(June 1, 2014 at 7:28 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Right. One of the theories of consciousness is that it is information-driven, not dependent on a particular physical mechanism. So the question in that case is-- how much information has to be processed in order to say something has consciousness? Where's the magic line in the sand?

My guess is it would be arbitrary. It's kind of like asking how many water molecules do you need in order to have wetness.

Are we then speaking of emergence? Or a Searle type biological naturalism? Or are you stretching to the Bob Doyle i-Phi?

(June 1, 2014 at 8:49 am)Chas Wrote: You continue to misunderstand what I've said and you are going in circles.
No, qualia aren't in the brain, they are in the mind. It is minds that experiences, brains are the substrate.

And once again you are objecting to something I didn't frickin' say.
I have neither claimed that my view is true nor that yours is false.
I have stated that the evidence we have supports that mind is dependent on brain and only brain.

Okay, first of all, let me apologize for agitating you. I accept that you have been careful to avoid making positive assertions about things you don't know for sure.

Let me say two things here. First, to make sure I understand what you're saying: the brain/mind distinction is one of object/property, unless you accept the possibility of a kind of substance dualism. So instead of saying a brain has qualia, you are saying mind supervenes on the brain and its functions, and once that mind exists, the subjective experience of it is called qualia, right?

Second, with regard to evidence. Part of science is the assumption that rules apply generally unless specific requirements are known and met. For example, we assume that an object a billion light-years away is subject to gravity. On the other hand, because I know how a girl gets pregnant, I wouldn't say, "People can get pregnant, and they are material structures, so all material structures may have the capacity for getting pregnant." I consider gravity universal, and pregnancy highly specific.

In the case of the evidence you are talking about, there are at least two possibilities: 1) mind is intrinsic to all matter; 2) mind is not intrinsic to all matter. The brain evidence (setting aside philosophical problems) demonstrates that matter is capable of generating minds. It does not identify what specific kinds, structures or functions of matter are required for some kind of subjective experience to exist. It DOES, however, tell us very much about how changes to brain structure and function can affect the CONTENT of our subjective experience.

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(June 1, 2014 at 7:42 pm)Cato Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 7:28 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Right. One of the theories of consciousness is that it is information-driven, not dependent on a particular physical mechanism. So the question in that case is-- how much information has to be processed in order to say something has consciousness? Where's the magic line in the sand?

My guess is it would be arbitrary. It's kind of like asking how many water molecules do you need in order to have wetness.

Are we then speaking of emergence? Or a Searle type biological naturalism? Or are you stretching to the Bob Doyle i-Phi?

This is not my theory, or one which I want to positively assert, so I can't say much more about it than that it exists. Here's what I had in mind when I mentioned the idea:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_...ion_theory

The only point I want to make is that until we know exactly what about the brain allows the existence of qualia, it's not sensible to assume that it is local to the brain.

--edit--
Okay, I looked up Searle, and that might be a good direction to take the debate.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism

Someone accuses him of being a secret dualist:
http://www.edwardfeser.com/unpublishedpa...earle.html

He denies it:
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf

This process is starting to look pretty familiar

(June 1, 2014 at 7:55 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 8:49 am)Chas Wrote: You continue to misunderstand what I've said and you are going in circles.
No, qualia aren't in the brain, they are in the mind. It is minds that experiences, brains are the substrate.

And once again you are objecting to something I didn't frickin' say.
I have neither claimed that my view is true nor that yours is false.
I have stated that the evidence we have supports that mind is dependent on brain and only brain.

Okay, first of all, let me apologize for agitating you. I accept that you have been careful to avoid making positive assertions about things you don't know for sure.

Not so much agitated as just annoyed. I have been careful to make only assertions that I can back up.

Quote:Let me say two things here. First, to make sure I understand what you're saying: the brain/mind distinction is one of object/property, unless you accept the possibility of a kind of substance dualism. So instead of saying a brain has qualia, you are saying mind supervenes on the brain and its functions, and once that mind exists, the subjective experience of it is called qualia, right?

Not exactly. I say mind is an emergent phenomenon of complexity of a particular kind. The only example of which we know is the brain. And, yes, qualia is not anything separate from mind, is is just the experience of consciousness.

Quote:Second, with regard to evidence. Part of science is the assumption that rules apply generally unless specific requirements are known and met. For example, we assume that an object a billion light-years away is subject to gravity. On the other hand, because I know how a girl gets pregnant, I wouldn't say, "People can get pregnant, and they are material structures, so all material structures may have the capacity for getting pregnant." I consider gravity universal, and pregnancy highly specific.

No, you wouldn't because it is a basic logical error. You can't go from "there exists X" to "for all X", that is an error.

Quote:In the case of the evidence you are talking about, there are at least two possibilities: 1) mind is intrinsic to all matter; 2) mind is not intrinsic to all matter. The brain evidence (setting aside philosophical problems) demonstrates that matter is capable of generating minds. It does not identify what specific kinds, structures or functions of matter are required for some kind of subjective experience to exist.

Not just any matter is capable, only matter connected and working at a sufficient level of complexity. In fact, we can't even say that matter is required - just complexity.

Quote:It DOES, however, tell us very much about how changes to brain structure and function can affect the CONTENT of our subjective experience.

I wouldn't completely agree with that; changes to the brain can change our qualia and even create experience.

(June 1, 2014 at 11:54 pm)Chas Wrote: Not exactly. I say mind is an emergent phenomenon of complexity of a particular kind. The only example of which we know is the brain. And, yes, qualia is not anything separate from mind, is is just the experience of consciousness.

You say that qualia are a property of the mind. Would it not be equally true to say that the mind is a descriptive word for a collection of qualia? If the latter, then the question is this-- what is the minimal structure or function required to have even a minimal "atomic" qualia?

Quote:No, you wouldn't because it is a basic logical error. You can't go from "there exists X" to "for all X", that is an error.

"There exists mind in brains" to "for all minds, there is a brain" doesn't work? I'm pretty sure if I go back about 4 pages, I'll find people saying exactly that.

Quote:Not just any matter is capable, only matter connected and working at a sufficient level of complexity. In fact, we can't even say that matter is required - just complexity.

You are stating with the air that it's a fact something which is not known to be a fact. Until you can tell me by what scientific criteria it is established that a physical structure has a mind, then there's no way to know whether an atom, or even a QM particle, isn't to some degree "aware" of the interactions it undergoes.

You say that a "sufficient" level of complexity is required. I suspect that the only complexity required is the transmission or reception of photons, and a subsequent change in state. You suspect that a complex system of information is required.

How will it be determined who is correct?

Quote:It DOES, however, tell us very much about how changes to brain structure and function can affect the CONTENT of our subjective experience.

I wouldn't completely agree with that; changes to the brain can change our qualia and even create experience.
[/quote]Maybe. But they don't explain the fact of experience rather than the lack of it. I want to see how any collection of non-experiencing particles leads to one which experiences. What's the mechanism?

(June 2, 2014 at 12:27 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(June 1, 2014 at 11:54 pm)Chas Wrote: Not exactly. I say mind is an emergent phenomenon of complexity of a particular kind. The only example of which we know is the brain. And, yes, qualia is not anything separate from mind, is is just the experience of consciousness.

You say that qualia are a property of the mind. Would it not be equally true to say that the mind is a descriptive word for a collection of qualia? If the latter, then the question is this-- what is the minimal structure or function required to have even a minimal "atomic" qualia?

There is no reason to believe in 'atomic qualia'. In fact, I see that as an incoherent concept.

Quote:

Quote:No, you wouldn't because it is a basic logical error. You can't go from "there exists X" to "for all X", that is an error.

"There exists mind in brains" to "for all minds, there is a brain" doesn't work? I'm pretty sure if I go back about 4 pages, I'll find people saying exactly that.

If others have made that error, shame on them. It's still an error.

Quote:

Quote:Not just any matter is capable, only matter connected and working at a sufficient level of complexity. In fact, we can't even say that matter is required - just complexity.

You are stating with the air that it's a fact something which is not known to be a fact. Until you can tell me by what scientific criteria it is established that a physical structure has a mind, then there's no way to know whether an atom, or even a QM particle, isn't to some degree "aware" of the interactions it undergoes.

I'm sorry I gave that impression - I am stating it as our only observation of mind. There is simply no reason to think that particles have mind; in fact, I would call it absurd. There is no place for 'awareness' to reside.

Quote:You say that a "sufficient" level of complexity is required. I suspect that the only complexity required is the transmission or reception of photons, and a subsequent change in state. You suspect that a complex system of information is required.

How will it be determined who is correct?


It DOES, however, tell us very much about how changes to brain structure and function can affect the CONTENT of our subjective experience.

Quote:I wouldn't completely agree with that; changes to the brain can change our qualia and even create experience.

Maybe. But they don't explain the fact of experience rather than the lack of it. I want to see how any collection of non-experiencing particles leads to one which experiences. What's the mechanism?

It's the complexity, not the particles. We are looking for the mechanism.

Let's try an experiment of the imagination. Let's take a brain, and select a single neuron, and remove it. Is there still mind? Yes-- nobody has ever suggested that there is one "magic keystone" neuron that, when removed, will render a person completely mindless. Now repeat this process over and over. We both agree a person's quality of experience will eventually suffer, but that there will (at least for a while) still be some kind of mind.

Now, at some point, you are going to argue that our gradually degraded brain is no longer capable of sustaining sufficient complexity to be said to be mindful, right? So let me ask you a question-- is there a specific line at which this will be said, or is it a gradual degradation that extends right down to a minimallly sufficient level of complexity?

(June 2, 2014 at 3:19 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Now, at some point, you are going to argue that our gradually degraded brain is no longer capable of sustaining sufficient complexity to be said to be mindful, right? So let me ask you a question-- is there a specific line at which this will be said, or is it a gradual degradation that extends right down to a minimallly sufficient level of complexity?

Neither. Consciousness is likely a product of multiple systems working together. If you remove components, you impair consciousness (e.g. cortical color blindness or hemineglect). If you disable the integration, the parts may remain, but the whole will be degraded (eg. split-brain subjects, blindsight).

(June 2, 2014 at 4:21 pm)rasetsu Wrote:

(June 2, 2014 at 3:19 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Now, at some point, you are going to argue that our gradually degraded brain is no longer capable of sustaining sufficient complexity to be said to be mindful, right? So let me ask you a question-- is there a specific line at which this will be said, or is it a gradual degradation that extends right down to a minimallly sufficient level of complexity?

Neither. Consciousness is likely a product of multiple systems working together. If you remove components, you impair consciousness (e.g. cortical color blindness or hemineglect). If you disable the integration, the parts may remain, but the whole will be degraded (eg. split-brain subjects, blindsight).

Okay, so in this integration, we are now moving from the brain as a whole to a collection of subsystems, each of which contributes some component of the human experience. But each brain part consists of multiple nerve bundles, which in turn consist of (obviously) multiple nerves. Let's apply the same thought experiment to each of them, and start yanking neurons. Is there a kind of "critical" mass at which you pull just one more neuron and can suddenly non-arbitrarily announce "now there is no more vision," or "now the person has a complete lack of face recognition" or whatever? Or is it just a gray scale from full functioning down to non-functioning?

Should be that gray scale thing... and with a great dependence on which exact neurons you pull out...
Should... can't say I've tested it... can't say I know of anyone who's done it, either...

(June 2, 2014 at 5:35 pm)pocaracas Wrote: Should be that gray scale thing... and with a great dependence on which exact neurons you pull out...
Should... can't say I've tested it... can't say I know of anyone who's done it, either...

If it's a gray scale, and not a critical mass, then you'd expect to get down to either two neuron or to a single neuron, and this should represent the most basic unit of (very primitive) possible awareness. Does anyone here disagree with this?