Non-existence

[Jon Paul]

Rhizomorph sufficiently answered your vain allegories.

And I answered him BEFORE you posted this!

Kyu

You answered with "it doesn't matter in the slightest ... what the solipsist affirms", to which I have already answered, that that is not a logically valid refutation of the fact that realism is much more complex than solipsism for the reasons I and Rizomorph have already given.

[Kyuuketsuki]

And I answered him BEFORE you posted this!

You answered with "it doesn't matter in the slightest ... what the solipsist affirms", to which I have already answered, that that is not a logically valid refutation of the fact that realism is much more complex than solipsism for the reasons I and Rizomorph have already given.

What I actually said was, "No he's not ... it doesn't matter in the slightest what the solipsist claims (we all know that making a claim means sod all unless it's supported by evidence), this is about a real comparison." so I gave more information than you cared to admit I did and the reasoning I gave was entirely valid!

Solipsism is a bankrupt philosophy just like metaphysics.

Kyu

[Jon Paul]

What I actually said was, "No he's not ... it doesn't matter in the slightest what the solipsist claims (we all know that making a claim means sod all unless it's supported by evidence), this is about a real comparison." so I gave more information than you cared to admit I did and the reasoning I gave was entirely valid!

Solipsism is a bankrupt philosophy just like metaphysics.

Kyu

You have still not demonstrated that there is less complexity in realism than in solipsism, simply because your allegory does not hold true of solipsism (as Rizomorph rightly pointed out).

[Edwardo Piet]

[...]there is absolutely no evidence that the brain depends on consciousness, or that the brain causally necessitates consciousness.

If I'm unconscious then my brain is not operating the same is it? If I'm in a coma I'm different.

Regardless of if consciousness makes a difference or not, we know that it is effected when the brain is. And there's no evidence to anything further. No evidence that it's a property of anything, just that it's effected when the brain is. So there's no reason to believe it's anything seperate to the physical workings of the brain. I have self-evidence of it, but not that it's a property of anything. However - as I said, we do know that it's effected when the brain is, and to simply say that 'everything could just be consciousness' - is purely semantical; because our experience is exactly the same whether we say this universe is 'all in the mind'...or not. Unless you have evidence to the contrary.

And I've already explained why there's no reason to believe in p-zeds, and it's related to the above.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

If I'm unconscious then my brain is not operating the same is it? If I'm in a coma I'm different.

But that doesn't prove a neccessary causal link exists between brain activity and consciousness generally. To prove that generally, you would have to do so from general naturalistic principles, without appealing to your own conscious experience. All your consciousness proves is that you have conscious experience of your brains activity, it proves nothing about the cause of it.

Regardless of if consciousness makes a difference or not, we know that it is effected when the brain is. And there's no evidence to anything further. No evidence that it's a property of anything, just that it's effected when the brain is. So there's no reason to believe it's anything seperate to the physical workings of the brain. I have self-evidence of it, but not that it's a property of anything. However - as I said, we do know that it's effected when the brain is, and to simply say that 'everything could just be consciousness' - is purely semantical; because our experience is exactly the same whether we say this universe is 'all in the mind'...or not. Unless you have evidence to the contrary.

While it's true that philosophical zombies grants the existence of the brain and exactly uses the brain as the explanation for everyone elses behaviour, that is because philosophical zombies is a realist ontology, which is far more complex than solipsism which acknowledges the existence of nothing beyond nor outside of the conscious experience of sense-data, and since all knowlege we have about the brain (in that scenario) is based on conscious experience of sense-data, it is not sufficient to refute solipsism to speak of the brain, something whose existence the solipsist does not acknowledge.

[Edwardo Piet]

But that doesn't prove a neccessary causal link exists between brain activity and consciousness generally

It doesn't need to. There's not even any self-evidence of consciousness as a phenonmenon in itself. I have self-evidence that I'm conscious, and my consciousness changes when I get, for example - hit on the head and knocked unconscious. There's no evidence for consciousness existing as a phenomenon seperate to the brain. And whether the brain is 'all consciousness' or 'all mind', is just semantic babbling because it makes no actual difference to our experience of this world, and there's no evidence of any difference actually existing.

While it's true that philosophical zombies grants the existence of the brain and exactly uses the brain as the explanation for everyone elses behaviour, that is because philosophical zombies is a realist ontology, which is far more complex than solipsism which acknowledges the existence of nothing beyond nor outside of the conscious experience of sense-data, and since all knowlege we have about the brain (in that scenario) is based on conscious experience of sense-data, it is not sufficient to refute solipsism to speak of the brain, something whose existence the solipsist does not acknowledge.

But if the concept of p-zeds is incoherent then other people have consciousnesses too, seperate to mine - otherwise I'd be conscious of them. So other minds exist apart from mine, and thus solipsism is erroneous.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

But that doesn't prove a neccessary causal link exists between brain activity and consciousness generally

It doesn't need to. There's not even any self-evidence of consciousness as a phenonmenon in itself. I have self-evidence that I'm conscious,

And that's all I mean with "consciousness", the fact of being conscious.

There's no evidence for consciousness existing as a phenomenon seperate to the brain.

Nor have I said that there is, or that there needs to be. Theres no evidence that there is a necessary causative link between the brain and consciousness. There is only the fact that I am consciously aware of my brains states, but that in no way proves a necessary causative link between brain activity and consciousness, which would have to be predicted by general principles and observational knowledge aside from conscious experience to be causally proven.

But if the concept of p-zeds is incoherent then other people have consciousnesses too, seperate to mine - otherwise I'd be conscious of them. So other minds exist apart from mine, and thus solipsism is erroneous.

That is not demonstrable given solipsism. It is only demonstrable given p-zeds because p-zeds is a naturalistic/realist ontology, and thus it grants the existence of an independently existing reality outside of the conscious experience of it.

[Edwardo Piet]

And that's all I mean with "consciousness", the fact of being conscious.

Good.

Theres no evidence that there is a necessary causative link between the brain and consciousness.

There's no evidence of consciousness seperate to the evidenced fact that it is effected when the brain is, therefore that it has a relationship to the brain. There's no reason to believe it's anything furhter than the workings of the brain. Like I said, I have self-evidence that I'm conscious, but not that consciousness is an external property. And there's evidence that it is effected when the brain is (if I get knocked unconscious), so once again, there's no reason to believe that it's anything more than the workings of the brain, because there's no evidence to anything further...or that it exists at all as a phenonmenon in and of itself that can exist without the brain.

That is not demonstrable given solipsism. It is only demonstrable given p-zeds because p-zeds is a naturalistic/realist ontology, and thus it grants the existence of an independently existing reality outside of the conscious experience of it.

Solipsim fails then, because solipsism requires for there to be no other minds other than one's own...and since p-zeds are incoherent, others are likely to have minds so solipsism is likely to be bullshit.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

There's no evidence of consciousness seperate to the evidenced fact that it is effected when the brain is, therefore that it has a relationship to the brain. There's no reason to believe it's anything furhter than the workings of the brain. Like I said, I have self-evidence that I'm conscious, but not that consciousness is an external property. And there's evidence that it is effected when the brain is (if I get knocked unconscious), so once again, there's no reason to believe that it's anything more than the workings of the brain, because there's no evidence to anything further...or that it exists at all as a phenonmenon in and of itself that can exist without the brain.

So consciousness of the brains states depends upon the brains states. I am clearly aware of that. That in no way, proves out of either general principles or observational knowledge, that the existence of a brain causally necessitates the existence of conscious experience. The only reason to think that it does is that I am myself conscious of my brains states, and then I am appealing to my own knowledge of my own conscious experience of my brains states, a knowledge I emphatically do not have of other brains. It is both a) externally unverifiable, and b) unnecessary to explain the brain states and behaviour of the human being, and c) unwarranted by general principles or specific observational knowledge, and d) unwarranted due to the lack of knowledge about the internal conscious experience or lack thereof of another brain, the very standard for the knowledge I have of my own conscious experience which I use to justify the idea that I have consciousness, to postulate that there is a necessary causative link between brain states and consciousness and that followingly other brains have conscious experience like I do, just because I do. From a scientific point of view, it is certainly not a valid claim.

Solipsim fails then, because solipsism requires for there to be no other minds other than one's own...and since p-zeds are incoherent, others are likely to have minds so solipsism is likely to be bullshit.

No, because the reason you believe p-zeds is incoherent, is that it acknowledges the existence of the brain and of other peoples brains, yet does not affirm consciousness in other people. You cannot reject solipsism on the grounds of the postulated incoherence of that view, since that is emphatically not the view of solipsism; solipsism does not acknowledge the existence of other peoples brain, nor even any brain at all (since that would be an independent reality outside of the conscious experience of sense-data) which you say is the logical requirement for acknowledging the existence of other minds, and so, according to that view, it would actually be irrational for solipsism to accept the existence of other consciousnesses (since you posite the premise for doing so to be the brain), or any conscious experience at all, besides that which self-evidentially and undeniably exists (your own).

[theVOID]

Consciousness is a product of the brain and does not exist without the brain.
Every brain achieves a different level of consciousness.
There can be no consciousness and therefore no mind outside of the brain.
There is no soul.

Anything else is based upon unnecessary assumptions.