Finally done reading the section on final causality. As usual, there was a lot to take in here, but still want to share my thoughts on this one.
I keep painstakingly wavering between "ok, it makes sense that we can't talk about the natural phenomena of this world without appeal to final causes" and "but no, hold on, I can theoretically make sense of these phenomena without appeal to final causes at all", so I'm just going to let Feser say what he had to say about this topic uncontested and simply concede final causality. He addresses a number of the arguments made by contemporary philosophers and scientists against final causality and does so in a way that makes the other side sound stupid for even rejecting final causality (regardless of the reasonability/compellingness of his counter arguments).
I understand, @Belaqua, you posted an explanation of what final causality is in your view and in the view of others, but my continued issue with Feser is that he still doesn't make clear (to me) what he means by "final cause". What is he saying when he speaks of "purpose", "end", "goal", "directedness"? I get the feeling he is saving what he really thinks final causality necessitates for later in the book when he gets to the proofs for God's existence.
The other thing to point out is that he has yet to address quantum physics and how this could be used as evidence that seems to strongly support Hume's skepticism of causality. There's much content on the role of teleology in evolutionary biology, DNA, in natural cycles, general physics, human thinking and action, but zero notes on quantum physics specifically. Is not the [apparent] randomness entailed by most interpretations of quantum mechanics not worth considering as an argument against the more intuitive causal framework originally proposed by Aristotle? Perhaps Feser eventually does address this later in the book, or even in the next section on efficient causality. At least am hoping this to be the case.
A lot of this section was pretty much providing counters to modern arguments against Aristotelian causality (especially final causality), with some beef noted against modern philosophers and scientists for not taking Aristotelian metaphysics seriously. His attitude against modern thinking certainly was made more obvious in this section. Interesting take on how (according to him) materialistic science was asserted by force and used as a political weapon against Aristotelianism and thus its eventual "success". Also of interest, the part where he notes there is a growing tendency among modern thinkers towards a neo-Aristotelian scheme, the "new essentialism", so to speak.
I keep painstakingly wavering between "ok, it makes sense that we can't talk about the natural phenomena of this world without appeal to final causes" and "but no, hold on, I can theoretically make sense of these phenomena without appeal to final causes at all", so I'm just going to let Feser say what he had to say about this topic uncontested and simply concede final causality. He addresses a number of the arguments made by contemporary philosophers and scientists against final causality and does so in a way that makes the other side sound stupid for even rejecting final causality (regardless of the reasonability/compellingness of his counter arguments).
I understand, @Belaqua, you posted an explanation of what final causality is in your view and in the view of others, but my continued issue with Feser is that he still doesn't make clear (to me) what he means by "final cause". What is he saying when he speaks of "purpose", "end", "goal", "directedness"? I get the feeling he is saving what he really thinks final causality necessitates for later in the book when he gets to the proofs for God's existence.
The other thing to point out is that he has yet to address quantum physics and how this could be used as evidence that seems to strongly support Hume's skepticism of causality. There's much content on the role of teleology in evolutionary biology, DNA, in natural cycles, general physics, human thinking and action, but zero notes on quantum physics specifically. Is not the [apparent] randomness entailed by most interpretations of quantum mechanics not worth considering as an argument against the more intuitive causal framework originally proposed by Aristotle? Perhaps Feser eventually does address this later in the book, or even in the next section on efficient causality. At least am hoping this to be the case.
A lot of this section was pretty much providing counters to modern arguments against Aristotelian causality (especially final causality), with some beef noted against modern philosophers and scientists for not taking Aristotelian metaphysics seriously. His attitude against modern thinking certainly was made more obvious in this section. Interesting take on how (according to him) materialistic science was asserted by force and used as a political weapon against Aristotelianism and thus its eventual "success". Also of interest, the part where he notes there is a growing tendency among modern thinkers towards a neo-Aristotelian scheme, the "new essentialism", so to speak.
