Abortion is morally wrong

[Esquilax]

Esquilax, I will attempt to address your arguments in this post.

I believe what a human fits firmly in with genetics. In fact, I believe this is all it comes down too. Enter my Domesticus Marsus example: A being who thinks, behaves and looks exactly like us but has a different genetic history and evolved from different organisms on a different planet. This organism though functionally equivalent, is not a human being.

You understand that you can have multiple qualifiers to a thing, right? A biological definition of a human doesn't just stop at genetics, it also includes physical traits and, if we're furthermore talking about an alive human, mental capacity, physiological processes, and so on. What people have been explaining to you, over and over, is that just focusing on genetics is too simple, too wide an umbrella; genetics is a required aspect of the definition, yes, but it's not the only aspect of the definition, and I suspect the reason you're so focused in on that is because you understand, as we all do, that broadening the definition to make it functional would also put fetuses outside of it.

Moreover, please note the difference, even if we were to accept your definition, between "human being," and "living human being." See, all you've done, even if you're successful with your argument, is move the problem back one step, so now we've got to discuss whether this fetal human being is alive like a regular size one is. It's not a helpful tack to take.

You state that under your definition certain things would be considered human beings that clearly are not. Can you site any examples besides a human corpse? I think this example is an ineffective argument because it is incoherent. A corspse is a *dead* human being.

Ah, so you do accept that, even talking about the genetics side of things alone, it's actually life/death that dictates the right to life, not genetics?

This is actually really frustrating: you stick to your genetic claim to the hilt, but the moment you're presented with a problem for that you switch to some other definition without even realizing you're doing it. You're no longer talking about genetics here, because functionally there's no genetic difference between a living human and a dead one, and saying "but that one's dead!" means you're considering some additional aspect that you haven't included in your claim before now. You're trying to palm some very important cards to make us play by rules you yourself won't.

You cant kill something that is already dead.

Right, so there's more to the right to life argument than just genetics. I know this, I was just waiting for you to catch up. Now that we're there, perhaps you'd like to argue as to why a fetus classifies as alive and not merely biologically functional?

In the case of fetuses, the nature of it being alive is assumed.

Sorry, I'm not going to accept presuppositions. Evidence and arguments, or you'll be dismissed out of hand. You don't just get to assume the premise you're trying to argue for here, because if you can do that then I can equally assume that a fetus isn't alive.

You really need to do better than this.

As for narrow arguments, I am using Modus ponens as my argument structure. Simply, if P, Q. P ergo Q. If fetuses are human beings than abortion is wrong. Fetuses are human beings therefore abortion is wrong.

If corpses are human beings, then killing a corpse is wrong. Corpses are human beings, therefore corpse-killing is wrong.

See how ridiculous that sounds? But are you really going to argue that a corpse isn't genetically human? This is the problem here: you're changing definitions, sometimes between paragraphs, in order to have the argument that's most convenient to you at the time. It's either profoundly dishonest or profoundly short sighted, and you need to understand that it's a problem either way.

In regards to the car crash example, it was an illustration showing where the blame should directly lie in regards to Thomsons article. Which ties into this principle.

If one puts another in a situation without their consent, that situation can not be worse than they would have been in otherwise, and that consent to put someone in a dependent situation, includes the responsibility of caring for that person.

But a consistent application of your own reasoning shows that no care should be given to car crash victims at all. Or are you attempting special pleading here, where women know the potential consequences of sex and thus should be afforded no help if they get pregnant, and yet drivers know the potential consequences of driving and yet should be given help if they crash?

This means that:
If causing someone to exist and then killing that person, does more harm than not causing such a person to exist, abortion is not permissible.

So now demonstrate that a fetus is alive sufficiently for its termination to be more important than, say, the killing of germs or insects. There are still large swathes of your argument that you're yet to even acknowledge, Arthur. You just assert them.

Also,
If one consents to a situation where another is dependent upon them, and that it would have been otherwise true that the person was not dependent upon them, the person consenting is obligated to provide for the other.

Right, so in a car crash the driver should be the one performing the necessary medical procedures on the passengers. Got it.

Furthermore, I shall quote you, "We do not prevent other humans from seeking to mitigate the consequences of their actions." Of course we do when by mitigating their they commit a morally impermissible act.

First of all, you haven't shown that abortion is morally impermissible, you've just asserted it a bunch. Secondly, you're wrong anyway, because we take context into consideration; murder is acceptable in the defense of oneself or others, for example. These are called "mitigating circumstances," and you haven't even begun to argue that abortion doesn't fall under that umbrella.