Hi Grand Nudger,
I know I’m a day late and a dollar short so ignore me if you want.
TL;DR: (Though I hope you do read it) God wants and commands what is best for us. It is good for us because it fits with how He made us. He can’t command something that violates His reason because His intellect is perfect.
The Grand Nudger’s question is trying to get at why something is good? Let’s be honest and say that while Plato may have honestly asked the question, I’d be very surprised if the Grand Nudger is doing it for any other reason than as a trap. But no worries, it’s a good question. Interesting to think about.
Following theologian and apologist, Karlo Broussard, I think we can summarize what the Big Nudge :-) is trying to say with three premises.
First, he says, “Are these things worthy because they shine out of gods wherever, or do they shine out of gods wherever because they are worthy?” The word “worthy” here is being used as a substitute for the word “good.” The statement is usually stated as “Is an action good because God commands it, or does God command an action because it’s already good?” Thus I would state the first premise as
1) Either an action is good because God commands it, or God commands an action because it’s already good.
Then he plays the gotcha and says “if badness, hate, falsity, ugliness, vacuity, and cowardice were what was shining out of gods wherever.. those things would be the set of the worthwhile.” He wants us to say, "well, I guess they would be worthwhile." It’s a gotcha because it makes the goodness of God into an arbitrary thing. To a theist it’s a logical contradiction, which is what Confused-by-christianity was pointing out. Let’s say the second premise as
2) If an action is good because God commands it, then God could arbitrarily command any evil act (like “curbstomping infants”), and that act would be good, which is absurd.
He also “wins” if we say that it’s not worthwhile just because God commands it. That means (at the surface) that there is a criteria for goodness independent of God, which a theist would not hold. Let’s say the third premise as
3) If God commands an action because it’s already good, then there is a standard of goodness independent of God, in which case God is not necessary for morality.
Conclusion: Since a theist can hold neither option, it follows that a theist’s claim that God is necessary for morality is undermined.
[Grand Nudger, if I have stated these wrong, please correct. Don’t rant yet, though. Give me time to update my logic.]
Since this post is long, we’ll only look at the third premise. If someone wants to consider the second, let me know.
I do not have any problem affirming that God commands an action because it’s good. The fallacy here is in the way of thinking what good is.
Because what is good and bad for human beings is determined by the ends set for us by nature. Any behavior that facilitates the achievement of our natural ends is considered good. If it frustrates those ends, then it is considered bad. For example, the way we were created/evolved says that drinking water is a good because it preserves our life. Procreation and rearing kittens are good for cats because they preserve the species.
And so, yes! God commands all actions that facilitate the achievement of our natural ends. Those actions he is commanding are good. He prohibits actions that frustrate those ends, “bad things, man.”
In summary, for premise 3, since human nature determines what is good and bad for us, and since God is the author of our nature, affirming that God commands something because it is good does not imply a standard of goodness independent of God.
I know I’m a day late and a dollar short so ignore me if you want.
TL;DR: (Though I hope you do read it) God wants and commands what is best for us. It is good for us because it fits with how He made us. He can’t command something that violates His reason because His intellect is perfect.
(November 30, 2023 at 9:12 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: I don't get it, for me this is super softball. OFC "devil stuff" wouldn't be worthwhile, perfect, or true just because it came out of a gods wherever - but that does mean that coming out of gods wherever is not the worthwhile/perfect/truth-making property. Hell, if it was "devil stuff" coming out of gods wherever, not only would you reject the consequences of your rule...you wouldn't even call it a god anymore. You seem to realize that something is askance. What's stopping us from stepping back and correcting a statement about what we -actually- believe, since it's not really what we just said we believed?Confused-by-christianity is doing a good job here, but the Euthyphro dilemma is hard. I would like to support him by adding to the discussion.
The Grand Nudger’s question is trying to get at why something is good? Let’s be honest and say that while Plato may have honestly asked the question, I’d be very surprised if the Grand Nudger is doing it for any other reason than as a trap. But no worries, it’s a good question. Interesting to think about.
Following theologian and apologist, Karlo Broussard, I think we can summarize what the Big Nudge :-) is trying to say with three premises.
First, he says, “Are these things worthy because they shine out of gods wherever, or do they shine out of gods wherever because they are worthy?” The word “worthy” here is being used as a substitute for the word “good.” The statement is usually stated as “Is an action good because God commands it, or does God command an action because it’s already good?” Thus I would state the first premise as
1) Either an action is good because God commands it, or God commands an action because it’s already good.
Then he plays the gotcha and says “if badness, hate, falsity, ugliness, vacuity, and cowardice were what was shining out of gods wherever.. those things would be the set of the worthwhile.” He wants us to say, "well, I guess they would be worthwhile." It’s a gotcha because it makes the goodness of God into an arbitrary thing. To a theist it’s a logical contradiction, which is what Confused-by-christianity was pointing out. Let’s say the second premise as
2) If an action is good because God commands it, then God could arbitrarily command any evil act (like “curbstomping infants”), and that act would be good, which is absurd.
He also “wins” if we say that it’s not worthwhile just because God commands it. That means (at the surface) that there is a criteria for goodness independent of God, which a theist would not hold. Let’s say the third premise as
3) If God commands an action because it’s already good, then there is a standard of goodness independent of God, in which case God is not necessary for morality.
Conclusion: Since a theist can hold neither option, it follows that a theist’s claim that God is necessary for morality is undermined.
[Grand Nudger, if I have stated these wrong, please correct. Don’t rant yet, though. Give me time to update my logic.]
Since this post is long, we’ll only look at the third premise. If someone wants to consider the second, let me know.
I do not have any problem affirming that God commands an action because it’s good. The fallacy here is in the way of thinking what good is.
Because what is good and bad for human beings is determined by the ends set for us by nature. Any behavior that facilitates the achievement of our natural ends is considered good. If it frustrates those ends, then it is considered bad. For example, the way we were created/evolved says that drinking water is a good because it preserves our life. Procreation and rearing kittens are good for cats because they preserve the species.
And so, yes! God commands all actions that facilitate the achievement of our natural ends. Those actions he is commanding are good. He prohibits actions that frustrate those ends, “bad things, man.”
In summary, for premise 3, since human nature determines what is good and bad for us, and since God is the author of our nature, affirming that God commands something because it is good does not imply a standard of goodness independent of God.
