(July 8, 2016 at 2:33 am)Alasdair Ham Wrote: @ Ignorant
You're overcomplicating things hugely. It's not necessary to talk about other possible determined universes, we are talking about the universe we do live in and are asking if it is predetermined, [1] and then asking what that says about free will. [2] There is a reason that the philosophy debate falls into four positions: Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism/Compatabilism, Libertarian Incompatabilism and Hard Incompatabilism [3]
Unless you agree these are the four possibilities regarding "free will" we are at an impasse: [4]
1. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we don't have free will. (Hard Determinism) [4]
2. There is at any given moment one physically possible future in this universe but we still have free will. (Soft Determinism/Compatabilism) [4]
3. There is more than one physically possible future in this universe and for this reason we have free will. (Libertarianism Incompatabilism) [4]
4. There is perhaps more than one physically possible future in this universe but we still don't have free will. (Hard Incompatabilism) [4]
I'm a Hard Incompatabilist. But I believe this world is determined, and I take the hard rather than soft determinist position.
1) 'Predetermined' by what? If one state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and had X been different, so would Y, then you are not talking about a necessary causal history. You are talking about a contingent and determined causal history which you are irrationally proposing as a necessary and determined one. If that is the case, then your discussion about the details of determination (e.g. what role, if any, does the personal will play in determining Y?) will import this false premise and prevent you from approaching anything resembling an adequate depiction of reality.
If however, you maintain that the state of things X determines a new state of things Y, and a different X is a logical impossibility (not merely a historical impossibility), then you ARE talking about a determined AND necessary causal history. If that is the case, then your discussion about the details of determination (e.g. what role, if any, does the personal will play in determining Y?) will inevitably be confusing to people who hold to the above sort of determinism. Unless you distinguish between the two... then you are bound for frustration and the ever common equivocating and poor dialogue.
2) I don't see how you can discuss well the role free will might play in determining action when we can't even discuss well the details of determining action in general.
3) Yes, there are many reasons for this, that doesn't mean those reasons are good for philosophy.
4) In determinism, what determines the one physically possible future from among the several metaphysically possible futures? Are there metaphysically possible futures? Doesn't that seem like an important question to ask?
If some things determine the next set of things, then the human will, if it exists, MIGHT be one of those determining things, or not. If it is, then either it determines contingently or necessarily. Whether contingently or necessarily, you can finally consider whether or not it determines freely.
If all things, together, determine the next set of things, then the human will, if it exists, is DEFINITELY contributing to the determination of the next set of things. If it is, then either it determines contingently or necessarily. Whether contingently or necessarily, you can finally consider whether or not it determines freely.
This distinguishing questions make a difference for the final conclusion of the will's free vs. non-free determination or its determination at all.
