Non-existence

[Jon Paul]

The philsophical zombie is an inconherent concept as I've already said. If they're indistingusible then they'll have all the same beliefs and responses and their brain will behave indentically - if they're indeed really behaviorally indistingusible. Hence they are conscious in the same sense we are. So their entire concept is entirely incoherent.

The only knowledge you deduce that from, is that you are conscious of your brains states. That does not mean that there is neither a dependence of any kind nor a causal necessitative link between brain states and the consciousness of brain states.

So consciousness, in p-zeds, of the brains states depends upon the brains states being there to be conscious of. I am clearly aware of that. That in no way, proves out of either general principles or observational knowledge, that the existence of a brain causally necessitates the existence of conscious experience. The only reason to think that it does is that I am myself conscious of my brains states, and then I am appealing to my own knowledge of my own conscious experience of my brains states, a knowledge I emphatically do not have of other brains.

The four points here are enough to refute that philosophical zombies is incoherent because it doesn't acknowledge consciousness in other brains.

Because to claim consciousness in other brains, is a) externally unverifiable by the standard of knowledge used to know conscious experience in yourself, which is itself conscious experience, and you don't have such of another persons consciousness, and b) unnecessary to explain the brain states and behaviour of other human beings, and c) unwarranted by general principles or specific observational knowledge, since no causative link or dependence has been proven between brain states and conscious experience.

Solipsism is the notion of there being no other mind other than one's own.

No. Solipsism is the notion that there is nothing, no independent reality, outside of the mind (conscius experience). That would imply that there would be no minds either, but no things either.

But this is false is p-zeds are false

No, because p-zeds admits to the existence of other brains which you claim is enough to know other minds (a notion I have also cateogrically refuted), so you are confounding solipsist and p-zed ontology, which is a red herring.

because if others aren't p-zeds then they have their own consciousness, so solipsism is false.

Others don't exist as anything other than sense-data which you have conscious experience of in solipsism.