Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

What's the "it" that is contradicting itself?

The negation of the statement "the world is real". Which is what you asked.

Spoken like a true substance dualist. Tell me, if I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting and manipulating "meaningful" information, or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

Read the definition again - and then restate your question.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Contradictory to itself. Which is what self-contradictory means.
And logic is the primary mode of inquiry within philosophy. Any contradiction indicates a misapplication or an error.

What's the "it" that is contradicting itself?

Sure:
Data processing is "the collection and manipulation of items of data to produce meaningful information."

Spoken like a true substance dualist. Tell me, if I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting and manipulating "meaningful" information, or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

Correct! And that is exactly why I believe 1) substance dualism and 2) that physical monist theories of mind lead to existencial nihilism, I.e. a purely physical system is in itself meaningless.

[MindForgedManacle]

Come on Chad. 'Meaning' is synonymous with 'valuable'. Value is by definition subjective, because they are purely about the desires of a particular agent, regardless of the metaphysical nature of that agent's mind. So it doesn't matter whether or not some kind of dualism or monism is true, they are all *intrinsically* meaningless. Only minds can imbue meaning onto something, demonstrating meaning is a contingent, assigned property of anything.

[genkaus]

Correct! And that is exactly why I believe 1) substance dualism and 2) that physical monist theories of mind lead to existencial nihilism, I.e. a purely physical system is in itself meaningless.

So, you believe in substance dualism because my definition of data-processing sounds to Benny like something a substance dualist would say? That has to be the weakest reason for holding a particular outlook.

[bennyboy]

What's the "it" that is contradicting itself?

The negation of the statement "the world is real". Which is what you asked.

That was short hand for "the world I experience is a part of an objective physical reality," since it's real enough as the collection of experiences that I've had. So the negation would be "the world I experience is not a part of an objective physical reality." There's nothing self-contradictory about it.

Spoken like a true substance dualist. Tell me, if I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting and manipulating "meaningful" information, or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

Read the definition again - and then restate your question.

[Data processing is "the collection and manipulation of items of data to produce meaningful information."]

Your definition is too imprecise. What's "data," if not any property of any physical system? What's "information" if not any property which influences the properties of any other system? But I will be happy to restate my question: If I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting "data" and producing "meaningful information," or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

[genkaus]

That was short hand for "the world I experience is a part of an objective physical reality," since it's real enough as the collection of experiences that I've had. So the negation would be "the world I experience is not a part of an objective physical reality." There's nothing self-contradictory about it.

Try avoiding sloppy short-hands in future.

And for this particular argument, look up the objections and responses to brain-in-vat argument.

Your definition is too imprecise. What's "data," if not any property of any physical system? What's "information" if not any property which influences the properties of any other system? But I will be happy to restate my question: If I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting "data" and producing "meaningful information," or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

Its not my definition. And both data and information are conceptual properties - meaning, there needs to be a conscious entity observing the system for those concepts to apply. As it happens, the role of that entity can be taken on by the system itself. In the given instance, that role is taken on by you and therefore you determine what the difference is.

On a side note - are we going to go back to the original discussion, where you kept insisting upon the agnosticism of qualia?

[bennyboy]

That was short hand for "the world I experience is a part of an objective physical reality," since it's real enough as the collection of experiences that I've had. So the negation would be "the world I experience is not a part of an objective physical reality." There's nothing self-contradictory about it.

Try avoiding sloppy short-hands in future.

And for this particular argument, look up the objections and responses to brain-in-vat argument.

Make your own arguments or don't make them. Look up the objections and responses to lmgtfy arguments.

Your definition is too imprecise. What's "data," if not any property of any physical system? What's "information" if not any property which influences the properties of any other system? But I will be happy to restate my question: If I look at a strange system, how am I to know whether it is collecting "data" and producing "meaningful information," or just part of the ongoing cascade of packets of energy moving around the universe?

Its not my definition. And both data and information are conceptual properties - meaning, there needs to be a conscious entity observing the system for those concepts to apply. As it happens, the role of that entity can be taken on by the system itself. In the given instance, that role is taken on by you and therefore you determine what the difference is.

On a side note - are we going to go back to the original discussion, where you kept insisting upon the agnosticism of qualia?

Let's go back further than that. Let's go back to the OP thread title, and it will be obvious that this red herring you are complaining about is the central theme of the argument.

What experiment could you do to distinguish between monistm and dualism? Well, for one, you could look to see if the same physical circumstances always creates qualia, rather than just seeming to. The problem is that your stated way of establishing whether a system has qualia is to decide if it seems to.

You could also look to see if qualia can exist WITHOUT those physical circumstances-- but wait, no you can't, because science is founded exclusively on physical observations. You don't get to use a system which necessarily ASSUMES physical monism to ESTABLISH physical monism, because the entire process already begs the question.

[genkaus]

What experiment could you do to distinguish between monistm and dualism? Well, for one, you could look to see if the same physical circumstances always creates qualia, rather than just seeming to. The problem is that your stated way of establishing whether a system has qualia is to decide if it seems to.

You could also look to see if qualia can exist WITHOUT those physical circumstances-- but wait, no you can't, because science is founded exclusively on physical observations. You don't get to use a system which necessarily ASSUMES physical monism to ESTABLISH physical monism, because the entire process already begs the question.

Still not seeing a problem here.

The behavior "seems" to indicate qualia the same way video of 9/11 "seems" to indicate the occurrence of the event - that is, they are evidence for the respective phenomena. So, the existence of qualia has been established.

Further, the explanation given for that qualia is that it is a self-referential form of data-processing - something that cannot occur absent a physical system. The experiments in neuroscience so far support this conclusion.

You are the one trying to argue against this position by suggesting qualia to be a property of all matter or qualia existing without matter - so you are the one who has to provide evidence.

[pocaracas]

You are the one trying to argue against this position by suggesting qualia to be a property of all matter or qualia existing without matter - so you are the one who has to provide evidence.

After weeks of this discussion, you guys are still stuck on this particular detail?
Give it a rest!

[Neo-Scholastic]

If I might thow a monkey wrench into the mix. With all the talk about zombies and what not, I think the issue falls back on the question of whether qualia have any reason to exist at all. This reminds me of this argument:

1. Knowledge depends on significant correspondence between awareness (qualitative phenomenal experience) and cognition (physical brain processes).

2. Natural selection explains the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

3. Evolutionary processes cannot select for features that do not affect behavior.

4. If awareness supervenes on cognition, then awareness is causally inert and cannot influence behavior.

5. Thus, natural selection cannot explain the correspondence between awareness and cognition.

6. And thus, knowledge does not depend on any significant correspondence between awareness and cognition.

Given that human consciousness is a result of evolutionary processes then you have two possibilities, neither of which square with materialism. First, if awareness is causally relevant and does affect behavior that means phenomenal properties influence physical processes from the top-down. That means phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to physical properties and the physical universe is not causally closed. On the other hand, if evolutionary processes can select features that do not affect behavior, then it displays teleological behavior that is inconsistent with an undirected naturalistic process.