RE: Hypothetically, science proves free will isn't real
July 12, 2016 at 2:26 pm
(This post was last modified: July 12, 2016 at 2:36 pm by Ignorant.)
(July 12, 2016 at 3:14 am)Alasdair Ham Wrote: By redefining things this way you're still not addressing your position on the normal definitions of the words. [1] Do you believe free will is compatible with my definition of determinism or not? [2] Are you a compatabilist or not? [3]
Your redefinition of things doesn't even address the issue it just confuses everything. [4]
1) Well, if I have not been clear, allow me to restate why. The 'normal definitions of the words' do not adequately describe the realities they aim at describing. My position, in my view, accounts for aspects of the realities for which the 'normal definitions of the words' are unable to provide an account. My position, in other words, requires a different vocabulary. In short, the 'normal definitions of the words' cannot address my position, and that is why I am not addressing my position according to the 'normal definition of the words'.
2) I think a certain description of free will is compatible with your version of determinism. I neither hold to that description of free will nor to your version of determinism, so I'm not sure how answering that question helps you understand what my position.
3) On your definition of compatibilist (which is defined in terms of your definitions of freedom, will, action, determination, determinism, necessity, etc), my position doesn't fit nicely into one of the categories you mentioned earlier. Yours don't account for a distinction between contingency and necessity, and the equivocation to which 'necessity' lends itself. Why should I pick one then?
4) It may be confusing to some, sure. So is relativity. That doesn't mean we demand that physicists conform their work on relativity to fit within a Newtonian/classical vocabulary and explanation. Rather, we recognize that relativity ultimately accounts for more of reality than the previous classical models, and while the classical models are acceptable for some contexts (F=ma seems to be good enough in a lot of settings), it fails in others. Do you really want to try and make sense out of elementary particles only using the classical models? If not, why try an make sense out of causal determination, freedom, and human contributions to a causal determination using only F=ma?
Here's what my plan would be (even though the discussion thus far does not encourage me to move forward): a) Adequately describe our universe's historical (i.e. successive) causal determination; b) Adequately describe the criteria required for human participation/contribution to a historical causal determination of the type described in (a); c) Argue for the presence of these criteria within our historical causal determination described in (a); d) Adequately describe the criteria required for freely participating/contributing to a historical causal determination of the type described in (a); e) Argue for the presence of these criteria within our historical causal determination described in (a); f) conclude that the free human contribution to causal determination within our own proceeding causal history is attainable.