Theists (all franchises) are often asked to prove that their god(s) exist. Non-theists (all franchises) are often asked to disprove the existence of god(s). Proofs of this sort seem to fall into two broad categories - evidentiary and logical. My contention is that exercises of this kind are about as useful as a fart in a spacesuit.
Gods, by their very nature, are not particularly subject to proof or disproof in any meaningful sense. A sufficiently subtle deity isn't going to provide direct evidence of its existence. Logical constructs (for and against) seem to always start with or to contain premises which are arguable enough to render the entire construct suspect, if not invalid.
A much handier way to evaluate whether gods exist has sometimes been called 'The Reasonableness of Belief'. Hume's argument regarding miracles (which I won't repeat here) is a good example of this sort of evaluation, as is the faeries-at-the-bottom-of-my-garden problem: It may indeed be the case that there are invisible, undetectable faeries living in my garden, but in the absence of evidence for them, it isn't reasonable to believe that there are.
As long as we can propose naturalistic, mundane explanations for mysterious phenomena, it simply isn't reasonable to propose others. And, given the track record or naturalism as an explicatory mechanism, it isn't reasonable to propose non-naturalistic explanations for things which we do not, as yet, understand.
This strikes me as the strongest support imaginable for non-theism. Until and unless theism can point to a phenomenon or group of phenomena for which no naturalistic explanation is possible, it leaves theism as an unreasonable belief.
I'd write more on this, but my painkillers are kicking in.
Boru
Gods, by their very nature, are not particularly subject to proof or disproof in any meaningful sense. A sufficiently subtle deity isn't going to provide direct evidence of its existence. Logical constructs (for and against) seem to always start with or to contain premises which are arguable enough to render the entire construct suspect, if not invalid.
A much handier way to evaluate whether gods exist has sometimes been called 'The Reasonableness of Belief'. Hume's argument regarding miracles (which I won't repeat here) is a good example of this sort of evaluation, as is the faeries-at-the-bottom-of-my-garden problem: It may indeed be the case that there are invisible, undetectable faeries living in my garden, but in the absence of evidence for them, it isn't reasonable to believe that there are.
As long as we can propose naturalistic, mundane explanations for mysterious phenomena, it simply isn't reasonable to propose others. And, given the track record or naturalism as an explicatory mechanism, it isn't reasonable to propose non-naturalistic explanations for things which we do not, as yet, understand.
This strikes me as the strongest support imaginable for non-theism. Until and unless theism can point to a phenomenon or group of phenomena for which no naturalistic explanation is possible, it leaves theism as an unreasonable belief.
I'd write more on this, but my painkillers are kicking in.
Boru
‘I can’t be having with this.’ - Esmeralda Weatherwax
