RE: Can a xtian god be free?
April 14, 2011 at 4:03 pm
(This post was last modified: April 14, 2011 at 4:11 pm by Captain Scarlet.)
(April 10, 2011 at 5:08 am)Godschild Wrote: Yes God is free, not free to do the things that are against is nature but free from the things that are against His nature, so there is no need in Him doing the things that are against His nature. It is quite simple actually, why do some of you try to make it difficult. Do you enjoy batting around things that are so easily understood. When a being is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent it is ludicrous to think that one can honestly believe they can define or dictate how that being should act.Sir, I have presented an argument which you have not refuted; You have just barely asserted that a god is free, becuase he is. This is not an argument, just a "becuase I said so". Theists make it difficult for themselves, as an athiest I have not defined god, nor made it complicated, but merely point out the problems with the concept. In other: words your problem, not mine.
If your god is free and ominpotent he can commit evil, his nature (according to theist defintions) includes omnipotence and at least being perfectly good (if not omnibenenovalent). You must argue that he cannot commit evil becuase whilst he is omnipotent he cannot do anything against other parts of his nature (like being perfectly good). 3 problems with this defence:
1) Why should perfect goodness trump omnipotence? This is not explianed. Commiting evil is not instrincally logically impossible. It is argued that it is logically impossible for a god to commit evil and be perfectly good, thus god isn't evil. But because both omnipotence and perfect goodness are both parts of gods nature why is it that goodness trumps ominpotence? It seems only to be a device to preserve a concepts consistency rather than a well argued defence. Being omipiotent and unable to commit evil means that either the god under examination isn't really ominpotent or cannot fully express that omnipotence in all circumstances. Ergo that being is not free.
2) If that being cannot commit evil and can only do goods things, then why is he worthy of worship? This god has no choice, is compelled only to do good. A being who is compelled to act a certain way is not entitled to worship; they had no choice in the matter. Ergo they are not free. The challenge was laid down by William Rowe
3) If the theist successfully argues that god is both free and always does good, then the theist must concede that thre free will defence (to the problem of evil) is seriously undermined. It is clear that if this argument goes through free will and always performing good acts are compatible after all, and a god could program us to be both perfectly free and do good things as well (created in his image after all). This would make mans fall from grace a pointless and capriocious act, and means that this god has condemend us to a less than perfect existence than he could have brought about. This challenge was laid down by John Mackie
"I still say a church steeple with a lightning rod on top shows a lack of confidence"...Doug McLeod.