a god...which, there isn't.

Genetics, just like physical laws, describe some pattern. You repeatedly admitted that natural laws and processes are descriptive. 

And a description can't also be an agent.

[Jehanne]

We have no experimentally verified theory of a ...

god or gods.

I will leave your musings on mathematics to our resident mathematician(s), if they should choose to engage with you on this topic.

[R00tKiT]

No, it is exactly the other way around: causality depends on the existence of natural laws.

That's just a claim. For the third time: do you have any reference of what's above.....??

I think you are wrong here. They describe the workings of the universe, but to say it is the 'inner' workings, you must assume there is something outside of the universe. That amounts to either a multiverse or some other universe, which must have its own physical laws.

The *ultimate* laws *cannot* be caused. That is because if they are caused, there is some law that describes the process of that causality, and *that* law would be more fundamental.

It doesn't follow that there is a law that describes causality. The word "law" is simply a label we put on have we describe repeatable phenomena around us, nothing tells us that are laws outside of the universe -assuming there is an outside.

And there is nothing logically incoherent about a lawless universe.

A flawed argument also used by Craig. It fails because of a lack of understanding of the nature of infinity and the non-contradictory aspects of infinite regress.

Yes, I think an actual infinite regress is possible. There is nothing contradictory about an actual infinity (in spite of what Aristotle and Aquinas thought).

It's a bit more than actual infinite regress, you have to take into account the fact that we exist, that our universe as an element of this causal chain really happened. It means an infinite duration of time (or sequences of events) preceded it -impossible.

So, the argument here is the impossibility of an eternal past, not infinite regress per se.

I'll answer. Noe of the above. it is also dependent on the assumptions of mathematics. Which rules of math actually apply to our universe can only be determined based on observation.

We apply the law of excluded middle for example, do we somehow observe this law in the universe...?
The proposition: "there are infinitely many prime numbers" is clearly of a different category than empirical propositons about the universe, it can't be falsified nor verified empirically.

[Jehanne]

So, the argument here is the impossibility of an eternal past, not infinite regress per se.

Are you saying that the APS is allowing the publication of scientific papers that purport to model physical impossibilities? Also, if an eternal past is impossible is an infinitely spatial Universe also physically impossible?

[Angrboda]

I never suggested the existence of an actual infinite, which is what was Aquinas' objection, and so no, you haven't provided a valid reason.  You neither know nor can demonstrate that an infinite duration must have preceded the creation of this universe.  You are simply mouthing ignorant articles of faith.

I am not sure I follow. You said we can't apply the CA to a universe prior to this one because it could be eternal, and I am telling you that this very preceding universe caused our own at some point, and so cannot have an eternal past (because we must get to the point where it actually causes our universe). 

No, I did not say that. I said the cosmological argument can't be applied because we can't know whether that predecessor universe began to exist. The rest is your invention.

An exception can prove a rule of convention, not a rule of logic, an inference, or a law of physics.   In such cases they are called counter-examples and falsify that being claimed, as here.  As noted, the existence of good isn't a bar to a malevolent deity.

Most inferences are done in the existence of exceptions. Inference is inherently probabilistic. We infer benevolence based on what we observe around us, if our world was some infinite loop where we repeatedly get squashed like bugs and then reincarnated, then yeah, maybe you can make a case for a malevolent deity. Instead, we have a world when people can experience pleasure, peace, empathy, have a wealthy life, etc. and where the universe is to some extent intelligible and predictable.

I meant deductive inferences, but even inductive inferences are falsified by counter-examples, it's just a question of how much. Since it's irrelevant, I won't discuss that aspect further. You stated an absolute rule that has a counter-example; that invalidates the rule as an absolute, regardless of whatever else you might say. Since your rule admits of exceptions, it is not itself a bar to a valid exception to it and is thus not absolute. I'm not making any case for a malevolent deity, but rather pointing out the flaw in your reasoning that a malevolent deity could not be responsible for the good that exists in the world. For the same reason that a good god may allow evil, a bad god may allow good; it may even insist on it. It's the same logic in both cases, that an overriding goal may justify subgoals that are not themselves apparently consistent with that overriding goal. That you endorse the logic when made on behalf of a good god, but object when it is used to defend the possibility of a bad god either shows that you are a hypocrite, or that you simply haven't the first clue about what you are talking about.

"You can't give what you haven't got," is simply invalid as a rule.

Why is it invalid? I already gave its equivalent within the universe, it's exactly the conservation of mass, or, even better, the conservation of energy. An isolated system's energy is constant, we simply can't have some ex nihilo energy popping out somewhere and prompting some movement or motion. In other words, a system can't give some energy it doesn't already have. Energy and mass are interchangeable (in theory) and can only be transformed, but never destroyed or created.

It is valid as an observation about mass or energy; it is not valid as a more general rule and specifically regarding what you claimed about good being incompatible with evil.

An insect isn't like the universe in that its wonderful adaptations evolved through natural means and required no god.  

Personal incredulity. Just because you can't imagine a god operating through these very adaptations doesn't mean he doesn't exist or isn't required. Is it really that difficult to understand that some agent must have started these "wonderful adaptations evolved through natural means".......

It's not personal incredulity as I'm not insisting that it could not have been the designed effects of a god. And yes, it is difficult to understand that a god is necessarily behind the existence of life in the absence of a compelling argument for that being the case. Since we were discussing the universe, not life, it's a bit of a moot point, but you haven't demonstrated that either life or the universe requires a designer.

As to your moronic challenge, it's a non sequitur and I won't waste my time attempting something that would prove nothing even if I failed.  The fact that I can't design an artificial human proves nothing about design.  Hell, I can't even cook a decent meatloaf.  That tells us nothing about God, except perhaps, that there isn't one.

You didn't even understand the challenge.... The point wasn't that you can't design an artificial human, it's that you would keep your body parts even in the presence of artificial organs... they already exist.

Uh huh. If you must know, I have in fact opted for artifical augmentations of what nature gave me. That you suggest there was some point to be made in the context of a discussion about design concerning my preference one way or the other is interesting, but again, amounts to a non sequitur.

[brewer]

I got bored with all the arguments in this thread, arguments don't make god exist, only beliefs. 

Got any actual evidence for existence yet Klor? Some that are not an abstraction, justification or story?

[R00tKiT]

Are you saying that the APS is allowing the publication of scientific papers that purport to model physical impossibilities?  Also, if an eternal past is impossible is an infinitely spatial Universe also physically impossible?

I am not sure the references you presented really suggest an eternal past. Although physics isn't exactly my field of expertise, in the few undergraduate courses I took, simplifying (but unrealistic) assumptions are very common. We assume, for example, the existence of a frictionless plane [Flash news: it doesn't exist] in basic classical mechanics courses in order to illustrate some Newtonian law.

As of an infinite space, I can't think of any reason of why it may be impossible. An eternal past is surely impossible, though, an "infinite amount of time elapsing" is clearly a contradiction.

No, I did not say that.  I said the cosmological argument can't be applied because we can't know whether that predecessor universe began to exist.  The rest is your invention.

If the purported predecessor universe didn't begin to exist, then it's eternal, and we use the same argument as before: inside this (eternal) predecessor universe, there has to be an infinite duration preceding the point where it causes our universe -impossible.

Thus, any possible predecessor universe must be finite in time, otherwise we have an eternal past. And because of that, we can still apply the cosmological argument to the predecessor universe.

Regardless of its irrelevance, you haven't presented a valid argument against actual infinities, so until you do, your objection is groundless.  You can't rule it out until you do.

Again, the only possible argument against actual infinities is to show that they yield an eternal past. Other than that, Swinburne, a professional theologian, conceded in his famous book The existence of God that there are no good arguments against actual infinities independently of time. 

It's clear why an infinite chain of universes yields an eternal past. If we assign every event or element in the causal chain to some point along the flow of time, then we must exhaust an infinitely long portion of time to get to present element of the chain (our universe), this is clearly impossible.

I meant deductive inferences, but even inductive inferences are falsified by counter-examples, it's just a question of how much.  Since it's irrelevant, I won't discuss that aspect further.  You stated an absolute rule that has a counter-example; that invalidates the rule as an absolute, regardless of whatever else you might say.  Since your rule admits of exceptions, it is not itself a bar to a valid exception to it and is thus not absolute.  I'm not making any case for a malevolent deity, but rather pointing out the flaw in your reasoning that a malevolent deity could not be responsible for the good that exists in the world.  For the same reason that a good god may allow evil, a bad god may allow good; it may even insist on it.  It's the same logic in both cases, that an overriding goal may justify subgoals that are not themselves apparently consistent with that overriding goal.  That you endorse the logic when made on behalf of a good god, but object when it is used to defend the possibility of a bad god either shows that you are a hypocrite, or that you simply haven't the first clue about what you are talking about.

Regarding the issue of benevolence/malevolence, my argument was simply that the instances of good outweigh evil. If this is the case, we can't infer a malevolent deity based on minor instance of evil. We know, for example, that natural disasters are occasional, they are not the default state of the Earth. One simply can't ignore the default state and use an exceptional state as a premise in an inductive argument.... you know what I mean.

[Jehanne]

An eternal past is surely impossible, though, an "infinite amount of time elapsing" is clearly a contradiction.

Please state your reasons for this.

[Angrboda]

No, I did not say that.  I said the cosmological argument can't be applied because we can't know whether that predecessor universe began to exist.  The rest is your invention.

If the purported predecessor universe didn't begin to exist, then it's eternal, and we use the same argument as before: inside this (eternal) predecessor universe, there has to be an infinite duration preceding the point where it causes our universe -impossible.

Thus, any possible predecessor universe must be finite in time, otherwise we have an eternal past. And because of that, we can still apply the cosmological argument to the predecessor universe.

False. We can't even say that our own universe required a beginning or else is past eternal, much less a universe we know nothing about.

You are simply wrong in your claim that any universe that did not begin to exist must be past eternal. How would you even know such a thing?

I meant deductive inferences, but even inductive inferences are falsified by counter-examples, it's just a question of how much.  Since it's irrelevant, I won't discuss that aspect further.  You stated an absolute rule that has a counter-example; that invalidates the rule as an absolute, regardless of whatever else you might say.  Since your rule admits of exceptions, it is not itself a bar to a valid exception to it and is thus not absolute.  I'm not making any case for a malevolent deity, but rather pointing out the flaw in your reasoning that a malevolent deity could not be responsible for the good that exists in the world.  For the same reason that a good god may allow evil, a bad god may allow good; it may even insist on it.  It's the same logic in both cases, that an overriding goal may justify subgoals that are not themselves apparently consistent with that overriding goal.  That you endorse the logic when made on behalf of a good god, but object when it is used to defend the possibility of a bad god either shows that you are a hypocrite, or that you simply haven't the first clue about what you are talking about.

Regarding the issue of benevolence/malevolence, my argument was simply that the instances of good outweigh evil. If this is the case, we can't infer a malevolent deity based on minor instance of evil. We know, for example, that natural disasters are occasional, they are not the default state of the Earth. One simply can't ignore the default state and use an exceptional state as a premise in an inductive argument.... you know what I mean.

This is the second time you've lied to me in this discussion. You said the following:

It's possible to argue for benevolence on the grounds of the ability of creation to fulfill good deeds, our inner moral compass, the maternal instinct, etc. All these mundane observations can serve as premises to prove some property that a deity likely has. Something can't give or cause what it doesn't have, if this rule holds (or, at worst, is probable), then a malevolent deity is unlikely to have created mothers who instinctively protect their children.

[emphasis mine]

As pointed out, the rule is not valid in this context and it doesn't justify thinking it unlikely that a malevolent deity would create the maternal instinct.

You're talking out of both sides of your mouth in more ways than one. If the existence of evil is compatible with a benevolent deity, then the existence of good is compatible with an evil deity. You can't carve out a greater likelihood for one or the other, as both depend upon the same argument.