falsifying the idea of falsification

[Belacqua]

If you drained it you could check the mud and caves....

What was stated in the other thread was that Interest is not legal under Islamic Law (Sharia) as stated in the Qu'ran and this was adopted by Pakistan when it became an Islamic Republic with serious consequences.
That Bangladeshi banks now allow the charging of interest does not alter the fact that they were governed by the Sharia rules previously with all attendant outcomes.

You still don't understand what the term "falsify" means. 

You've continued your Gish Gallop on the subject of interest in Muslim countries. Now you're claiming that at some time in the past they couldn't charge interest. Before you were saying that they can't. You're sliding around and changing things.

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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/

Popper was profoundly impressed by the differences between the allegedly ‘scientific’ theories of Freud and Adler and the revolution effected by Einstein’s theory of relativity in physics in the first two decades of this century. The main difference between them, as Popper saw it, was that while Einstein’s theory was highly ‘risky’, in the sense that it was possible to deduce consequences from it which were, in the light of the then dominant Newtonian physics, highly improbable (e.g., that light is deflected towards solid bodies—confirmed by Eddington’s experiments in 1919), and which would, if they turned out to be false, falsify the whole theory, nothing could, even in principle, falsify psychoanalytic theories. These latter, Popper came to feel, have more in common with primitive myths than with genuine science. That is to say, he saw that what is apparently the chief source of strength of psychoanalysis, and the principal basis on which its claim to scientific status is grounded, viz. its capability to accommodate, and explain, every possible form of human behaviour, is in fact a critical weakness, for it entails that it is not, and could not be, genuinely predictive. Psychoanalytic theories by their nature are insufficiently precise to have negative implications, and so are immunised from experiential falsification.