RE: Book reports
November 27, 2019 at 8:33 am
(This post was last modified: November 27, 2019 at 10:24 am by GrandizerII.)
Just finished the rather long section on the First Way. Took me two nights to be done absorbing as much as I could out of this section, just so I didn't continue having a half-arsed understanding of the argument. Even then, I still struggled with some of the stuff Feser said. For example, despite stubborn rereadings of the relevant paragraphs, I still don't quite understand Feser's reasoning for why the so-called "unmoved mover" could not potentially be movable. Feser repeatedly emphasised the need to account for the existence of "first mover", but I'm not sure how relevant that was to the objection he was addressing. And I say this as someone who is inclined to agree that if there is a first cause, it makes more sense that it be unmovable (no potentiality whatsoever to be moved) than it is to be movable. I just didn't understand fully Feser's reasoning.
As for what I think about the argument personally. Aside from the common and boring objection that the argument doesn't immediately lead to the conclusion that Aquinas's God exists specifically (which, if I recall him saying, Feser addresses later in the book), the one objection that I can think of that Feser doesn't attempt to address in the section is that there could be multiple "unmoved movers" ultimately actualizing the various changes within reality as opposed to just one "unmoved mover". Each "unmoved mover" is like the most fundamental being, each occupying its own spacetime "niche" and ultimately accounting for all changes within its spacetime "vicinity".
He did argue in the previous chapter, however, that there could only be one "pure act", but I wasn't really convinced by it. Feser would most probably appeal to the principle of individuation to counter the objection I've stated, but I don't see why this should matter anyway if each unmoved mover can be distinguished from one another via their specific fixed locations in spacetime.
And even if these are not "pure acts" in the same way that Aquinas's God is meant to be, they nevertheless have no potency and therefore cannot be reduced to further act. They are each what they actually are, and can do no differently.
ETA: Of course, must give some credit for the objection I bring up to a very effing smart atheist philosopher of religion by the name of Graham Oppy who makes a similar argument (though not exactly identical) to the one I'm making, in his debate with Feser on "Capturing Christianity" YouTube channel. His is more refined and elegant, for sure.
Forgot another thing to add earlier: Feser never addresses the B theory of time in this section, even though I think it's very relevant to the First Way itself with its implication that change is apparent.
As for what I think about the argument personally. Aside from the common and boring objection that the argument doesn't immediately lead to the conclusion that Aquinas's God exists specifically (which, if I recall him saying, Feser addresses later in the book), the one objection that I can think of that Feser doesn't attempt to address in the section is that there could be multiple "unmoved movers" ultimately actualizing the various changes within reality as opposed to just one "unmoved mover". Each "unmoved mover" is like the most fundamental being, each occupying its own spacetime "niche" and ultimately accounting for all changes within its spacetime "vicinity".
He did argue in the previous chapter, however, that there could only be one "pure act", but I wasn't really convinced by it. Feser would most probably appeal to the principle of individuation to counter the objection I've stated, but I don't see why this should matter anyway if each unmoved mover can be distinguished from one another via their specific fixed locations in spacetime.
And even if these are not "pure acts" in the same way that Aquinas's God is meant to be, they nevertheless have no potency and therefore cannot be reduced to further act. They are each what they actually are, and can do no differently.
ETA: Of course, must give some credit for the objection I bring up to a very effing smart atheist philosopher of religion by the name of Graham Oppy who makes a similar argument (though not exactly identical) to the one I'm making, in his debate with Feser on "Capturing Christianity" YouTube channel. His is more refined and elegant, for sure.
Forgot another thing to add earlier: Feser never addresses the B theory of time in this section, even though I think it's very relevant to the First Way itself with its implication that change is apparent.
