Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Sheldon]

So while yes, one could claim a Nazis based their moral judgments by "following their heart", whatever that means, this seems to me like a false equivalence to my claim. FWIW I was not claiming this in any way represented or supported objective morality. 

Specifically nazi ideology and nazi moral assertions were a distinct cultural phenomena.  Beyond non cognitives like emotivism, 

 I agree of course, it wasn't meant to generalise, but was a direct response to your assertion: 

"An objectivist notes that a pitch black heart also follows itself."

My purpose was to point out the difference between that, and my assertion about basing morality on caring about how others are treated and what happens to them, obviously my reasoning that formed that emotion differs to the Nazis ideological beliefs. Though both moral worldviews are ultimately subjective. One moral worldview is only better than the other, if one accepts the subjective assertion that caring about others and how they're treated is moral, and not caring immoral. 

 there is additional moral content that comes down to the dictates and decrees our society.  Where those facts are the truth making properties of moral assertions. 

I feel like this point keeps getting repeated, but the fact that an assertion contains an objectively true statement, and contains a moral assertion, does not make the moral assertion objectively true, lets try an example:

It is objectively true that the Holocaust caused unimaginable and unnecessary suffering, and I would say was therefore immoral, but only the first part is an objectively true claim, not the second, which is a subjective one. 

A society really does make this or that demand,  a person can accurately relate the contents of their culture to another person - or they can butcher it.  The mere existence of this content, of these basis and these assertions, logically demonstrates that not all moral assertions or basis are or even can be subjective.

 
This seems like the same error above, I already accepted that if we have a subjective moral assertion we can base objectively true claims on it, but ultimately they all rest on a subjective moral assertion. This has been true of every example you have offered so far. 

A person can also reject their cultural indoctrination in general or in specific, though.  They can know what society has to say about x, and reject that..both in specific on a statement by statement basis, but also in general as rejecting the set of all things "because society says so" as truth making properties in moral assertions.  Thus the statement "all moral assertions are relative" is demonstrably false. 

I don't think all moral assertions are relative of course, I can imagine no context in which rape would be acceptable, or torturing a baby for fun, for example, though sadly others have, and can. However these are examples, not a rule, so we must be careful not to dismiss moral relativism, but rather to be cautious, as the idea seems to have grave ramifications if applied universally. On what moral basis did we prosecute Nazis war criminals for crimes against humanity, if all morality is relative, and subjective, it's a disconcerting thought to be sure. I think the best we can hope for here are international laws, that enshrine certain universal human rights. I should not want to be murdered or raped, and this alone is sufficient for me to think these ought to be illegal, one of them at all times, and in all places, the other with the caveat: unless it is necessary to prevent a greater harm. 

The overwhelming majority of moral assertions you'll ever see or hear are presented as objectivist assertions...even if they are not. 

Yes I'd have to agree that this at least reflects my experience of discussing morality. Though I find moral absolutes to more problematic than subjective morals, as I can use my reason to evaluate the consequences of an action, and even though my conclusion is not objectively true, I can see how best it serves the wellbeing of as many humans as possible. Since morals are anachronistic, claiming we have a set of immutable moral rules, derived from bronze age patriarchal Bedouin societies, is always going to be problematic two millennia later, in post industrialised societies of hundreds of millions. 

The emotivist homophobe says queerness is bad but really means yuck.  The subjectivist says queerness is bad but really means it's not for him.  The relativist says queerness is bad but really means..and this one is on the nose, queerness is queer.  Maybe every purportedly objective moral assertion is one of these things in disguise....but I don't think so.  I think that's a very difficult claim to make or implicitly rely on.

Well one need not be tied to one distinct moral philosophy of course, but I think ultimately our moral worldview is subjective, from there we can make objectively true claims, and label them moral, but this does not mean they are objectively moral or immoral, merely that it's objectively true they best serve our subjective moral worldview. 

So for example, in a Christian culture where the bible is cited as containing immutable moral truths, it was easy to cite biblical texts that specifically and emphatically justify owning slaves, and thus assert it as being moral. So I don't think moral absolutes necessarily best serve human wellbeing, even as disconcerting as moral subjectivity can seem at times. Why tie ourselves the moral ravings of bronze age patriarchal Bedouin societies, two millennia later, in post industrialised democracies of hundreds of millions. I am sure our own moral distinctions will be evaluated millennia from now, (if humans survive that long), and just as sure they'll be found to be flawed, as they cannot be otherwise, since we ourselves are flawed.