Regarding the Second Way (now that I just got done reading about it in Feser's book):
Just as there could be multiple "unmoved movers" instead of one, it seems like there could be multiple "uncaused causes" as well, each with its essence equal to its existence.
However, suppose the above isn't exactly parsimonious, and that we're better off appealing instead to a singular "unmoved mover" that is simultaneously the singular "uncaused cause".
Why couldn't something about the universe itself be that singular "unmoved mover"/"uncaused cause" whose essence and existence are identical? I've not really seen a compelling argument for why we need to go beyond the universe itself for a "first cause". If not the whole universe, something about the universe itself does [intuitively] appear to me as if it necessarily exists.
By universe, I mean the whole material world, and not just this local observable [sub-]universe.
Just as there could be multiple "unmoved movers" instead of one, it seems like there could be multiple "uncaused causes" as well, each with its essence equal to its existence.
However, suppose the above isn't exactly parsimonious, and that we're better off appealing instead to a singular "unmoved mover" that is simultaneously the singular "uncaused cause".
Why couldn't something about the universe itself be that singular "unmoved mover"/"uncaused cause" whose essence and existence are identical? I've not really seen a compelling argument for why we need to go beyond the universe itself for a "first cause". If not the whole universe, something about the universe itself does [intuitively] appear to me as if it necessarily exists.
By universe, I mean the whole material world, and not just this local observable [sub-]universe.
