The Free Will Defense - Isn't it Unusable?

[MindForgedManacle]

The Free-will Defense to the problem of evil can, I believe, be simply summarized as saying that the explanation for a benevolent, all-powerful and perfect god allowing for evil/suffering to exist in his creation is that [libertarian] free will is something so good that keeping it intact is necessary for said deity, even though it allows for agents to possibly do evil. There are some problems with this for theists I think, that I'd like to see them answer.


Firstly, I'd like to know how libertarian free will is such a high good. To clarify, proponents of this apologetic heavily imply this since the whole purported reason for evil existing is to allow for the preservation of free will. Anyhow, there doesn't seem - on the face of it - to be anything about libertarian free will that "makes" it good in the way that other things can be said to be (making people happy, preventing harm, etc.). The only response that seems to make come close to making sense is to say that it safeguards moral blameworthyness/praise. But that would seem to clash with the orthodox belief that all praise and glory is to be to God. Or rather, all it seems to say is that it is so that God can get himself praised by his creations.

Another thing is that under libertarian free will, you can be inclined without being necessitated. And yet according to a literal reading of Genesis (which seems a widespread view) Adam and Eve were so easily swayed by the serpent into disobeying God. If God had wanted us to truly not sin, could he not simply have inclined us not to sin or disobey him, or made the first 2 humans be so inclined (but not necessitated) to listen to him over all others? If the answer is no, then that's tantamount to determinism (i.e all humans would have eaten the forbidden fruit), which contradicts the above.
I think these needs defending.


Lastly, - and I think this is the biggest issue - the libertarian concept of free will doesn't have a tenable or coherent formulation (currently). This is I think reflected in the fact that under 14% of philosophers subscribe to it, versus say compatibilusm's ~60%. Even Robert Kane, who's thought to have given a clever whack at working it out, isn't convinced of his attempt and sustained heavy critique by the likes of Dennett.


So if there isn't a coherent formulation of libertarian free will, then theists cannot use the Free will defense, yes? Sorry for the length. o3o

[Faith No More]

I have often asked what the value of free will is from a theist when they use it as a defense for evil, but all I have ever gotten are appeals to emotion like "would you want to be a robot?" I for one would have no problem being a robot if it meant people wouldn't rape and kill each other.

As to the question of how they know we have free will, I rarely get a response, and most of the time when I do get a response, the claim is that free will is simply obvious. If that happens, I know then that the conversation with that individual is pointless.

The problem about determinism and Adam and Eve can easily be solved by saying that it was all god's will. God intended to let sin into the world, but then they are left trying to defend the reason behind that. I usually get something like "we can't know his motivation" or "I'm sure there was a good reason."

[CapnAwesome]

I think the problem with this argument is really trying to justify an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. Most cultures have not believed in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent god. I don't think there is a proper reading of the old testament that says the ancient Jews believed in an omnibenevolent God either. The ancient Greeks never had to deal with the problem of evil because they believed the Gods to be bastards. I often wonder why modern Theists feel the necessity to cling to descriptions for their God that are so difficult to defend.

[Anomalocaris]

. I often wonder why modern Theists feel the necessity to cling to descriptions for their God that are so difficult to defend.

I think it's pretty obvious. To continue to browbeat the dimwitted and the weakwilled even as humanity accummulated capacity to smell bullshit, claims made on behalf of nosy overlord in the sky must increase in outrageousness in direct proportion to the bogeyman's declining credibility.

[discipulus]

The Free-will Defense to the problem of evil can, I believe, be simply summarized as saying that the explanation for a benevolent, all-powerful and perfect god allowing for evil/suffering to exist in his creation is that [libertarian] free will is something so good that keeping it intact is necessary for said deity, even though it allows for agents to possibly do evil. There are some problems with this for theists I think, that I'd like to see them answer.


Firstly, I'd like to know how libertarian free will is such a high good. To clarify, proponents of this apologetic heavily imply this since the whole purported reason for evil existing is to allow for the preservation of free will. Anyhow, there doesn't seem - on the face of it - to be anything about libertarian free will that "makes" it good in the way that other things can be said to be (making people happy, preventing harm, etc.). The only response that seems to make come close to making sense is to say that it safeguards moral blameworthyness/praise. But that would seem to clash with the orthodox belief that all praise and glory is to be to God. Or rather, all it seems to say is that it is so that God can get himself praised by his creations.

Another thing is that under libertarian free will, you can be inclined without being necessitated. And yet according to a literal reading of Genesis (which seems a widespread view) Adam and Eve were so easily swayed by the serpent into disobeying God. If God had wanted us to truly not sin, could he not simply have inclined us not to sin or disobey him, or made the first 2 humans be so inclined (but not necessitated) to listen to him over all others? If the answer is no, then that's tantamount to determinism (i.e all humans would have eaten the forbidden fruit), which contradicts the above.
I think these needs defending.


Lastly, - and I think this is the biggest issue - the libertarian concept of free will doesn't have a tenable or coherent formulation (currently). This is I think reflected in the fact that under 14% of philosophers subscribe to it, versus say compatibilusm's ~60%. Even Robert Kane, who's thought to have given a clever whack at working it out, isn't convinced of his attempt and sustained heavy critique by the likes of Dennett.


So if there isn't a coherent formulation of libertarian free will, then theists cannot use the Free will defense, yes? Sorry for the length. o3o

I do not personally hold that our will is free in the libertarian sense.

I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".

[Tonus]

I have often asked what the value of free will is from a theist when they use it as a defense for evil, but all I have ever gotten are appeals to emotion like "would you want to be a robot?" I for one would have no problem being a robot if it meant people wouldn't rape and kill each other.

Being instinct-driven doesn't stop other species from killing and raping, so it can't just be a matter of free will.

I do wonder, though. Would Christians say that we have free will now? Or was it only Adam and Eve? Because the explanations that I am aware of indicate that we exist in an imperfect form which cannot help but commit sin. That is why sacrifices were needed, to atone for wrongdoing, and the Bible describes only three perfect humans who ever existed (Adam, Eve, Jesus).

If we are driven to violate god's principles, how can we have free will? If we have been stricken with a condition that makes us act contrary to god's wishes, so that only god's intervention can save us from damnation, how is that the act of a caring person? Even his own intercession did not fix that particular flaw, it just provided a constant reminder that we are not really in control of our actions. Paul described this in Romans:

Romans 7:21 So I find this law at work: Although I want to do good, evil is right there with me. 22 For in my inner being I delight in God’s law; 23 but I see another law at work in me, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within me. 24 What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body that is subject to death?

Did Paul have free will, when his own body betrayed his desire to serve god fully and perfectly?

[Chas]

The Free-will Defense to the problem of evil can, I believe, be simply summarized as saying that the explanation for a benevolent, all-powerful and perfect god allowing for evil/suffering to exist in his creation is that [libertarian] free will is something so good that keeping it intact is necessary for said deity, even though it allows for agents to possibly do evil. There are some problems with this for theists I think, that I'd like to see them answer.


Firstly, I'd like to know how libertarian free will is such a high good. To clarify, proponents of this apologetic heavily imply this since the whole purported reason for evil existing is to allow for the preservation of free will. Anyhow, there doesn't seem - on the face of it - to be anything about libertarian free will that "makes" it good in the way that other things can be said to be (making people happy, preventing harm, etc.). The only response that seems to make come close to making sense is to say that it safeguards moral blameworthyness/praise. But that would seem to clash with the orthodox belief that all praise and glory is to be to God. Or rather, all it seems to say is that it is so that God can get himself praised by his creations.

Another thing is that under libertarian free will, you can be inclined without being necessitated. And yet according to a literal reading of Genesis (which seems a widespread view) Adam and Eve were so easily swayed by the serpent into disobeying God. If God had wanted us to truly not sin, could he not simply have inclined us not to sin or disobey him, or made the first 2 humans be so inclined (but not necessitated) to listen to him over all others? If the answer is no, then that's tantamount to determinism (i.e all humans would have eaten the forbidden fruit), which contradicts the above.
I think these needs defending.


Lastly, - and I think this is the biggest issue - the libertarian concept of free will doesn't have a tenable or coherent formulation (currently). This is I think reflected in the fact that under 14% of philosophers subscribe to it, versus say compatibilusm's ~60%. Even Robert Kane, who's thought to have given a clever whack at working it out, isn't convinced of his attempt and sustained heavy critique by the likes of Dennett.


So if there isn't a coherent formulation of libertarian free will, then theists cannot use the Free will defense, yes? Sorry for the length. o3o

I do not personally hold that our will is free in the libertarian sense.

I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".

But that god cannot be omnipotent and loving. One or the other, but not both.

[Esquilax]

I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".

That's because there's a third proposition you've skipped over. You need to add "god is always good" in there.

[discipulus]

I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".

That's because there's a third proposition you've skipped over. You need to add "god is always good" in there.

Ok...

I grant your point.

The propositions:

P1. An Omnibenevolent God exists

and..

P2. Evil Exists

are not logically contradictory.

In defending this view, we would be delving into theodicies and theology, which means I would have to do a lot of teaching on Anselmian Perfect Being Theology and the attributes of God under such a view as the scholastics held.

In defending the view, a definition of "evil" would have to be given as well.

---

I do not personally hold that our will is free in the libertarian sense.

I however, see no logical contradiction in the propositions: "God exists" and "evil exists".

But that god cannot be omnipotent and loving. One or the other, but not both.

I believe He can be both. My view is defended by the scholastics and theologians such as Aquinas, Anselm, and others.

Speaking strictly logically, and taking into account Anselms's conceptualization of The Greatest Conceivable Being, a being who can be both would be greater than a being who could only be one or the other. Therefore, God must be both omnipotent and loving.

[MindForgedManacle]

Ok...

I grant your point.

The propositions:

P1. An Omnibenevolent God exists

and..

P2. Evil Exists

are not logically contradictory.

In defending this view, we would be delving into theodicies and theology, which means I would have to do a lot of teaching on Anselmian Perfect Being Theology and the attributes of God under such a view as the scholastics held.

In defending the view, a definition of "evil" would have to be given as well.

I think a more powerful and explicit formulation would be along the lines of:

P1) God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient.

P2) God's actions are in line with and a reflection of his nature.

P3) God created the universe.

P4) The universe contains evil, and evil is not a reflection of God's nature.

C) ?


Whether or not that entails a contradiction is hard for me to say. This is the sort of issue the Free-will Defense is supposed to guard against I think, which I don't think works (hence the thread :p).