Finally finished Chapter 2 of Feser's book on Aquinas. The last two sections were on efficient causality and being, respectively.
Feser finally addresses quantum mechanics in the section on efficient causality but does so in a rather unsatisfying way. Feser basically says: so what, nothing in Aquinas's metaphysics necessitates that determinism be true anyway, no biggie. But if things do/can occur in an indeterministic manner, then doesn't this suggest some lack of directionality, and wouldn't this therefore be a problem for Aristotelian causality in general? Granted, indeterminism prob poses no threat to efficient causality perse, but efficient causality rests on final causality (as I remember Feser argued earlier in the book).
Not all popular interpretations of quantum mechanics are indeterministic anyway. The many worlds interpretation, though it concedes prediction with 100% certainty is theoretically impossible, is nevertheless deterministic and still seems to be a threat to Aristotelian causality (since it seems to imply a lack of specific directionality towards one particular outcome).
This is not to argue, however, that Aristotelian metaphysics overall cannot be reconciled with quantum mechanics, only that Feser hasn't provided a proper address of quantum mechanics so far in this book. Perhaps Feser doesn't feel qualified enough to attempt such a reconciliation or he is saving the meaty counter arguments for later in the book.
Regarding the section on being, I think Feser did at least a fair job here addressing the Fregean-style objection(s) to Aquinas's notions of essence and existence.
Feser, however, lost me once again with the angel stuff. I don't think he did well enough at distinguishing between angels and Platonic Forms. Pure forms existing concretely yet independently of matter still doesn't feel like it makes sense.
Feser finally addresses quantum mechanics in the section on efficient causality but does so in a rather unsatisfying way. Feser basically says: so what, nothing in Aquinas's metaphysics necessitates that determinism be true anyway, no biggie. But if things do/can occur in an indeterministic manner, then doesn't this suggest some lack of directionality, and wouldn't this therefore be a problem for Aristotelian causality in general? Granted, indeterminism prob poses no threat to efficient causality perse, but efficient causality rests on final causality (as I remember Feser argued earlier in the book).
Not all popular interpretations of quantum mechanics are indeterministic anyway. The many worlds interpretation, though it concedes prediction with 100% certainty is theoretically impossible, is nevertheless deterministic and still seems to be a threat to Aristotelian causality (since it seems to imply a lack of specific directionality towards one particular outcome).
This is not to argue, however, that Aristotelian metaphysics overall cannot be reconciled with quantum mechanics, only that Feser hasn't provided a proper address of quantum mechanics so far in this book. Perhaps Feser doesn't feel qualified enough to attempt such a reconciliation or he is saving the meaty counter arguments for later in the book.
Regarding the section on being, I think Feser did at least a fair job here addressing the Fregean-style objection(s) to Aquinas's notions of essence and existence.
Feser, however, lost me once again with the angel stuff. I don't think he did well enough at distinguishing between angels and Platonic Forms. Pure forms existing concretely yet independently of matter still doesn't feel like it makes sense.
