Does it make sense to speak of "Universal Consciousness" or "Universal Intelligence"?

[Mudhammam]

Other than misdirection, I'm not clear why people keep bringing physics in to this. Consciousness has only ever been observed/measured/recorded in living creatures with some sort of brain. Fact. That makes this a question for biologists not physicists. Everything else is just misdefinition of terms in an attempt to support supernatural and unfalsifiable speculation.

How the hell you "measure the consciousness"?

That's a circular argument.

Basically the only consciousness you can "measure" is your own, and then you infer that things that appear like you are also conscious. That's the logic.

But the basic problem is this: in what respect?

And nobody knows the answer.

So, your fact is no fact, and to claim it is a fact is a piece of pseudo-science.

Quantum mind is one theory, and it ought to be taken seriusly, as it makes perfect sense. If you ask me, it's the most appealing option, but this my subjective opinion.

Calling quantum theories of consciousness "supernatural" is beyond ridiculous. These models are 100% naturalist, based on, for Christ's sake, an interpretation the best verified scientific theory (QM) in whole human history!

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To clarify: I was saying that the only articles I had read about the evidence in support of the Orch OR model directly cited Hameroff and Penrose basically saying, "See, our theory is right," which I found odd because I would expect an unbiased article to say, "Hameroff and Stuart claim this... while others object, saying it means this..." But none of that was in there. Hameroff and Penrose may have even written the original article, I don't recall, that other sites then simply borrowed from.

I think the articles themselves even included mention of Orch OR in the headline or subtitle.

Ok. I have only read Penrose's Emperor's New Mind and the article I gave the link to and couple of its reviews. So I am no specialist. So I got you somewhat wrong. In any case they base their evidence on some findings in quantum biology concerning photo-synthesis and more directly some research on microtubulars, if I remenber correctly, which falsify the argument based on decoherence.

Personally, I used to believe the theory was an error because of the decoherence argument, but now it seems that I have to reconsider it.

I am not a Believer, and obviously the theory can be false. In any case, I respect it as a good guess.

I read their brief summary of the theory as part of a wider range of contributions in the excellent book "Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem" by Johnathan Shear. I don't reject Orch-OR because honestly, I just don't understand it really. And while Penrose is unquestionably a brilliant physicist, I have my doubts about Hameroff. I don't like that he seems overly enthusiastic about pushing his theory into almost cultist, unscientific territory, such as that of "quantum healing," which I don't think offers any validation to his ideas and somewhat discredits him (in my mind).

[Hegel]

I read their brief summary of the theory as part of a wider range of contributions in the excellent book "Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem" by Johnathan Shear. I don't reject Orch-OR because honestly, I just don't understand it really. And while Penrose is unquestionably a brilliant physicist, I have my doubts about Hameroff. I don't like that he seems overly enthusiastic about pushing his theory into almost cultist, unscientific territory, such as that of "quantum healing," which I don't think offers any validation to his ideas and somewhat discredits him (in my mind).

Yes, it's impossible to appraise that stuff without profound knowledge of QM and neurophysiology. I am not a physicist nor a neuro- physiologist, and all that molecular stuff in particular goes over my head, and the physical ideas I can understand only on a superficial level. My "real" knowledge is limited to the basics of QM and the philosophical ideas behind the various interpretations. So, I have no idea how valid the Penrosean interpretion is; but as he has worked with guys like Stephen Hawkins and as his model is considered respectable by mainstream physicists, it would be a folly to claim it makes no sense. I also share your doubts about Hamerhoff. Obviously he is what is called "an enthusiast". But flirting with new age can only tell that he is only a curious and open-minded person who can perfectly well distinguish hypothesis from fact. It's hard to tell. In any case, even if is a newager, his theory can still be valid. Just think W. Pauli. It's not too uncommon that excellent scientists are "enthusiasts"; actually the aggressively "naturalist" types are seldom on the top of their fields.

[pocaracas]

Philosophy of physics... what an oxymoron...

Yeah ... it's also called the problem of interpretation of QM, something which, among others, Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein, among others, were deeply interested in. What non-sense! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretat..._mechanics

Oh, now you change the terms to mean something else... ok.
You can have the cake...

Let me see is my QM is still up to notch: what do you think this collapse of wave function is? Which wave function?

So you have not understood the very idea of the theory ... Of the Schrödinger equation of the brain state "orhestrated" by the micro-tubular processes.

Do you mind writing down that equation?
Somehow, I don't think that Shrödinger's equation will have what you think it does... but I need to see it, first.

Correlation does not imply causation...
oh well...

Of course it does not.
But I never claimed anything like that; this has nothing to do with anything I said. I showed you made the inductionist fallacy.

You're arguing for a theory that's far... very far... from demonstrated... if it will ever be.
And the major piece of evidence the proponents of the theory have to show is the effect of anesthetics on some structures within the neurons. This is what I mean that correlation does not imply causation: the effect of the anesthetic does not mean that the theory is correct...
But you highly developed "philosophy of physics" brain must have been way ahead of my tiny observation and went right over it... -.-'

Indeed it is far from obvious. Still, it's to be expected that an alteration of the nerve cell should lead to an impairment (or improvement) of the neural impulse emission.

Yeah, but why does it impair the mind to the degree of making it loose consciousness? There is nothing obvious in this, and that ruins your whole point.

All I saw was that it impaired movement of tadpoles...
My reading skillz must be a bit off, I am getting a bit old!

This reminds me of the model of the Solar System, where the Earth is at the center... So many correct p's and yet....

Gosh .Seriously, you should study the basics of philosophy of science if you want to avoid such fallacies as these.
You CAN FALSIFY this theory. That's what Copernicus did, for Christ's sake.

But before Copernicus, no one falsified it... Concerning Penrose's theory we are in the pre-Copernicus era... We'll see how it develops.

Ok, manifestly, we're not there yet, but I see no bright future for this theory... I wish all their proponents well and a breath of nice results, but I anticipate no such thing.

I respect your gifts as a soothsayer.

Thank you. They are quite well developed, however they have utterly failed in guessing the Euromillions numbers!

OH OH OH... like I didn't quote what the damn theorem says.... -.-'

Look, my knowledge is not some parrott-references from Wiki, I UNDERSTAND it. You're talking about a theory you don't understand.

Ok, let me explain. Gödel's incompleteness proof and Turing's solution to the halting problem are analogous applications of the diagonal lemma first applied by Cantor in context of transfinite sets. As applied in context of halting problem, it applies obviously to mind as understood as computer, and the Penrose argument is easy to formulate both in context of Gödel's proof and that of Turing-machines.

Why Penrose first applied it in the context of Gödel-proof , is because he wanted to show that mathematician's mind is not simply algorithmic.

So, if you can't see how this is related to mind and is some sort of wooh wooh, you are simply making a complete jerk of your self.

OK, let me see you wiggle out of this, oh great and high connoisseur of the Turing's solution to the halting problem in Turing machines.
Turing machines are sequential machines, like all computer CPUs up to the 90's. At best, one can claim that current parallel CPUs can do the same as a single CPU, it just takes longer. The brain, it seems, has different areas dedicated to different tasks, meaning that one of those areas could not perform the tasks of the other areas, so it is a parallel machine not reducible to a sequential one.
Thus any analogy between the brain and a Turing machine, like what Penrose is trying to accomplish, is faulty.
The theory fails at the most basic level.... and no one notices, because Penrose has worked with such great minds as Stephen Hawkins... -.-'

I could be wrong, the brain may be reducible to a sequential machine... if that is ever proven, then I'll have to revise my position. Until then, it seems this theory is not the best candidate to solve the problem of consciousness.

Yes, smart argument, yes...
I can't see how Gödel's theorem is related to the mind?... right... because it's not.

Sure. But perhaps you should first understand a little about logic and how logic is related to mind...

Oh ,[fun time] you should meet the female half of the world's population!

So, how does that apply to the physical mind?

It applies to the mind of hard AI which conceives mind as a ******Turing machine!

Ah.... ok.... enjoy that. That's not the problem at hand, remember?

Sometimes, you don't need to understand something completely, to intuit that it maybe BS.

Sure. Like nazis "intuited" relativity was part of Jewish plot.
Ignorance rationalized.

I think this discussion has gone on long enough.

It's starting to feel like I'm arguing with a creationist... A very small amount of papers which made it into reputable publications, always authored by the same people... enjoy!

[Chas]

There is no evidence for dualism, and you have not provided any.

That depends what you mean by evidence. If you mean "something one person can show another to support or prove a point," then I'd say my lack of evidence, and that of 100% of other people as well, IS the evidence. Don't believe me? What are the criteria for establishing that a given physical structure is conscious? What evidence will be accepted? If you dare even to answer, I guarantee you'll define mind in terms of physical correlates, like brain waves or blood flow, and not in terms of qualia.

If one has thus to cheat on a semantic level to fit reality into his model, then the model is insufficient. And that's why physical monism fails.

"We don't yet have an answer" is not equivalent to "It's a failure".

I would accept a physical structure as conscious by its behavior, not by particulars of its structure.

Physical monism is the only theory with any supporting evidence. Nothing else has any at all.

[bennyboy]

"We don't yet have an answer" is not equivalent to "It's a failure".

Unless your system has proven capable of answer a particular category of question, then "We don't YET have an answer" is a statement of faith. There's no YET, because there is no milestone which determines whether science can solve this question. That science has solved some problems is not evidence that it can solve questions like cosmogony or psychogony.

And I didn't say physical monism fails because it hasn't yet explained why mind exists rather than not. I said it fails because talking about mind in a physical monist model requires defining mind as what it is not: chemistry, blood flow, etc. That's not what mind is. Mind is the subjective experience of qualia. The other things are correlates that we have chosen to look for, because we have no good way to determine what structures are/aren't experiencing qualia.

I would accept a physical structure as conscious by its behavior, not by particulars of its structure.

That's right. You have to, because nobody can see or interact directly with a mind, and you don't want to do science about fairies, IPUs, mind, or other intangible things that nobody can even see. The problem is that as mental beings we do in fact know that minds exist. It's not the mind's fault that a particular world view cannot readily adapt to its reality and obvious existence. But you have a problem: some things may behave in ways that make them seem human (or will, very soon, with AI); also, some beings experience which exhibit no noticeable behaviors at all-- some coma patients, for example.

Physical monism is the only theory with any supporting evidence. Nothing else has any at all.

That sounds great until you realize that you are talking about a standard of evidence which requires everything being defined in terms that fit into the theory you are supposedly using the evidence to investigate. That's exactly the definition of "begging the question."

Again, the fact that some things are not well-suited to be obects of scientific study is not their failure. The instistence that they be redefined to "fit in," however, is a failure-- to accept reality. There's irony there, because science is supposed to be a tool for objective inquiry-- not the imposition of philsophical beliefs on direct observgation.

[Cato]

I know a cat that begs to differ 50% of the time.

Are you confusing a thought experiment designed to explain how QM works with an actual macroscopic event?

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Moreover QM solves the binding problem of dualist theories. From both a philosophical and scientific perspective, interactive dualism is the better theory. Just because you don't like the implications doesn't give you grounds for dismissing it.

How does QM solve the binding problem? Again, nobody can use QM to fully explain an electron pair but some want to jump straight to solving the problem of consciousness.

I have no problem with the implications of dualism. I have a problem with the lack of evidence for dualism and the fact that all dualist explanations make the system more complicated. We don't need an out of body mind to explain what we observe. Could there be? Who knows at this point, but evidence suggests no and I don't have to take it seriously until evidence is produced to suggest I should. A few loud adherents is not evidence.

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But how could one in principle even test for consciousness in an entity that has no means of communication with us? Even in the case of the entity that could communicate with us, such as a computer in the Turing test, some would still raise philosophical difficulties with actually being able to determine the nature of its "experience", one example being the "problem of other minds."

Your going to have to explain why this is relevant. We only observe consciousness in a narrow description of existents. Assuming that non-living existents could have consciousness because we can't develop a test for something that is outside our experience is getting close to "what if D-O-G really spelled cat". I think we should figure out how the consciousness we can observe works before trying to determine what tickles a rock.

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That sounds great until you realize that you are talking about a standard of evidence which requires everything being defined in terms that fit into the theory you are supposedly using the evidence to investigate. That's exactly the definition of "begging the question."

Again, the fact that some things are not well-suited to be obects of scientific study is not their failure. The instistence that they be redefined to "fit in," however, is a failure-- to accept reality. There's irony there, because science is supposed to be a tool for objective inquiry-- not the imposition of philsophical beliefs on direct observgation.

It would have been easier to type "I have no evidence". You are free to believe in ghosts if you wish, but until you provide a compelling reason for the rest of us to do so we really don't have to take any of this seriously. You can't just wave your hands and eliminate the need for evidence by stating that we are imposing philosophy on observation. Where's the evidence?

[bennyboy]

It would have been easier to type "I have no evidence". You are free to believe in ghosts if you wish, but until you provide a compelling reason for the rest of us to do so we really don't have to take any of this seriously. You can't just wave your hands and eliminate the need for evidence by stating that we are imposing philosophy on observation. Where's the evidence?

Thank you for effectively reinforcing my point. Since you're such a huge proponent of evidence and an objective scientist of mind, then do me a favor, so that I might learn from your expertise: give me an example of a physical structure which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. Now, tell me what purely physical evidence you are using to arrive at the conclusion that that structure is not a philosophical zombie.

Hint: no fair conflating philosophical assumptions with your evidence. We don't want to inadvertently talk about "ghosts" while we're pretending to be objective.

[Chas]

"We don't yet have an answer" is not equivalent to "It's a failure".

Unless your system has proven capable of answer a particular category of question, then "We don't YET have an answer" is a statement of faith. There's no YET, because there is no milestone which determines whether science can solve this question. That science has solved some problems is not evidence that it can solve questions like cosmogony or psychogony.

And I didn't say physical monism fails because it hasn't yet explained why mind exists rather than not. I said it fails because talking about mind in a physical monist model requires defining mind as what it is not: chemistry, blood flow, etc. That's not what mind is. Mind is the subjective experience of qualia. The other things are correlates that we have chosen to look for, because we have no good way to determine what structures are/aren't experiencing qualia.

You are making unsubstantiated claims when you say what consciousness is not. You don't know this. Is this your statement of faith?

I would accept a physical structure as conscious by its behavior, not by particulars of its structure.

That's right. You have to, because nobody can see or interact directly with a mind, and you don't want to do science about fairies, IPUs, mind, or other intangible things that nobody can even see. The problem is that as mental beings we do in fact know that minds exist. It's not the mind's fault that a particular world view cannot readily adapt to its reality and obvious existence. But you have a problem: some things may behave in ways that make them seem human (or will, very soon, with AI); also, some beings experience which exhibit no noticeable behaviors at all-- some coma patients, for example.

Physical monism is the only theory with any supporting evidence. Nothing else has any at all.

That sounds great until you realize that you are talking about a standard of evidence which requires everything being defined in terms that fit into the theory you are supposedly using the evidence to investigate. That's exactly the definition of "begging the question."

I call bullshit. I have not defined 'evidence' to fit into any theory; without evidence, you've got squat.

Again, the fact that some things are not well-suited to be obects of scientific study is not their failure. The instistence that they be redefined to "fit in," however, is a failure-- to accept reality. There's irony there, because science is supposed to be a tool for objective inquiry-- not the imposition of philsophical beliefs on direct observgation.

You are declaring things out of bounds for science. Is this your faith, again?

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It would have been easier to type "I have no evidence". You are free to believe in ghosts if you wish, but until you provide a compelling reason for the rest of us to do so we really don't have to take any of this seriously. You can't just wave your hands and eliminate the need for evidence by stating that we are imposing philosophy on observation. Where's the evidence?

Thank you for effectively reinforcing my point. Since you're such a huge proponent of evidence and an objective scientist of mind, then do me a favor, so that I might learn from your expertise: give me an example of a physical structure which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. Now, tell me what purely physical evidence you are using to arrive at the conclusion that that structure is not a philosophical zombie.

Hint: no fair conflating philosophical assumptions with your evidence. We don't want to inadvertently talk about "ghosts" while we're pretending to be objective.

You have not shown that qualia are out of the reach of science. Do you think that we've created all of the instruments we ever will? You are no better at predicting the future capabilities of science than an astrologer.

[Cato]

Thank you for effectively reinforcing my point. Since you're such a huge proponent of evidence and an objective scientist of mind, then do me a favor, so that I might learn from your expertise: give me an example of a physical structure which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. Now, tell me what purely physical evidence you are using to arrive at the conclusion that that structure is not a philosophical zombie.

Hint: no fair conflating philosophical assumptions with your evidence. We don't want to inadvertently talk about "ghosts" while we're pretending to be objective.

Give me an example of a non-physical structure which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. In fact, you can't demonstrate a non-physical structure that just seems to. Just one example that supports my position is that my grandfather's experience of the taste of meatloaf disappeared when his brain died, unless you are going to make the argument that his experience is disembodied and floating around in the proverbial ether.

[bennyboy]

You are making unsubstantiated claims when you say what consciousness is not. You don't know this. Is this your statement of faith?

No. It's a definition. When I open my eyes in the morning, I become aware of colors, shapes, etc. as qualia-- the "what it's like." Whether the source of those experiences is a physical universe, the Matrix, or the Mind of God is irrelevant to that definition. Conflating the word for experience with ideas about the source of the experience is unnecessary.

I call bullshit. I have not defined 'evidence' to fit into any theory; without evidence, you've got squat.

Maybe you should define what evidence means to you. What nature of evidence would you consider relevant to the OP, or to the past few posts?

You are declaring things out of bounds for science. Is this your faith, again?

I haven't made any statements of faith, so you are wrong to use the word "again."

Science can mean a lot of things, but I assume we are all in this thread talking about science as it is practiced now: physical observation, hypothesis, and experimentation or other methods of confirming the hypothesis. And-- most importantly-- the ability for others to independently reproduce the observation and confirmation.

Some things are not observable by others. For example, my qualia are real and easily identified-- by me. You, however, cannot ever have access to my "what it's like to drink cocoa" sensations. At best, you can correlate someone's verbal descriptions with physical markers, like blood flow or brain wave measurements. Qualia themselves are therefore outside the sphere of science, because they cannot be observed, directly interacted with, or even confirmed to exist. Correlations between reported qualia and the brain, on the other hand, are within the sphere of science, because verbal descriptions are sharable, as are brain scans. The problem is that people are not careful in distinguishing between the two.

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Give me an example of a non-physical structure which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. In fact, you can't demonstrate a non-physical structure that just seems to.

Neither you nor I can give any example of ANY entity --physical or otherwise-- which actually experiences qualia, rather than just seeming to. The belief that qualia exists outside of my experience cannot be founded in evidence. It can only be rooted in a philosophical assumption.

Just one example that supports my position is that my grandfather's experience of the taste of meatloaf disappeared when his brain died, unless you are going to make the argument that his experience is disembodied and floating around in the proverbial ether.

How do you know your grandfather wasn't a philosophical zombie? You know what words came out of his mouth, the look in his eyes, the way his limbs moved; you might have had access to fMRI or other brain scans. His qualia, if he actually had any, are for you only a matter of philosophical assumption.

Now, let's consider the OP proposition. How would you know whether an atom, or a star, or the galaxy has some kind of awareness-- its own kind of qualia? You can't-- because you never had access to qualia in the first place. An atom won't produce words about meatloaf or have shaky hands, or show any of the physical markers that make you feel justified in making your philosophical assumption about people's minds.

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