(December 13, 2010 at 11:51 am)Captain Scarlet Wrote: Can't have made my point clearly enough contextually then. My point isn't that survival is an important factor nor that contractarianism is correct (it is one of a number of views held by ethicists. My point is that you do not need god to get you to objective morality, that there is no such thing as absolute morality, and that god is a more complicated explanation than natural ones.
I agree with all of that
Ultimately there is either one objective theory of morality or there are none, it all hinges on what values are and whether or not the things that are (or give rise to) values can be evaluated outside the attitudes of person(s). I'm fairly certain that all values are relational properties and are the products of desires, not only can you phrase any value statement as a relationship between desires and states of affairs and/or objects, but they automatically account for intention (they are the only reason for action that exists) and they are brain states (downstream from the dopamine 'motivation/reward' system), so there are scientific truths to be known about desires. We have empirical evidence for the claim that you always act to fulfil the most/strongest from competing sets of desires.
If it can be true or false that desires are good and bad for an individual relative to it's ability to fulfil other desires (because this necessarily has more value than the alternatives that fulfil less/weaker desires) then it is also true that in terms of shared values (what is good and bad for 'us') that which is morally good is a desire that tends to fulfil the most and/or strongest desires from competing sets of desires (the only thing that has changed is the sets encompass all value).
This means that there is no need to build a case for a particular thing like pleasure as the thing to be maximized (which always eventually collapses on intuition - 'pleasure seems to be good' or 'we like pleasure'), you get a theory of value that doesn't need to limit the object of evaluation to pleasure, pain, happiness etc and you don't need to justify maximising value as it follows that the most value is better than less value. You get utilitarianism by conclusion.
It accounts for intention perfectly by examining desires. A desire to save lives is a good desire even in circumstances where the outcome is bad. The outcome doesn't effect the desire, for instance killing a million people is bad, but if it is necessary to save a billion then it is the action - If you desire to save the most lives then killing the least number of people (thwarting the least/weakest set of desires) is the best choice in the dilemma.
Euthanasia is amoral as the desire to die is stronger than the desire to live and the desire to be killed when you do not want to live is one that promotes more and stronger desires than it thwarts.
Etc.
I hope that makes sense, it's quite different from other takes on morality, but I think it works perfectly.
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