Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Sheldon]

Remained subjective in the sense that the conclusion was true only if one accepted another subjective claim. For example, if one (subjectively) accepts that X is immoral, and Y causes X, then it would probably  be true that Y is immoral. 

Lets put this in a utilitarian context, utilitarianism being a popular objectivist theory.  

When we say that crack addiction is bad for us we're not suggesting that a person has to accept this claim is true, or any underlying subjectivist claim as true, in order for the claim to be true.   We're saying there's something about crack which is bad for us regardless of a subjects personal opinion or a groups predispositions.  If a crack addict says "that's just your opinion, I think it's good for me" and his crackhead friends go "yeah, it's good for us!" this is not taken to be a cogent argument against the doctors assertion or advice, or proof that the statement is coming from a fundamentally subjective basis.

They're not equivalent claims though, unless by bad you mean using it is immoral? The word bad here is a little ambiguous perhaps, do we mean bad as in immoral or bad as in bad for our health? The latter I would accept is objectively true, the former I am dubious about. 

Punching someone causes pain, if causing pain is immoral, then punching someone must be immoral. See how the statement is true, but still ultimately based on a subjective opinion? The statement doesn't objectively demonstrate that causing pain is immoral. all the examples were like that. 

Similar to the above - and it's worth noting that not all true claims of pain or harm would qualify as objectivist pains or harms.  We could go back and forth with examples of this one until the end of days but at the bottom of it all there's an accurate answer, which may be truly unsatisfying.  Harm basis spring out at us from every metaethical angle.   Ethicists, psychologists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists,  neurologists and the reporting subjects themselves say that when people talk about morality they are talking about or considering harm - this conclusion is based upon a mountain of evidence.

None of which demonstrates that causing harm is objectively wrong, all we have is a broad consensus based on what appears to be an expedient, but subjective opinion. That there is a broad consensus of opinion, is not objective evidence that the opinion is objectively true of course. 

The whole thing is fascinating. 

I absolutely agree about that. 

What's interesting to harm based objectivism and our convo in specific here is that the part of our brain that lights up when we moralize is associated with regulation and inhibition of the competing metaethical basis in analytic philosophy.

I can see why evolution might have "hardwired" us to view causing unnecessary or excessive harm as bad. If that's what you are implying? 

So, If I'm asked why I think harm is a valid metric in moral consideration, that it belongs in conversations about morality, that we could not fully describe morality without it's reference...I could point to it's manifestly apparent presence in our artifacts and anecdotal reports, I could invite the other person to consider the many ways in which they make such assertions..but I could also point to the the physical structure and function of the brain.  

I usually just accept it as an expedient component of moral discourse, imagine the kind of world where human violence was never checked either by the individual or society, even life in the worst prisons wouldn't compare. Though I am still dubious this makes causing harm objectively immoral, as expedient to avoid something is not quite the same, and of course again I'd say this must be relative. Where harm were considered necessary, to avoid a greater harm for example. 

So, even if we contend that objectivism is metaethically false, harm is still an issue we're talking about or considering..when we discuss or consider morality, right?  I didn't choose to include it.  It's not arbitrarily placed.  It's not unevidenced, and the sorts of evidence available for the assertion or basis not only satisfy our demands of objectivity in most other terms or senses...but can be found in what you or I might consider to be the very pinnacle of human objectivity in practice. 

Well it forms part of my moral worldview, and I'd say this was true for most people, and societies. that they place some sort of limit or moratorium on causing unnecessary harm, though I am not sure what you're claiming is objectively evidenced here, as I said, I see no evidence that causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral, though I can reason that it is expedient to try and avid and prevent it, and so I include it in my subjective moral evaluations. 
How much stems from evolved emotions and instincts, and how much from reason is harder to evaluate, but I suspect they're all at play.