Here is why you should believe in God.

[The Grand Nudger]

That was his assertion, which would be false even if there were a great fairy. He thought that since prescriptive law, the kind he believes in, needed a "lawgiver" then natural law must also need one. It doesn't, by denition.

Presumably, if there really is a great fairy - there really is some way of expressing that which isn't immediately recognized to be invalid. Plantinga managed it, ffs, why can't Kloro?

Since we've made it to page six in a thread about why we should believe in god, in which the author referred to "good reasons" let's go ahead and do that. Let's put up some good reason.

The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga 1974 goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent. Then consider the following argument:

There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p, one can infer that it is necessary that p. Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.

And, of course, they do. Let’s just run the argument in reverse.

There is no entity which possesses maximal greatness.
(Hence) There is no possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
Plainly enough, if you do not already accept the claim that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, then you won’t agree that the first of these arguments is more acceptable than the second. So, as a proof of the existence of a being which possesses maximal greatness, Plantinga’s argument seems to be a non-starter.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees: the “victorious” modal ontological argument is not a proof of the existence of a being which possesses maximal greatness. But how, then, is it “victorious”? Plantinga writes: “Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontol...#PlaOntArg