Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Sheldon]

I would agree, but none of the examples appear to do this? The conclusion that X is moral / immoral remained subjective, even when it was preceded with a fact that Y led to X. 

Remained subjective in some way not described by metaethical subjectivism, and subjective in some way that other mechanically equivalent assertions are not, or remained subjective in some way that any assertion of any type or kind or quality about anything whatsoever..is subjective?  

Remained subjective in the sense that the conclusion was true only if one accepted another subjective claim. For example, if one (subjectively) accepts that X is immoral, and Y causes X, then it would probably  be true that Y is immoral. 

Well I find the "idea that moral claims are true if they accurately describe objective features of the world" dubious. Since we saw you offer examples that contained true statements, or partially true, and yet the moral conclusions were still subjective, or required further subjective assertions. 

That is, very quickly and dirtily speaking, the way other truth assertions which you consider to be objective are determined to be so.  By accurately reporting whatever fact they purport to report.  

Punching someone causes pain, if causing pain is immoral, then punching someone must be immoral. See how the statement is true, but still ultimately based on a subjective opinion? The statement doesn't objectively demonstrate that causing pain is immoral. all the examples were like that. 

Though they will ultimately rest on a subjective moral assertion. For example we can say it is true that murder causes harm, if we then accept the subjective assertion that causing harm is immoral, then the assertion that murder is immoral would be objectively true. The problem is that the first subjective claim is also relative, what if the harm were considered necessary? Then the statement murder is immoral is not objectively true, no? 

An emotivist morality rests on emotivist assertions.  Relativist moralities rest on relativist assertions.  Objectivist moralities rest on objectivist assertions.  Necessary harms are still harms.  Necessary evils are still evil. It's right there on the tin.  We have or imagine all sorts of reasons to do good and bad things....but the difference between these isms and ists is the truth making property in a given system or assertion.  

We seem to be back at the start with me asking for a moral assertion that does not ultimately rest on subjective opinion. FWIW my moral worldview involves my emotions, but is not based solely on them, as I use my reason to weight consequences, but nor do I always use consequentialism, I also accept that moral relativism has some truth in it. 

It seems hard to place myself in a particular box, as if all those ideas have some merit, but none are entirely compelling. 

Anyway, thanks for not talking down to me, or being condescending.