[Serious] Book reports

[GrandizerII]

Just as there could be multiple "unmoved movers" instead of one, it seems like there could be multiple "uncaused causes" as well, each with its essence equal to its existence.

I don't know these things...

You've gone past what I can argue, because -- unsurprisingly -- my limits are reached pretty quickly. 

No doubt people have worked on this, and that if you're interested enough you can track down the arguments. It would be wildly conceited for any of us to think we'd identified the one unnoticed flaw in the argument that has been going on for millennia. That's not to say there are GOOD arguments -- obviously if I don't know them I can't judge them.

I can sketch how an objection to multiple movers might go...

First we have to get over the idea of the cause or mover as a demiurge. There certainly could be a pair or committee of demiurges. I think we're supposed to work backwards asking the question "and what is necessary for this to exist?" So we'd ask about the roomful of demiurges, "what is necessary for this group of things to exist?" (Because in Thomas "cause" means "that which is necessary for it to exist.") And the idea is that a roomful of demiurges would still require something more fundamental for their existence. And that this would end up being something like existence itself. And existence itself is singular -- everything that exists shares in existence. So for example if there were multiple movers occupying various niches in spacetime, it would mean that spacetime is (logically, not temporally) prior to them. Which would mean that they aren't the end of the chain, and therefore not the First. 

That's how I see it...

Your proposed objection is linked to the Third Way, and when I mused about multiple movers and such, I hadn't yet gotten to the Third Way yet. I think you're misinterpreting my ponderings as definite statements of objection rather than me simply sharing my thoughts on the book as I progressively go through it. I also later on did say perhaps it's not the best counter anyway by appeal to parsimony.

I will say, though, that I could adjust the argument you've proposed this objection to by saying something like each of these entities (which you call "demiurges") could be the niches themselves and so nothing prior to them. It's relatively easy to think up a model of reality that can somewhat make sense. What's difficult is seeing if it actually does map to actual reality.

Personally I'm not in a hurry to conclude an answer. "Certainty is absurd," as the man said. I respect anyone who can look into this with genuine curiosity and dispassionate skepticism.

Certainty is absurd when it comes to matters of metaphysics. I don't think you need to point this out here on an atheist forum. People here generally agree with this.

But it doesn't mean we can't spot potential flaws in arguments based on the evidence that has been observed. Doing so isn't the same as coming up with a knockdown argument. I'm not so deluded as to think that most intelligent arguments for or against God can be knocked down so easily.

ETA: Regarding the "existence is singular" bit of the objection which I missed earlier, I'm not really sure about it. Even if Feser's framework demands this to be the case, I remain unconvinced that this has to be so. And I'm still not even sure how this gels with Feser's belief in a triune God.

I'm well aware, btw, that these sorts of counters have been noted time and time again, and that apologists like Feser have ways to address them in an apparently convincing way. But that doesn't mean they are convincing for the other side. At some point, it ultimately boils down to "well, I don't see it the way you do, so we'll have to leave it at that". This is something I somewhat noticed in the Feser vs. Oppy debate. The problem with Feser's attitude is he is way too convicted that his case must be true.