Free will/evil/punishment

[The Grand Nudger]

I think both camps would agree that a definition of free will should be based on the empirical data

Okay...and that empirical data would also contain some clarification as to whether or not free will actually existed in the first place.  We're not talking about simply -defining- something into existence here, neither of us, right?

. From my perspective, compatibilists think that hard determinism is too restrictive, and hard determinists think that free will is too overreaching. 

I don't think it's over-reaching...I think it's non-existent as described.

The difficulty is created by our experience of freedom, the nature of causality and the physics of the world, and the moral problems that arise from treating all destructive thoughts and actions as virtually tantamount to miniature brain tumors---which, if it was the case, would eliminate any rational basis for moral outrage or blame to be had on the part of offenders. 

So what?...We should just accept it to be true not because it -is- true or that anyone can demonstrate it to be true...but to avoid some consequence that may or may not -actually- be relevant, or even..itself..existent...is this not the implication you're making?  Whether or not we have free will isn't even -capable- of touching our moral outrage...we have it, rational or not, free will or not, either way.  

I don't see a difference between volition and freedom so much as I do between conscious and unconscious volition, the latter more excusable when it commits harm. 

Then perhaps you're not actually -capable- of answering the question I'm asking? This sentence though, seems to suggest that "volition" actually isn't synonymous with freedom, that you do understand the difference, as things unconsciously done can hardly be said to be chosen or free...and yet you still call it volition.

Per hard determinism, then yes... every time a person does something there is a mitigating excuse that lies outside the domain of the person themselves.

Excuse....wtf are you talking about?  I thought we were discussing cause?

That's where we disagree. If someone were to intervene and restrain Schopenhauer from doing what his will compelled him to do, then he would no longer be free to do as he willed. Short of that, he is free to do as he wills (free will) even though his will is determined (compatibilism).

There would simply be -yet another- restriction placed upon him.  That sentence, though, Nestor...it isn't even mechanically workable. It ....makes..... no..... sense. If your will is determined by factors other than yourself...you aren't freely doing anything. If your self is, itself, determined by factors other than itself....even if you -were- determining things yourself...they still aren't free.

Actions that we determine---per our morals---to be wrong, on your view are no different than ill-health, which it would be absurd to hold any person responsible or to express outrage at them, rather than the sickness, considering a lack of choice in the matter.

We -do- express outrage at ill health and while we may not have a rational basis for that outrage the basis of that emotion -does- have a rational explanation...but I;m not sure how it's relevant.  Are we planning a ski trip....down some particularly slippery slope...Nestor?