Hypothetically, science proves free will isn't real

[Edwardo Piet]

So would it matter at all if we were 'able to do otherwise' in the sense that we are things with the ability to do the other thing if the requisite circumstances were present?

If different circumstances were present then things would be different so we would do things for different reasons. Under determinism there is only one physically possible future at any given moment.

What do 1 and 2 mean? How does this help me to understand what a free choice is?

Compatabilsm says our choices are free if they are voluntary or not coerced. You know what those words mean. An example of a choice being voluntary is a choice that we do intentionally. For example, someone can step on someone's foot intentionally to hurt them as opposed to by accident. An example of a choice being not coerced is a choice under normal circumstances where we are under no coercion: e.g. A choice with a gun to your head is coerced. That's why if someone who is working at a bank and has a gun to their head and is told to hand over the money they might say in retrospect that they "had no choice".

Any definition of free will that merely talks about that kind of choice is a kind of free will that no one deines anyway. Hence why that definition doesn't address the question of whether we can do otherwise. It's because this kind of freedom is perfectly compataible with determinism. It's trivially true and undeniable.

Care to solve the problem and define 'that kind' of free choice? So far your definition is pretty vague (probably due to my ignorance).

Choice that is not coerced.

This seems like confusing terminology...

It's only to those unfamiliar with it. I'm trying to introduce you to it.

didn't you say that "could have done otherwise" is the same as "us determining otherwise".

It would be if it was a coherent concept. We cannot determine otherwise because we ourselves would have to be determined in that case. If we're not, that's because indeterminism is true.

The question is not whether or not human actions are determined... the question is who/what does the determining: either the person self-determines action in pure independence from determining influence; the person self-determines action in concert with determining influence; or the person does not determine action at all, rather other, non personally operating processes determine human action.

Yes my point was one of consistency and coherence. If we do the determining then ultimately we have to be determined too and so ultimately we don't do the determining. My point is the idea of "self-determining" is ultimately incoherent. And when we're talking about normal non-ultimate self-determining that's basically the normal concept of choice that no one doubts.

We ultimately cannot do the determining because if we must ask what determines our own actions and we answer "we did" we must then also ask what determined us to determine our actions, because if we need a cause for one thing, we must continue for the same reason. We can't just decide where the buck stops whether we like, that's inconsistent.