Soldiers life threatened by his own side.

[liam]

this respone has taken a while to consider and actually get around to writing but here goes

Oh, we have no foresight into what the person who in my example will do? Even after he told us, then followed through with his actions? I think in that particular example it's reasonable to assume he will continue to kill.

No, I simply meant that I could not adopt a consequentialist approach because of the issues I raised, that I placed them as I did was clumsiness perhaps

What I call "right" is short hand for "the correct action to perform to maximize happiness and minimize suffering for the most people possible". My definition of "right" is not to be confused with desirable circumstances.

However, I would disagree with this definition of right, from whence the entire disagreement stems. I would argue that the rightness of an action comes from the rights of a human and so the outcomes hold no sway to me. I would not condone the murder of anyone as it is a violation to their autonomy as well as their natural moral right not to be murdered.

in order to achieve happiness for the most people it may sometimes be that taking down the person going on a rampage down town will be the move most conducive to maintaining a happy society.

I disagree with the democratic justification of an action, this is tantamount to that most illustrious example whereby the murder of an individual for their organs which then save 4 other people, the individual's
rights are abandoned for the good of the community. While this is not a response to the example I feel it must be pointed out that happiness is not always achieved for the right reasons or by the right means and to say that it justifies the means, as Jeremy Bentham does, simply opens the door to a whole host of issues. A prime example of this is the question 'at what point does an outcome not justify it's means?' For example, the utilitarian or consequentialist may say that killing one to save 100 is justified, but when we question the ratio of death:lives we will undoubtedly reach an arbitrary point of cut-off. For example, the death 1,000,000 to save 1,000,001 may or not be justified in a consequentialist view, leaving us with two issues:
1-If this is justified then the consequentialist has condemned the slight minority in favour of the slight majority, this seems a completely unethical outcome and to claim that the ends still justify the means would hardly be possible.
2- If this is not justified then the basic 'greatest good for the greatest number' would cease to apply simply on the grounds of scale, meaning that the theory does not work.

In this particular case, culpability also factors in. A person down town about to murder five people (let's say they've made it clear they will) is culpable for the deaths of those five people, whereas a healthy individual in a waiting room adjacent to a ward containing five patients in need of five different organ transplants is not. If you ignore culpability, then yes, you will end up with absurd conclusions like "killing a person willing to murder five people is equivalent to stealing the organs from a healthy person to save the lives of five patients". In the former case, the killer has a direct role in whether they live or die, whereas in the latter the patient is unrelated and not at fault for the patients' conditions. Notice too that culpability is derivative from the value of happiness. Societies in which there is no culpability will become less happy.

We simply cannot treat act and omission as the same thing, that i kill a man is an act of evil, that I do not help a man who will die is my prerogative, admittedly it is a good act to do so but this does not necessarily mean that it is a bad act not to do so. Despite the supposition that omission is opposite to act, act is opposite to act, and only actually hurting the man am i acting contrary to his rights. To omit action is a necessity in human life, If this was not true then not intervening in the murder of a person in a different country would render me immoral, yet this is no fault of my own nor can i physically do anything to help. However, if we are to say that leaving the killer to his devices is immoral then we instantly regard the omission of an act as immoral when this is not necessarily true, I am to be responsible for my own morality and nothing else, thus I would see it as ridiculous to compromise my own morality in order to prevent that of another. Surely if he had acted in exactly the same way that I do then there need be no moral qualm in the first place? "act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law", this may seem fanboyistic but I think that the only way to achieve collective moral behaviour is to consider only one's own acts.

So, what's wrong with your summary of my opinion that, "x is wrong, to stop x we must perform x"? It's simplistic, much like your own conclusions I responded to. Notice that X can be replaced with "Imprisoning someone against their will (the action formerly known as 'X') is wrong, to stop people being imprisoned against their will we must imprison people against their will." Are you against the imprisonment of criminals who imprison others? I'm advocating a more nuanced "rule" (or maybe "guideline" is more accurate).

Simplicity is not indicative of untruth, occam's principle would show that much, not that i am advocating the truth of simplicity as that would be simply unreasonable. This contradiction does form a very serious problem with the absolutist approach and, I must concede, had me thoroughly stumped I admit that this cannot be answered in any way other than to condemn both cases, surely the right to remain unimprisoned may not be impeached but the pragmatism of an action does not determine it's moral value. So I find that this situation should not be resolved by the imprisonment of a person but rather by their exile, to lock them in is a fundamental error, to lock them out would be a far more moral solution, however, the situation of states (which I thoroughly disagree with) has made this very difficult. Furthermore, the crux of this matter is, in my opinion, the act of imprisoning someone against their will, you say that the individual who was initially imprisoned (imprisoned by he who society would imprison) should be imprisoned, I hold the view, still, that the refusal to imprison anyone should be the universal, not the punishment of others to be universalised. Perhaps the consequentialist view would post imprisoning this man but the absolutist would state posit him not performing it in the first place as the first problem.

"X is wrong. Stopping X is desirable, but not always achievable without committing X. In circumstances where performing X will prevent greater X from occurring, X is permissible, providing it is also congruent with value Y."

Yet, we are arguing that x is wrong, to say that x is wrong but it can be congruent with, as you go on to state, rightness is completely self-defeating. The wrongness of X depends on an intrinsic lack of rightness (as you classify Y above) and so we say that X is wrong because it is not right, but may be permissible if it is in accordance with rightness, wrongness cannot, by it's nature, be in accordance with rightness.
Now, if we take Y to be happiness, as is necessary considering it cannot be rightness, as discussed above, to state that x is right because of it's effect on y is only to suppose that the effect is good. If we say that 'x is good because it provides greatest happiness (where happiness is Y)' (whilst I do disagree with this statement on why it is good) we do not, in fact, state that x is good, only that it's provision of the greatest happiness is good. That is to say that 'Therefore, because Y is good, and X may cause some Y, X must be good.' This is not necessarily true, and the provision of Y is of questionable goodness in itself. Therefore your version of the statement becomes:
'Y is good, creating Y is good, stopping Y is bad. X is bad, stopping X is good. Performing X to stop X is acceptable in some circumstances, but only because it may be conducive to most Y for highest N (number of people), even if creating -Y and X.'


However, if we assume that happiness is not the be all and end all of goodness then this seems only to be 'X is bad, stopping X is good. X is permissible in some circumstances, if it reduces X' Whilst this is, as previously discussed, not necessarily true. Furthermore, value Y is unknowable and so we come to 'x is permissible if it is likely to increase potential Y' which seems an unsure basis for the justification of x, does it not? Surely to say that 'X is wrong, wrong is the opposite of right, therefore X is not right' is simply true? I do not feel there is any circumstance whereby the intrinsic wrongness of an action is overruled. Even in the example you put forward, X is still wrong and you acknowledge it thus, this would suggest to me that the action is still intrinsically wrong, your approach would simply abandon the pre-confirmed moral absolute, not disprove it.

The constant in these statements remains 'X is wrong' and this is because X IS WRONG, regardless of the situation in which it occurs, X must always be acknowledged as wrong in order for the statement to continue, this would deductively lead us to the conclusion that X is wrong. Now if we are to state that X is wrong we must be positing that the concept of X as both an idea and action are wrong (I.E- Murder is wrong, the act of murdering is wrong), now the act is all that we are debating here, you say that the act may be right, I disagree (this may, admittedly, change). But the idea of X is always bad, the idea may be seen in the act removed from the context, we say that the contextual killing of a man to prevent him killing is bad, but decontextualised this becomes: Killing is bad (for reasons that have previously been discussed). This idea is where the truth of the moral quandary lies, the act is bad. The outcome, being a completely seperate thing, is good, I concede that and have never argued to the contrary. However, determining the act by the outcome is not necessary, the judgement of the act is all that matters as the act is all that is morally considerable, the outcome is not knowable and so does not bare considering as it could occur completely differently to anything that we may foresee. This also brings to light the issue of perceived consequences and actual consequences, if we say that the happiness produced from shooting a person to save another's life will be enough to justify it then in foresight this seems a good decision to take for the consequentialist. However, if we perform this action and the outcomes do not match up to our expectations, in that they produce less happiness than suffering, then we have acted immorally. In this case, consequentialism would both condone and condemn the same action based on the outcome, so what, according to you, do we base the moral rightness on? your statement on what is right would suggest that you judge it mainly on what does produce the most love, thus the actual outcomes. So let us, hypothetically, say that the man who is to shoot at aforementioned murderer does so and the bullet, through some strange coincidence, hits another person (either through ricochet or penetration). In this scenario, was it the right thing to do? in this case your assumption on rightness would posit that he was immoral as the actual outcomes of his decision would not have caused happiness and protected from suffering, yet his predicted outcomes were supposedly moral.

I prefer relative judgements, such as "more right", rather than just "right"; i.e., it is more right to not kill than it is to kill a single person; it is more right to kill a single person than let a million people suffer radiation poisoning over a period of several months after which they die. You will encounter a sorites paradox if you say things are either X or not X. This is to my knowledge anyway. I only just gave myself a crash course in the sorites paradox ten minutes ago.

That depends on which paradox you mean and obviously I have no definitive answer to a question I do not know. However, if I were to assume that you are, in effect, questioning when something becomes a moral absolute then I would have to state that it is not an absolute because of any degree of social attitude, pleasure or other arbitrary attribute. The moral absolutes stem from the natural right of man and so do not have 'grey areas' as the consequential system would. If i say that murder is wrong then there can be no soritic paradox because there is no point of rightness whereby degrees of an act come into play, this is where the paradox occurs in consequentialism. That x and -x (representing x's opposite) enounter a paradox is therefore, to my knowledge, not true. The problem with stating that there are 'more and less right things' you seem to discount the existence of moral absolutes, which is a fundamental and self-evident untruth.

Appreciate this answer, it took me a night to think through and write but seriously very well argued thus far sir, perhaps we can keep it shorter in future? my fingers ache...

[Angrboda]

What I call "right" is short hand for "the correct action to perform to maximize happiness and minimize suffering for the most people possible". My definition of "right" is not to be confused with desirable circumstances.

However, I would disagree with this definition of right, from whence the entire disagreement stems. I would argue that the rightness of an action comes from the rights of a human and so the outcomes hold no sway to me. I would not condone the murder of anyone as it is a violation to their autonomy as well as their natural moral right not to be murdered.

What is a right? What property of matter imbues a certain collection of matter, say a human, with rights, and not an almost identical collection of matter, say a recently deceased corpse? Why does a man have rights that a cow does not? What is different about the matter forming a man and that forming a cow? Why don't mosquitoes have rights? Why do I have the right to use my property, even if microbes and worms are killed or inconvenienced as a result? Is it immoral for me to sneeze, knowing that bacteria will be expelled from a hospitable environment, where they might thrive, into an inhospitable one where they most surely will die?

No offense, but your moral theories appear to be largely ipse dixit.

[liam]

Is it immoral for me to sneeze, knowing that bacteria will be expelled from a hospitable environment, where they might thrive, into an inhospitable one where they most surely will die?

i have actually written an essay on the topic of the morally considerable and the reason that expelling the bacteria from your self is not immoral rests on two things. These are broken down into subject and act considerations:
-the subject demonstrates absolutely no signs of consciousness and so it would not be logical to assume that the bacteria is worthy of moral consideration. Furthermore there is nothing in it's biological existence that would imply that it can even feel, there is no sign of intelligent or conscious behaviour, no recognisable thought center that would otherwise display that it may be capable of feeling anything. Thus it need not be afforded the right of not being harmed as there is no harm to be done, this applies equally to the accidental killing by sneezing. The bacteria may be seen as the inanimate life, they are not animate as we understand life but simply act towards procreation and respire, this implies no thought process or any other property that would necessitate them being ascribed the status of alive as we would to humans or other animals.

-the act also provides further issue with your example, that we perform an immoral act must first be understood, it is necessary to understand that the act must require intention to be performed in the instant, as crashing my car into another is an immoral act only insofar as it is intended, if I were to crash because I had suffered a heart attack at the wheel I would not be held responsible. Furthermore, as previously explored, we must act as act and omission are not the same. Thus the act of killing the bacteria is thoroughly inescapable, the death of bacteria occurs at every level of human existence and to abstain from killing bacteria is simply impossible as this is a necessary part of human existence, that we move, breathe or even exist results in the death of bacteria and so we may not be logically supposed to avoid the killing of all bacteria as it is inescapable and, as previously stated, the subject is not worthy of moral consideration.

What is a right? What property of matter imbues a certain collection of matter, say a human, with rights, and not an almost identical collection of matter, say a recently deceased corpse?

That is simple; life. The property of fully functional life, not as a primordial expression of biological function but rather that which the basic biological functions are needed to support, thought. Thought is the fundamental expression of life, it is the greatest function to derive from biological evolution and it is the primary indicator of the value of life itself, not perhaps abstract thought that we possess but rather the simple knowledge that the self exists, the cow, as you posed as example, is aware of it's own existence as a physical and psychic existence and exhibits behaviours that are responsive to pain and other environmental stimuli beyond that which is necessary for survival.

Why does a man have rights that a cow does not? What is different about the matter forming a man and that forming a cow? result?

A man has no right that a cow does not have, he/she is entitled to the same rights, but perhaps the aptitude of a cow would grant it less in terms of privilege, as the greater reasonal aptitude of man has granted him the privileges of housing and all other of his engineering and technological faculties. The cow, however, has done no such thing and so cannot fully profit from the efforts of man or from itself. Yet the right to freedom from harm and the right to life is still afforded to the cow.

Why don't mosquitoes have rights?/quote]

Who says that mosquitos don't have rights? They too have the right to live and be protected from harm and so many more that we afford to other animals, including man. Why do you assume I would afford animals different rights?

[quote] Why do I have the right to use my property, even if microbes and worms are killed or inconvenienced as a result

I don't understand what you mean by this. Please clarify and express it as a more understandable question, what do you mean by 'property'?

[The Grand Nudger]

This bit starts with the assumption that you have accurately defined what does or does not deserve considerations of morality and that your metrics for determining this are also accurate. What if we questioned your metrics or the accuracy of your methods in determining them? You have decided which set of things belong in your "deserves consideration" camp, and as far as your own opinions are concerned this is entirely acceptable, but perhaps Apo would like to include the bacteria as well?

[liam]

This bit starts with the assumption that you have accurately defined what does or does not deserve considerations of morality and that your metrics for determining this are accurate. It also falls flat on its face when this assumption is questioned. You have decided which set of things belong in your "deserves consideration" camp, and as far as your own opinions are concerned this is entirely acceptable, but perhaps Apo would like to include the bacteria as well?

Yet bacteria do not perform any function that makes it considerable? it reproduces, yes, and surely it is technically 'alive'. However, surely the moral right is derived from life in the sense that there is thought, as this to me seem to be the only real qualifier for life beyond simple processes of biology, of which the most basic and unthinking 'life-form' is possessed. Furthermore, to consider bacteria a morally considerable entity, it would be impossible to even exist as the immune system kills millions of bacteria from the body without the individual being aware of it. Thus to exist would be immoral, yet to remove oneself from existence is also immoral as this would kill bacteria, thus the ascription of this consideration to bacteria is completely illogical. However, I'm more than happy to concede bacteria to the realm if you can prove they are thinking beings

Then, if my answer is wrong, how would you define what is morally considerable? Or perhaps what would you prefer to use to determine this? Open to suggestion

[The Grand Nudger]

"Surely" and "it seems to me"....meh, I'm gonna have to ask for a little more than that. It's illogical to consider the bacteria because in doing so your existence would be immoral? "I don't like the outcome therefore it is illogical"....I'm not sure that's how that works (but maybe I've misunderstood?). I'm asking you why "thinking beings" deserve moral consideration, or why non-thinking beings do not. It isn't up to me to provide the substance of your little assumption there, nor is it up to me to show you a thinking non-thinking thing in order to win some point.

Your personal morality sounds fine to me, but so does Apos bacteria sympathizing morality.

---

You know that leads me to an amusing little musing. Lets say that a very specific type of morality exists, that it's "true". That doesn't mean that any given creature is actually capable of meeting its requirements for a moral being, even if it were fully cognizant of those requirements,..does it?

[liam]

"Surely" and "it seems to me"....meh, I'm gonna have to ask for a little more than that. It's illogical to consider the bacteria because in doing so your existence would be immoral? I'm asking you why "thinking beings" deserve moral consideration, or why non-thinking beings do not.

Okay, let me break it down into a more deductive series of expressions, perhaps you will find that more certain:

1- The natural right of living things is to not be harmed (as an example)
2- Harm requires the possession of mind (seen as thought or reasoning)
3- Therefore, that which does not possess a mind cannot be treated in any way that would violate this right.
4-If we cannot violate the rights of a thing in any way then we cannot act immorally towards it, meaning it requires no consideration.

Is that better? if not then tell me what I am overlooking

It isn't up to me to provide the substance of your little assumption there, nor is it up to me to show you a thinking non-thinking thing in order to win some point.

Indeed it is not but it would be generally helpful and perhaps serve to shed some light on this situation, however, there is of course no obligation on your part to do so and i would not purport that you must do anything. That is your decision

Your personal morality sounds fine to me, but so does Apos bacteria sympathizing morality

I concur entirely, I am not forcing any dogmatism into anybody else's orifices but rather making clear the reasoning behind my beliefs

[The Grand Nudger]

1: Is this an assumption or an axiom, is it the premise? Its actually a couple of axioms or assumptions or a set of premises all rolled into one. That there are rights, that living things possess rights, and that one of these rights is to not be harmed.

2: Are we not capable of harming the environment, for example? Does it have a mind? The word harm is too slippery, it can mean too many things. More precisely, harm -as you have defined it by reference to the above- requires a mind, but this is only true if we concede the above, which is precisely what I'm questioning. I'm not only questioning that the statement is accurate btw, but whether or not the metrics available to us in determining the accuracy of the statement are themselves accurate or reliable.

3: Here's the dividing line, the therefore, gonna have to handle the above.

[liam]

Hmm...I'll get back to you on this, with some purely deductive stuff.

[Reforged]

Oh *wow*, did I call this one right or what?