Atheism and morality

[Ryantology]

If belief in God was merely a philosophical issue, then insistence on defining atheism that way might be correct. However, I think the reason the term has come into its much more widely-accepted meaning is because people who might feel philosophically inclined to not dismiss gods altogether may still live their practical lives as if positive atheism is reality. Practical atheist, philosophical agnostic (even if only barely) describes myself and most atheists I know. As practical matters are of more importance to our lives than philosophical, it makes sense to call one's self an atheist.

I've never seen a claim that God exists. Care to point me to one?

(Mine and other theists claim of belief in God of course attracts no burden. So your atheism seems to be groundless)

I've seen you make many implicitly objective and positive/negative claims about God's nature, behavior, thoughts, and so on. Those indicate either an implicit claim that God exists, which attracts the burden, or speculation of no meaning to anybody but yourself.

[Inigo]

What is someone talking about when they talk about 'personal morals'? Are these a person's beliefs about which acts are right or wrong?

I have no clue why you attribute to me the view that morality is something the content of which no human could know about. I have never, ever said that - so I don't know where you're getting it from.

If the god morality presupposes exists then you find out what is right or wrong the regular way - you engage in NORMATIVE moral theorising. So, you try to systemise the deliverances of your moral sense reports.

What we call 'science' is just an attempt to systemise the deliverances of our sense of sight and touch.

What we call 'normative ethics' is just attempts to systemise the deliverances of our moral sense.

Perhaps we are never in a position to be able to 'know' that a given act is right, or a given act wrong. But if that's the case (and I'm not at all sure it is) this has noting to do with morality presupposing a god. Rather, it has to do with the fact (if it is a fact) that our moral sense is not sufficiently reliable.

When I say no human could know about I mean know for sure, as a certainty.

It still seems to me that you're basing your belief in the existence of something on what the definition of a word is, morality is inescapable rational instructions, death is inescapable, god must exist.

There's still no proof that the inescapable instructions exist, which morals are truly right or wrong or that they are are inescapable.

This has nothing to do with the definition of words. They're just labels. What I am doing is describing morality. I am describing how things seem when I sense that an act is wrong. For I use words like 'wrong' and 'morally bad' and 'morally obligatory' to refer to such bundles of features. Now, perhaps you don't. Perhaps you use the term 'morally wrong' to refer to a piece of cheesecake, or a feeling of devastation, or the first Tuesday of the month. Then you're just not talking about or analysing what I'm talking about.
However, it seems I am not unusual either in what I am labelling my moral experiences or in my use of that label. For so far in my life it appears to me that other people are using those terms to refer to exactly the same impression. And in moral philosophy I have read many articles and books in which the authors describe a relevantly similar experience and use the terms as I do. And so I conclude that we are all talking about the same thing.

What I am referring to is an experience: an experience of something being externally instructed 'not to be done' and this 'not to be doneness' somehow giving rise in me to the belief that this act is one that I now have inescapable reason not to do.

That's just the description, not the analysis. It is just a description of something I experience and form beliefs about. It was what Kant was talking about, it was what Socrates and Plato were talking about, and so on. They didn't call it 'morality' in ancient Greece. Doesn't matter. The label doesn't matter. They were talking about the same feature of their reality -the same experience and trying, just as we are, to make sense of it.

So, once again, my premise that morality instructs, and my premise that morality's instructions aree ones that possess inescapable rational authority are just descriptions of the thing I am analysing.

Then there's the analysis. That's where the real work happens. If you disagree with the description then really you're just not talking about what I am talking about and I'm frankly not interested in you, just as someone who uses the term 'atheism' to refer to the baking practices of 18th century Denmark would probably be surprised at this site and wonder why no-one was addressing the topic they were interested in.

My analysis is that morality must be composed of the intructions and favourings of a god. That's the raw ingredient. Just as if one wants to analyse, say, peanut butter one would reverse engineer it. One would see what combination of more basic ingredients would create something that had all the same qualities as the original. You discover that if you mash peanuts up with a bit of oil you get something that has all of the same features as peanut butter. If you find that there is no other way of creating those features then you've discovered what peanut butter is made of. That, in effect, is what I am saying about morality. Given the features I have described the only way that I can see that you could get such feature in reality is if there is a god of a certain kind.

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I've seen you make many implicitly objective and positive/negative claims about God's nature, behavior, thoughts, and so on. Those indicate either an implicit claim that God exists, which attracts the burden, or speculation of no meaning to anybody but yourself.

You seem incapable of distinguishing between different arguments.

I am arguing first, that morality requires a god.

I would THEN argue that this argument is a good one:

1. Morality requires a god
2. Morality exists
3. A god exists.

That argument has as its first premise the conclusion of the previous argument. So, to block the conclusion of this argument you must either show that morality does not require a god (which would require refuting my previous arguments) or arguing that premise 2 is false.

Note, however, that premise 1 is consistent with atheism. For an atheist could run this argument.

1. Morality requires a god
2. no god exists
3. Morality does not exist

However, which argument it is more rational to buy depends on the relative plausibility of the premises. Both arguments have the same first premise, so we can put that one aside. The relative plausibility of these arguments now turns entirely on the plausibility of their second premises. Now, I would claim that it is more clear and distinct that morality exists than that there is no god. Of these two claims 'there is nothing right or wrong with anything' and 'no gods exist' I find the former implausible than the latter. And thus I think that it is rational to go for the first argument and conclude that a god exists.

[Ryantology]

The part of my post to which you responded was directed at fr0d0, not you.

Though, I see no reason why morality should directly require a god. It's a non-sequitor.

[Inigo]

I've never seen a claim that God exists. Care to point me to one?

(Mine and other theists claim of belief in God of course attracts no burden. So your atheism seems to be groundless)

Okay, unless you're referring to in this thread only, and you've managed to memorize hundreds of posts, you're lying when you say you've never encoumtered the claim that 'God exists'. I mean hell, one could just as easily plop open the Bible and find a verse clearly stating that God exists, such as when Paul refers to "God's glory and power have been clearly seen, so that they are without excuse" [for not believing].

I would claim that a god exists. However, my argument that morality requires a god does not, in itself, establish the existence of a god. It is part of a larger case.
If morality requires a god, then morality - our moral sense data - becomes defeasible evidence for a god. In the same way that if you are wondering if there is any celery in your cupboard and you find that there does seem to be a jar of marmite in your cupboard, and that marmite is made, in part, of celery you have just discovered that there is indeed some celery in your cupboard (even if you didn't notice it at first because it was in the form of marmite).

Now, most of you atheists implicitly recognise the importance of reconciling the reality of morality with your worldview. For you recognise, at some inchoate poorly thought-out level, that unless you can do this your worldview has a serious deficiency. Something that appears very real, has to be considered a hallucination. This damages the credibility of the view. It damages it because to most of us morality appears more real than the reports of our sense of touch and sight (after all, it is conceivable that those are just hallucinations - it is conceivable, very conceivable, that I am dreaming right now). Yet it is far harder to conceive that there is nothing right or wrong with anything. That's precisely why the moral argument for a god's existence has real teeth and precisely why most of you feel it so important to deny what I am saying. it is why philoosphers are currently furiously working away at trying to show that morality is compatible with atheism (and failing - just take a look at their bonkers theories).

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The part of my post to which you responded was directed at fr0d0, not you.

Oh, oops.

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Isn't the consistent diff between d and t gods that the t gods are personal wheras the d gods are not? Creator, omni-whatever, those would be down to the particular d or t god.

For example, many native american "gods" where definitely -not- omnipotent, -not- omniscienct, -not- pefrectly morally good (often quite the opposite or some blurring).....but they were definitely "t" gods though, as their interactions and personal interests in the affairs of men or particular men form the backdrop for their entire religious narrative and experience (including rituals rites and offerings).

Obviously, whatever you define to be a god is whatever would constitute a god for you, but in reverse fashion, Frodo, for example, could tally up all the ancillary attributes and the sum would not be "Yahweh". It's "Yaweh" first, then tally it up. No amounting of checking tally boxes makes one a christian - unless the "christ" box is tallied explicitly. Similarly, d and t gods may have long lists of disparate (or commensurate) ancillary attributes but the diff between the two seems to be an issue of just one box in that list.

Surely we would refer to as 'a god' any incredibly powerful supernatural agent of some kind? That's how I use the term. They do not have to be 'all' powerful. Just very powerful. They can't be non-agential. A supernatural chair is not a god. They have to be minded.

Anyway, that's why I say morality requires a god. It requires someone like that. An agent with a huge amount of power over us. I think it is in accordance with common usage to refer to such a being as a 'god'. I think we would not hesitate to do so if we came to believe one existed.

Unfortunately the term 'god' has become hijacked by the Judaeo Christian tradition to such an extent that if you use the term it is now commonplace to assume that you mean the Judaeo Christian one. This is a problem given that the case for the existence of THAT god is really quite poor and people think that if one can show that god not to exist - and I think there is excellent evidence against the existence of such a being - then atheism is true. And thus good arguments are overlooked. For instance, the moral argument for 'a god' is very powerful. The moral argument for the Christian god is weak, however. And so on. More damage has been done to belief in god by the Judaeo Christian tradition, and their focus on 'faith' over 'reason' than by any other. they are, if you like, a god-send to atheism. They champion 'faith' because they know that 'reason' will destroy them and so must insulate their belief system against it, by admitting it as a guest only who can be instantly ejected should they start causing any trouble (but embraced should their company be found congenial). Belief in god then becomes associated with a kind of non-thinking. With dogmatism. With narrow mindedness. Atheism becomes associated with reason, clear thinking and so on. But another possibility is consistently overlooked. Namely, that reason may support belief in god, but not THAT god. But anyone who runs such arguments will find themselves on their own. Bugger.

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The part of my post to which you responded was directed at fr0d0, not you.

Though, I see no reason why morality should directly require a god. It's a non-sequitor.

I refer you to my arguments in which the existence of a god arrives as a conclusion to a deductively valid argument. That's the precise opposite of a non-sequitur.

[The Grand Nudger]

Anyway, that's why I say morality requires a god. It requires someone like that. An agent with a huge amount of power over us.

Meh, that such an agent doesn;t have any measurable power over me - would be the first troubling bit. That waffles could be such an agent, depending on my state of mind is the second troubling bit.

I think it is in accordance with common usage to refer to such a being as a 'god'. I think we would not hesitate to do so if we came to believe one existed.

Depends on what the "god" or waffle wanted me to do. If it dictated some horrid shit I really wouldn't care what sort of "power" it chose to excercize out of the blue. I'll either continue not giving a shit, or be compelled by said power (at which point who cares, I'm a wafflepuppet at that point, not me).

Unfortunately the term 'god' has become hijacked by the Judaeo Christian tradition to such an extent that if you use the term it is now commonplace to assume that you mean the Judaeo Christian one.

LOL, dont worry bud, I don't assume that sort of thing. I don't even assume that judeo christian types worship the judeo-christian god.

This is a problem given that the case for the existence of THAT god is really quite poor and people think that if one can show that god not to exist - and I think there is excellent evidence against the existence of such a being - then atheism is true. And thus good arguments are overlooked. For instance, the moral argument for 'a god' is very powerful.

I've never seen it presented with any sort of power. You certainly haven't managed to do so. Waffles.

[MindForgedManacle]

I would claim that a god exists.
However, my argument that morality requires a god does not, in itself, establish the existence of a god. It is part of a larger case.

Er, my post wasn't directed at you, was it?

If morality requires a god, then morality - our moral sense data - becomes defeasible evidence for a god.

Therein lies [part of] the problem, because no one has come close (in this thread anyway) to actually establishing that a sound moral framework requires a god, and a god of a certain sort no less. In fact, there are large problems with positing that, as some have already pointed out.

In addition, there is good evidence that this view holds in the philosophical community as well, seeing as most philosophers are atheists (~74%) and more than half are moral realists (~58%, IIRC). Now, that obviously doesn't make it false that morality necessitates a deity, but it does form some good reasons for thinking that such is not a very widely held belief in the field (unless nearly every moral philosopher is a believer, which they aren't).

In the same way that if you are wondering if there is any celery in your cupboard and you find that there does seem to be a jar of marmite in your cupboard, and that marmite is made, in part, of celery you have just discovered that there is indeed some celery in your cupboard (even if you didn't notice it at first because it was in the form of marmite).

I don't think that comparison is very good, since it's referring to empirical evidence that would seem to corroborate an inferencd, while the one in question relates to, as you said, a moral sense which is more abstract.

Now, most of you atheists implicitly recognise the importance of reconciling the reality of morality with your worldview. For you recognise, at some inchoate poorly thought-out level, that unless you can do this your worldview has a serious deficiency. Something that appears very real, has to be considered a hallucination. This damages the credibility of the view.

Again, this just seems, I dunno, fractally wrong. For starters, atheists are quite likely to think that morality already DOES (or could) fit quite well into the godless worldview and that theists have the real troubles, especially of the Abrahamic faiths. You also quite INcorrectly state that we recognize that bar morality, our worldview would be deficient by, because that assumes that simply because something appears to be - in William Lane Craig's parlay - "intuitively obvious", sans the truth of that impression the worldview is discredited. But that would seem to grossly ignore nearly the ENTIRE history of Western philosophy AND science, because both have dealt practically killing blows to this. If I had to rattle off a few, they'd be:

*Hume's dissection of the problems of causality

*The is-ought problem


*Scientific discoveries showing our impressions of what seemed to be the case being outright wrong, like whether or not the Earth moves or the simultaneity of events (Einstein).

It damages it because to most of us morality appears more real than the reports of our sense of touch and sight (after all, it is conceivable that those are just hallucinations - it is conceivable, very conceivable, that I am dreaming right now). Yet it is far harder to conceive that there is nothing right or wrong with anything. That's precisely why the moral argument for a god's existence has real teeth and precisely why most of you feel it so important to deny what I am saying. it is why philoosphers are currently furiously working away at trying to show that morality is compatible with atheism (and failing - just take a look at their bonkers theories).

Look at my above response.


Again, your inability to conceive of the falsity of an 'intuitively obvious' thing makes no difference to whether or not it is in fact false. Furthermore, it isn't all that hard at all to conceive of your 'moral sense' being naught but an illusion. This is why I find moral anti-realism to be a defensible position, even if I don't hold it (held by around ~30% of philosophers, if I remember correctly).

Whether or not moral theories of philosophers are 'bonkers', again, says nothing about whether or not they work. Hume's work on causality seems bonkers to me, but it still seems valid regardless.



Can we lower the post length people? My thumbs hurt.

[Bad Writer]

There is no one set of morals out there, just like there is no one set of underpants to rule them all.

To say that there can be no morals if there is no God is laughably false, simply because the concept of morals changing from society to society is demonstrably true...or perhaps each of those societies got their set of morals from their own god(s).

Jeez...what I said sounded so absurd, and yet that would be the logical conclusion if morals came from gods.

[Inigo]

[quote]
Therein lies [part of] the problem, because no one has come close (in this thread anyway) to actually establishing that a sound moral framework requires a god, and a god of a certain sort no less. In fact, there are large problems with positing that, as some have already pointed out. [\quote]

Yes they have. Me. I have presented arguments that establish that morality requires a god. Unless you actually address those arguments and show something to be wrong with the premises (which involves more than just nay saying) then I have done exactly as you asked. Deny that morality instructs and provide supporting considertaions. Deny that moral norms have inescapable rational authority and provide supporting evidence. Unless you can do that you're just nay saying. You just dislike the conclusion and infer that the argument must be faulty because a conclusion you dislike can't possible be true (or so I suggest).

[quote]
In addition, there is good evidence that this view holds in the philosophical community as well, seeing as most philosophers are atheists (~74%) and more than half are moral realists (~58%, IIRC). Now, that obviously doesn't make it false that morality necessitates a deity, but it does form some good reasons for thinking that such is not a very widely held belief in the field (unless nearly every moral philosopher is a believer, which they aren't).

[\quote]

You think you can refute an argument with a head count do you? Even if every single philosopher thinks that morality does not require a god it does if my arguments are valid and sound. And that's that. You can head count all you want, it will never show there to be something wrong with the arguments. YOu acknowledge this to try and cover yourself. But then why mention the numbers unless you think it of some relevance?

YOu do realise that rival metaethical views - those that are defended in the literature - are all hopeless? you do realise that? You do realise that this is recognised by the philosophers who defend them? You do realise that most of contemporary metaethical debate involves merely showing that your own favoured position is only slightly less bonkers than its nearest rival?? You do realise that moral nihilism or error theory - the view that morality does not exist - is growing in popularity among moral philosophers precisely due to the apparent inability of any rival analysis to respect morality's core features?? Perhaps most philosophers are atheists. Perhaps most moral philosophers are. But one thing is also for certain: most moral philosophers recognise that there are incredible difficulties reconciling morality with an atheistic world view and none, NONE would be so foolish as to suggest that it has been done to anything remotely close to everyone's satisfaction!!!

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[quote='MindForgedManacle' pid='475134' dateline='1373419940']


[quote]
I don't think that comparison is very good, since it's referring to empirical evidence that would seem to corroborate an inferencd, while the one in question relates to, as you said, a moral sense which is more abstract.
[/quote]




That's a bit like saying it isn't a very good example because morality is not a jar of marmite and god is not celery.

We have a moral sense. It gives us the impression that there are instructions with which we have inescapable reason to comply.
There is only one way that I can see such things could be a reality and that is if a god exists.
This is evidence that such a god exists in the same way that your visual sense is evidence that there is an outside world.

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[quote='MindForgedManacle' pid='475134' dateline='1373419940']
[quote='Inigo' pid='475117' dateline='1373416916']



Again, this just seems, I dunno, fractally wrong. For starters, atheists are quite likely to think that morality already DOES (or could) fit quite well into the godless worldview and that theists have the real troubles, especially of the Abrahamic faiths. You also quite INcorrectly state that we recognize that bar morality, our worldview would be deficient by, because that assumes that simply because something appears to be - in William Lane Craig's parlay - "intuitively obvious", sans the truth of that impression the worldview is discredited. But that would seem to grossly ignore nearly the ENTIRE history of Western philosophy AND science, because both have dealt practically killing blows to this. If I had to rattle off a few, they'd be:

*Hume's dissection of the problems of causality

*The is-ought problem


*Scientific discoveries showing our impressions of what seemed to be the case being outright wrong, like whether or not the Earth moves or the simultaneity of events (Einstein).

[quote]

Factually incorrect? No, an awful lot of moral philosophers actually see their job to be precisely to reconcile important concepts with the naturalistic (scientifically respectable) world view. Not all, by any means. But a lot. Naturalism is taken for granted and morality's existence is taken for granted - they then set about trying to reconcile them. Rather an odd procedure, in my view, and one that can give people the misleading impression that morality 'is' compatible with the naturalistic world view simply because that has been made into a working assumption. But that's all it is. A working assumption.

The list of problems that you 'rattled off' are just statements. Kindly show how each one poses a problem. show your workings!

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[quote='MindForgedManacle' pid='475134' dateline='1373419940']

[quote] Look at my above response. [\quote]

I did. I wasn't impressed. You left out all the detail. Tell me about Hume's is/ought problem. You can't refute my position with vague gestures in the direction of something. And I can't defend myself against vague gestures. Put in the detail and we'll begin. If you can't put in the detail, well done - you've discovered you're prejudiced!!

[Ryantology]

Yes they have. Me. I have presented arguments that establish that morality requires a god. Unless you actually address those arguments and show something to be wrong with the premises (which involves more than just nay saying) then I have done exactly as you asked. Deny that morality instructs and provide supporting considertaions. Deny that moral norms have inescapable rational authority and provide supporting evidence. Unless you can do that you're just nay saying. You just dislike the conclusion and infer that the argument must be faulty because a conclusion you dislike can't possible be true (or so I suggest).

This is a long thread and I've come to it late. Can you point me to the posts you've made which explain your assertion that morality is instructive, and why (if this is true) that only a god can explain it?

[Inigo]

Whether or not moral theories of philosophers are 'bonkers', again, says nothing about whether or not they work. Hume's work on causality seems bonkers to me, but it still seems valid regardless.

Can we lower the post length people? My thumbs hurt.

I mean by 'bonkers' totally implausible. If someone describes a view as 'bonkers' one should take them to mean that it is totally implausible. They're unlikely to be commending it to you!

They are bonkers because each one has huge glaring flaws. That's another way of saying 'they don't work'!! They do not explain what needs to be explained. They're trying to explain something, they fail to explain it.

Now, I could go through each one and say what I think the flaw is. But you've just said to keep the posts short. So what do you want?

I'll say how I see the terrain at the moment. Very roughly there are 'naturalist objectivist' views. These identify moral properties with objective natural properties of some kind. The glaring flaw with these views is that they cannot accommodate the prescriptivity of morality. Objective natural properties don't issue instructions. To think that one can is as bonkers as thinking that a table can - indeed, it is in effect exactly the same thought! And even if such views could somehow make sense of morality's prescriptivity they could not explain the inescapable rational authority of those prescriptions. So such views, though popular, are spectacularly implausible. There's more wrong with them than right. One might as well identify morality with an orange.
Then there are non-naturalist objectivist views. These views recognise that moral properties are prescriptive and that objective natural properties are not (so one gold star to them) but this motivates them to posit 'non-natural' properties instead. What they mean by such strange things is objective properties that somehow issue instructions. They tend to give these posits fancy labels so that no-one will notice how bonkers such things are. They will call them things such as 'sui generis normative properties'. See? That makes it all seem alright doesn't it? One doesn't have to say 'instructing properties that just somehow exist but are no part of the natural word' (which would get one locked up, surely), one can say instead 'sui generis normative properties' and then you sound clever and respectable. Just a label though, and the view is bonkers.

Then there are subjectivist naturalist views that identify moral properties with subjective statets of natural agents, such as ourselves. Wrongness becomes the property of being disapproved of by us or something like that. Such views have the upside of being able to accommodate the prescriptivity and favouring nature of morality, but not its objectivity or inescapable rational authority. They're not bonkers so much as just obviously false.

Then there are expressivist views. These deny that we're even describing when we say things such as 'that act is wrong' and insist that we are expressing our disapproval and/or issuing an instruction. This flies in the face of the evidence and inherits the same basic problems as the subjectivist view.

And that's about it.
Then there's my type of divine command view which has none of these huge flaws and so should be endorsed.