RE: Non-existence
August 11, 2009 at 6:01 pm
(This post was last modified: August 11, 2009 at 6:14 pm by Jon Paul.)
(August 11, 2009 at 5:51 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: @ Jon Paul,
You didn't address my last post to you earlier in this thread, in response to you:
http://atheistforums.org/thread-1531-pos...l#pid25352
EvF
I did.. I'll quote my reply:
(August 10, 2009 at 7:49 pm)Jon Paul Wrote:(August 10, 2009 at 7:16 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: There is no evidence for philsophical zombies either.Philosophical zombies is not a claim which requires evidence on the point of minds, in contradistinction to the claim that we do have minds.
For everything that philosophical zombies predict of human behaviour is verifiable and holds true.
Whereas, the idea that others have minds is an unverifiable presupposition based on personal inclination to that generalisation.
(August 10, 2009 at 7:16 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: There is merely a failure of evidence for the consciousness of others. This doesn't mean they're philosophical zombies.Of course it doesn't prove it, because it's not a claim which needs to be proven, as it is readily verifiable that what philosophical zombies does predict does occur. That does not prove the exclusion of mind; but it proves that postulating mind in others is unnecessary, is to claim more than needed to explain the same fact, and the only really important thing - is unverifiable.
(August 10, 2009 at 7:16 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: It's far more likely that they are the same as me but...the reason why I can't detect their consciousness....is that I'm not them!.Now you are going into the nature of ontology. The problem is that there is no reason to assume the possibility for the ontogenesis of a conscious mind to begin with, if we are to proceed from general naturalistic principles. So that under naturalism, in fact, your own conscious mind is a surprise rather than something you should expect and predict. And importantly, it is externally unverifiable, and only an internal surprise.
(August 10, 2009 at 7:16 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: - I would suscribe to the view of these two quotes. There is evidence of consciousness, but not that it is anything but the brain...because, there is evidence of own belief in consciousness, and the workings of the brain itself, and no further. My brain gets totally effected when it gets effected physically. As far as I know consciousness is nothing special.Daniel Dennet doesn't address the points I've raised, and I have already read much of what he has to say about consciousness and qualia, which largely adds absolutely nothing to our understanding of these phenomena, except an introduction of some new semantics.
(August 10, 2009 at 7:16 pm)EvidenceVsFaith Wrote: If Philosophical Zombies are behaviorally indistinguisable then they must include consciousness, because if you strip the consciousness off you change the behavior.There is no need to "strip consciousness off", unless you already expect consciousness to occur. And you have no neutral source in naturalistic principles for that expectation, only your own qualitative experience of consciousness, which, insofar as it is not itself predicted by any generative principles, and is externally unverifiable, does not mandate such a prediction in general, from the causal mechanism (brain) which can be explained as a philosophical zombie just as well, to the internal ontology (conscious mind) which is externally unverifiable and unpredictable by methodological principles.
In short, you are not interested in dealing with the fact that solipsism is much simpler than realism, and proposes much less complexity, yet is empirically the same.
(August 11, 2009 at 6:00 pm)Rhizomorph13 Wrote: I think we all agree that it is not a valuable reality and certainly proves nothing.Of course, I am not a solipsist either.
But the inabillity to point to a rational reason for the rejection of solipsism (on LukeMC and Kyus part) and his insistence on the same reductionism and empricism which ultimately supports solipsism, does prove a point in regards to how we know theories to be true or false.
If we know solipsism to be false, then we don't know theories to be true or false based on their empirical equivalence or their level complexity.
And what I proposed long ago is that we know solipsism (and philosophical zombies) to be false, because the belief in reality and other minds is a properly basic knowledge, on par with the basic knowledge of our own conscious mind which is externally unverifiable, on par with our properly basic knowledge of God, which is externally unverifiable.
The people who are the most bigoted are the people who have no convictions at all.
-G. K. Chesterton
-G. K. Chesterton