Isn't the fine tuning argument ad hoc?

[Anomalocaris]

No, you misunderstand occum's razor. Redundancy per se is irrelevant to occum's razor. The parsimony referred to in occum's razor pertains to minimization of probabilistically multiplicative assumptions. It does not refer to single assumption containing probabilistically indifferent, or cumulative redundancies.

The multiverse hypothesis is a 'probablistically multiplicative assumption', and a massive one at that.

No, multiverse is not probabilistically multiplicative. Each universe is not required to be exactly the way it might be, so the probability of the entire multiverse scenario is not the product of the probability of each constituent universe being the way it is. s infinitesimal.

Think of the scenario of a pot of water boiling. The probability that water will boil when it reaches 212 degrees is not the same as the multiplicative probability of each roiling bubble in the pot being precisely the size, location and velocity vector it is. The probability of there being many bubbles is one, but the probability of there being precisely the arrangement of bubbles you specify is infinitesimal.

Also, it is not excessive redundancy to say a pot boiling long enough will produce, within a certain tolerance, bubbles of every physically possible size, shape and movement vector within the environment prevailing in the pot.

[genkaus]

The first. But the comparison isn't quite right. For the multiverse hypothesis, you posit innumerable other universes to explain the permission of life in our own, while with the deck of cards it's considerably more limited with respect to transgressing Occam's Razor. Am I missing something?


But my point is that it has to be admitted that it does fall afoul of Occam, not that it doesn't explain the fine-tuning.

Are you saying that the multiverse hypothesis would be simpler if I said that there are 52 universes? I disagree with your point that it falls foul or Occam.

[Anomalocaris]

You may argue easily that multiverse hypothesis isn't very good, but the basis should be its lack of practical falsifiability, not its lack of economy. It is, at our current state of knowledge, as economical as any other for explaining what we see.

[max-greece]

You may argue easily that multiverse hypothesis isn't very good, but the basis should be its lack of practical falsifiability, not its lack of economy. It is, at our current state of knowledge, as economical as any other for explaining what we see.

This is particularly true if other universes are net energy states of zero as ours appears to be.

[downbeatplumb]

Well we know that one universe at least does exist.

[Mister Agenda]

Well, I'd like to point out that the proposed multiverse solution to the Fine-tuning argument is contrary to Occam's Razor, i.e it is multiplying entities beyond necessity, and in this case, potentially to an infinite degree.

I myself am only just beginning to get acquainted with the relevant science on the matter. In my thread on this (over in the philosophy section), Apopgenia said something interesting along the lines of that a major assumption is that the "constants" of our universe are unlikely, shen it isn't even sure how that can be known or assessed in the first place.

To the best of my knowledge, multiple universes were not originally propsed as a solution to fine-tuning, multiple universes would be a consequence if certain other physics hypotheses turn out to be true. In that case, multiple universes would be a simpler explanation than whatever would be needed to explain why the hypothesis is true but the logical consequences of it are not.

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I don't know TEG. To me the question is more philosophical. How can there be any order at all, not just this particular example?

Throw a handful of nickels, there's a chance they'll all land heads up: that's an orderly pattern. For them NEVER to land all heads up would also be an orderly pattern. Order is a natural consequence of chaos. A complete absence of order would be a paradox, because that would be a form of order in itself. If you can always bet 'whatever happens, it won't be orderly!' and win, you've got a sure thing...and that's a form of order.

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I meant as in comparison to the God hypothesis. If you had to choose between (a) the multiverse theory or (b) the God hypothesis, which of the two would be the simplest explanation? It would be (a) of course because it's more consistent with reality as we understand it.

Actually, the simplest explanation would be God in that case. That was the point of my post: if you posit the multiverse hypothesis, then you're going against Occam's Razor to potentially an infinite degree. Occam's Razor just has to do with which hypothesis accounts for the data least redundantly, not which is more consistent with reality as we usually understand it (i.e naturally rather than supernaturally).

Occam's razor is only violated if you multiply entities unneccessarily. One of the problems with God as a hypothesis is that it doesn't actually explain anything, so it's always unnecessary.

In the case of multiple universes, IF the constants could be much different than they are, we didn't beat the odds, there are so many universes that no matter how small the chance, some of them can allow life and we're in one of those.

In the case of an omnipotent God, the constants could be anything that God felt like and it could still support life, because an omnipotent being could have us live on the surface of black holes if it wanted. Only a universe in which life could arise naturally is a God-like power necessary as an explanation. Plus, multiple universes are still not unlikely in this scenario...why would this being only create one uinverse?

A less-than-omnipotent God might be a more parsimonious explanation than multiple universes except...we have no basis to presume that the universe is singular. I'm not aware of ANY natural explanation for our universe where the physics entails that there be only one. If we live in an eternal cyclic universe, there could be others. If we live in a universe caused by a quantum fluctuation, universes could 'happen' all the time. We don't know if there are multiple universes, but we are justified in saying that we know that there could be. We know it's possible, that it doesn't violate what we know of the laws of physics. We aren't justified in saying we know there could be an ultrapowerful being that made only one universe and we have no physics that suggests such a being is possible.

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WHAT? God is LESS parsimonious than an infinite number of universes? -_- Come on.

From this statement I must conclude that you're using a non-standard definition of God without ANY of the infinite properties usually ascribed to it...a multiverse with infinute universes has only two infinite properties: the number of universes and future time if they never cease to exist entirely, which they seem not to (I'll leave aside that the number of universes in a multiverse doesn't have to be infinite as an explanation for supposed fine-tuning, as many universes as there are planets in our universe should be plenty).

Please give a more detailed description of the finite God you're referring to so we can better evaluate if it's more parsimonious than multiple universes as an explanation. It's hard to conceive why even a finite God would ever only create one universe...the math suggests we could make one in the right kind of supercollider, and I doulbt we'd stop at one once we figured out how to do it. A 'god' like that would also need an explanation for it's existence; it can't be one of those 'ground of all being' versions of God if it's defined as completely finite.

[Faith No More]

To the best of my knowledge, multiple universes were not originally propsed as a solution to fine-tuning, multiple universes would be a consequence if certain other physics hypotheses turn out to be true.

I'm reading "The Fabric of the Cosmos" by Brian Greene, in which the author said that the multiverse theory was proposed as an explanation for quantum probability. If I remember correctly, it was proposed that when a particle is observed, the universes "branch off" with one existing for each point that particle could be at, and we simply "continue" through one of those universes.

[Mister Agenda]

At this point, I'd like to throw out three things: One, fine-tuning isn't a problem that needs to be answered. It's a speculation based on a mental exercise. We don't know which, if any of the constants could have been different than they are, or how much they could vary or what the probability of different values are. All there is to fine-tuning can be summed up as 'if all of these constants could vary by a high degree in a relatively even probabablistic range with the value of none of them being determined by the value of any of the others, it would be really unlikely for any universe with specific values for its constants to exist, including ours.' Until there's evidence that the above statement is true, it isn't justifiable to actually claim that our universe is 'fine-tuned'. Positing explanations for why it could be true if it is is just thought experiments.

Two: Multiple universes were proposed before fine-tuning was, it wasn't made up to answer fine-tuning. An already existing hypothesis was co-opted as a possible explanation for why the universe might appear to be fine-tuned if the above speculation turned out to be true.

Three: Given One, it just isn't valid to look at an event that has already happened and declare it was too unlikely to have happened by chance. The odds against any given hand of Bridge is billions to one; and you can deal out billions-to-one hands until your arms drop off. It's easy to do incredibly improbable things...as long as you don't specify the hand in advance. If you deal the exact hand in the exact order you pre-specified, THAT is surprising. What fine-tuners are doing is the equivalent of a first time Bridge-player looking at the first bridge hand they've ever been dealt, seeing that it's precisely the hand they needed to win, and concluding that the dealer must have cheated in their favor...when ANY hand they were dealt would be equally improbable. It ain't necessarily so. Under fine-tuning, no other pre-specified universe is more probable than ours is. Ours just has something in it capable of being surprised by how improbable their universe (given One being true).

[Angrboda]

At this point, I'd like to throw out three things: One, fine-tuning isn't a problem that needs to be answered. It's a speculation based on a mental exercise. We don't know which, if any of the constants could have been different than they are, or how much they could vary or what the probability of different values are. All there is to fine-tuning can be summed up as 'if all of these constants could vary by a high degree in a relatively even probabablistic range with the value of none of them being determined by the value of any of the others, it would be really unlikely for any universe with specific values for its constants to exist, including ours.' Until there's evidence that the above statement is true, it isn't justifiable to actually claim that our universe is 'fine-tuned'. Positing explanations for why it could be true if it is is just thought experiments.

I think it's worth noting that the likelihood of the constants is only one half of the fine tuning argument as used by theists. The other half is an inference to design, namely, that the specifics of such tuning suggest the intervention of an intelligent, designing agent. As such, it inherits many or most of the flaws of typical intelligent design arguments designed to explain biological life. Of particular note is that, while there are measures of 'complexity' which one might borrow from communication theory and computational theory, none appear to have a ready-made fit to either design of life forms or universes; more importantly, none appear unambiguously associated with design (see critiques of Dembski's work for more on this).

[MindForgedManacle]

To the best of my knowledge, multiple universes were not originally propsed as a solution to fine-tuning, multiple universes would be a consequence if certain other physics hypotheses turn out to be true. In that case, multiple universes would be a simpler explanation than whatever would be needed to explain why the hypothesis is true but the logical consequences of it are not.

I didn't say that the multiverse hypothesis was originally proposed to explain fine-tuning, but that users here (and elsewhere) do so for that reason.

Occam's razor is only violated if you multiply entities unneccessarily. One of the problems with God as a hypothesis is that it doesn't actually explain anything, so it's always unnecessary.

I didn't say that Occam's Razor isn't applicable to God, just that the multiverse hypothesis being proposed for the explicit reason of voiding fine-tuning does so much more.

In the case of multiple universes, IF the constants could be much different than they are, we didn't beat the odds, there are so many universes that no matter how small the chance, some of them can allow life and we're in one of those.

I'd agree, but then it could still be levelled by theists (correctly, I think) that that solution is still susceptible to the razor.

In the case of an omnipotent God, the constants could be anything that God felt like and it could still support life, because an omnipotent being could have us live on the surface of black holes if it wanted. Only a universe in which life could arise naturally is a God-like power necessary as an explanation. Plus, multiple universes are still not unlikely in this scenario...why would this being only create one uinverse?

That's a better objection to the fine-tuning argument I think. However, I think the last bit is better used elsewhere, like asking why a perfect being would create anything at all.

A less-than-omnipotent God might be a more parsimonious explanation than multiple universes except...we have no basis to presume that the universe is singular. I'm not aware of ANY natural explanation for our universe where the physics entails that there be only one.

You lost me here. We don't assume more universes until we've solid evidence for them, we don't assume there are more because we don't have contrary evidence there aren't more.

If we live in an eternal cyclic universe, there could be others. If we live in a universe caused by a quantum fluctuation, universes could 'happen' all the time. We don't know if there are multiple universes, but we are justified in saying that we know that there could be.

The problem here is that you're invoking possibilities, and I've heard some physicists like Victor Stenger say that there are problems with cyclic models. I don't think invoking possibilities here helps much.

We know it's possible, that it doesn't violate what we know of the laws of physics. We aren't justified in saying we know there could be an ultrapowerful being that made only one universe and we have no physics that suggests such a being is possible.

I don't recall asserting that there were: I'm an atheist. My point is that it does seem to be a valid point that proposing the multiverse of an indefinite number of universes is contrary to parsimony. I repeat, that does not make it false, nor does it make God likely, it's just not parsimonious.

From this statement I must conclude that you're using a non-standard definition of God without ANY of the infinite properties usually ascribed to it

Actually I'm not. Apologists like William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga equate God's omni- attributes with "maximality" of those characteristics not an infinity (which Craig ostensibly believes cannot exist in reality), and even make use of them (ex: Plantinga's Ontological argument uses them).

...a multiverse with infinute universes has only two infinite properties: the number of universes and future time if they never cease to exist entirely, which they seem not to (I'll leave aside that the number of universes in a multiverse doesn't have to be infinite as an explanation for supposed fine-tuning, as many universes as there are planets in our universe should be plenty).

I have noted in several posts that regardless of if the multiverse is to contain an infinite amount of universes or just an immensely large number, it's still not a parsimonious answer to fine-tuning.