Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[Sheldon]

Great, what is the objective evidence that the harm using crack on oneself causes, is immoral? 

Well we can objectively demonstrate that the world is not flat, I am not sure we can do this when we claim X is immoral, without using subjective a priori claims. 

Here's something that might help.  Is "flat" a subjective a priori claim?  Why is flat?  Is flat just what you say it is?  Is flat flat because you say it's flat? Is flat not flat if people can't agree it's flat?  Immoral is an adjective.  It's descriptive.  In whatever moral system we're discussing... subjectivist, relativist, objectivist - immoral will have the same inter-contextual meaning.  These systems disagree with each other (and then have internal disagreements with themselves) but immoral always means the rejection or antithesis of the truth making properties in a given system.  Standing opposite to moral, distinguishable from amoral.

Emotivist "yuck!" is "immoral", for example.  An emotivist thinks that's what moral assertions are about, and in the strongest sense that this is also the underlying metaethical reality which explains the phenomena.  

It seems like you're suggesting that moral arguments, even from objectivists, are presuppositional? Apologies if I have misunderstood, but if not then I agree, we must base our moral worldview on some axiom, even if it is subjective. Then we can make objectively true claims about how best to be "moral", but the word moral then defines a subjective position at it's core. I have already said for example, that I have no problem encompassing harm into moral discourse, as it is expedient to do so. Though this I think remains a subjective view. 

If a person believes that the moral truth making properties are god properties then they may also believe that moral assertions, and specifically their gods moral assertions... are absolute.  They'll tell you this themselves six ways to sunday if you ask.  That is to say those assertions are good or bad for all people in all times without any respect for specific facts of the matters.  This is not tenable for moral objectivism, explicitly premised (or purported, if we prefer) on exactly those facts of those matters.  Not the unchanging shitlist of an almighty god.

I describe them as subjectivist because they are explicitly premised in gods nature as moral truth maker.

If I've understood you, then I think we concur on this, but given we both are atheists that's perhaps not a surprise here. So even though they claim god X has made objectively moral claims, and these are absolutes, they are simply wrong, as the claims are subjective absolutes that are not supported by objective facts? It becomes more problematic for theists when the immutable moral truths are contradictory of course, either in some indirect way, or in an unequivocal way. 

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As I said I found that claim circular, since while it may be true true that an assertion contains a fact, it need not necessarily make the conclusion in the assertion a fact. So on what objective evidence do we assert: causing harm is immoral? That it is the most commonly used metric seems (to me)a bare appeal to numbers. 
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I include blood pressure in consideration of health because blood pressure really is one of the things we're talking about when we discuss health.  Is this circular?

No, but that's a false equivalence, unless we equate immoral with "bad for our health". 

Is eating chocolate (even to excess) objectively immoral? 
That would be the strong implication of a great number of moral and medical theories.  Harming yourself is bad.

I think this then would the kind of subjective axiom I am talking about. A basis for objective claims about morality, that is itself subjective. 

You agreed that my inclusion of harm consideration, at least as a matter of descriptive ethics, was (or could be) objectively premised.  I assumed you were asking why I thought we considered it as a matter of fact, why we do it.  If you're looking for something deeper...?  We consider harm for control.  For risk analysis.  To navigate in what seems to be a real world where we can really be harmed...and not just harmed in my opinion, harmed in fact.

I think this leads down to why we bother with morality at all, leaving aside the precursors are likely in our evolved past, societal cohesion without some understanding, or some ability to learn what is and is not acceptable behaviour to the group. This would explain why we find including harm in a morality expedient, though I think it is still a subjective axiom when we examine the reason, or go deeper as you say. When I asked earlier you said that without including harm in moral discourse, morality would be meaningless. So in a way we form a priori subjective opinion we use as a moral axiom, on which to base our moral worldview. 

Cognitivist positions... subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism, all share at least one idea.  That moral assertions are truth-alike.  The different cognitivist metaethical positions are mutually exclusive in that they posit competing moral truth making properties among the subset of truth alike assertions.  Are the real™ or valid truth making properties facts about reporting subjects, or facts about the societies or places or times the subject comes from, or are they facts about the object of the subjects report?  If the moral properties are our emotional reactions to objects - then none of them are true or false strictly speaking.  They are not truth-alike....and so, all cognitivist metaethical theories are false.    

The notion that an assertion (moral or otherwise) needs to tell you something about the object.....is an objectivist one.

They overlap in their conclusions of course, most human societies no matter how disparate they appear, tend to have some moral moratorium on certain behaviours. I am just not sure that this makes labelling them wrong objectively true, with an a priori subjective moral axiom. I would suggest they stem emotionally from our evolved past, we have evolved the ability to reason, and to make objective claims about the world, and these all combine to form our moral worldview, which is ultimately based a subjective view we consider a moral axiom, perhaps for expedience, or because it is emotionally intuitive. Hearing a child or baby cry is almost unbearable, and it's not hard to see why this trait evolved. 

Except not everything is solely an opinion, facts and evidence rest on well defined epistemological limitations. 

That's exactly what objectivist would tell you.  

Yes but the reason we consider X an objective fact, and y an entirely unsupported subjective opinion is because of those epistemological limits. I am not a scientist, but if I can see that there is universal consensus among elite biologist that evolution is objectively true, then I am inclined to accept this, as they are best placed to understand the evidence, and the methodology is designed to expose and discard subjective bias as much as is possible. 
No amount of consensus will sway me, in the absence of sufficient objective evidence, it's simply a bare appeal to numbers. 
Anyway I have to go out now, so thanks, I will catch up later if anyone still wants to discuss this.